John F. Begg, D.D.S. v. Nicole Alexander-Scott, M.D., in her capacity as Director for the State of Rhode Island Department of Health ( 2020 )

December 10, 2020
Supreme Court
No. 2018-155-M.P.
(PC 18-1873)
John F. Begg, D.D.S. :
v. :
Nicole Alexander-Scott, M.D., in her :
capacity as Director for the State of
Rhode Island Department of Health,
et al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any
typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2018-155-M.P.
(PC 18-1873)
John F. Begg, D.D.S. :
v. :
Nicole Alexander-Scott, M.D., in her :
capacity as Director for the State of
Rhode Island Department of Health,
et al.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme
Court on October 8, 2020, pursuant to a writ of certiorari by the appellant, John F.
Begg, D.D.S., who seeks review of an order and judgment of the Superior Court
denying his administrative appeal from a decision of the Rhode Island Department
of Health (DOH) in favor of the appellees, Nicole Alexander-Scott, M.D., in her
capacity as Director of the DOH (Director); the Board of Examiners in Dentistry of
the DOH (Board); and the DOH. Doctor Begg argues that the trial justice erred:
(1) in finding that DOH was vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to pursue the
underlying administrative proceeding in spite of the fact that DOH failed to
comply with statutory notice provisions; (2) in finding that DOH can compel the
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production of confidential patient records without a subpoena; and (3) in affirming
DOH’s suspension of the appellant’s license to practice dentistry for two years,
based on his refusal to produce confidential patient information. For the reasons
stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
The appellant has been licensed to practice dentistry in Rhode Island since
January 1, 1969; during the time period relevant to this case, he maintained a place
of business at Lincoln Dental Associates (Lincoln Dental), located in Lincoln,
Rhode Island. On March 21, 2018, appellant filed a Superior Court complaint and
notice of appeal in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956
§ 42-35-15, challenging a decision and order of the Board concerning his dentistry
practice. The complaint alleged that, in January 2016, Dr. Martin Nager performed
an inspection of the records at Lincoln Dental, which led to the issuance of a two-
count specification of charges against Dr. Begg. Count 1 alleged that Dr. Begg
failed to conform to the minimal standards of acceptable practice in maintaining
his patient records, and Count 2 charged Dr. Begg with failure to furnish the Board
with full and complete information as requested by the Board.
A hearing committee of the Board conducted an evidentiary hearing on
July 12 and October 4, 2017, including the presentation of documentary and
testimonial evidence. The Board issued a written decision and order dated
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February 7, 2018, which detailed the inspection of Dr. Begg’s patient records and
the shortcomings in those records, including missing documents and required
records. The Board imposed sanctions for violations of G.L. 1956 §§ 5-31.1-
10(19), (23), and (24), and §§ 25.1.1, 27.1(s), 27.1(x), and 27.1(w) of DOH’s then-
existing Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Dentists, Dental Hygienists, and
Dental Assistants. Specifically, as to Count 2, the decision directed that Dr.
Begg’s license to practice dentistry be suspended for two years. As to Count 1—
and before his license could be reinstated after the two-year suspension—Dr. Begg
was required to engage in forty hours of continuing education, including twelve
hours focused on record-keeping, the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and treatment planning records. In addition,
he was required to arrange for an outside monitoring service to review his records
for the first year after his reinstatement and to pay for certain costs and expenses
arising out of the administrative proceedings. The Director adopted the decision
and order of the Board in its entirety on February 13, 2018. Doctor Begg filed a
timely appeal.
Before the Superior Court, Dr. Begg alleged the usual grounds for an
administrative appeal: he argued that the decision was (1) in violation of
constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions; (2) in excess of the Board’s and
DOH’s authority; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of
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law; (5) clearly erroneous; and (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse
of discretion. Doctor Begg presented three arguments in support of his appeal.
First, he asserted that “DOH never had subject matter jurisdiction to pursue the
underlying administrative proceeding because it failed to comply with statutorily
mandated inspection and notice protocols” by failing to leave a copy of the
inspector’s report with Dr. Begg prior to leaving Lincoln Dental. Next, appellant
argued that, even if DOH was vested with subject-matter jurisdiction, its decision
was flawed based on myriad reasons, as set forth in his complaint. Finally, he
maintained that the sanctions imposed were “wholly disproportionate to the
technical records keeping violations” with which he was charged.
The appellees argued that the Board’s decision should be upheld because the
Board was vested with subject-matter jurisdiction in accordance with § 5-31.1-11,
and that there was no statutory support for appellant’s argument that the notice
provision created a “condition precedent for regulatory authority and action.” The
appellees also denied that they were required to seek information from Dr. Begg
only by subpoena or patient consent, and they contended that appellant had
misread § 5-31.1-4(6). Lastly, appellees argued that the sanction imposed was
neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of power, and that the Board’s decision
was supported by competent evidence and not affected by error of law.
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The trial justice entertained argument on April 26, 2018; on May 23, 2018,
she delivered a bench decision denying the appeal and affirming the Board’s
decision. In rendering her decision, the trial justice indicated that she had reviewed
the administrative record, particularly the hearing testimony of Dr. Nager; Linda
Esposito, a DOH employee; Richard Beretta, Esq., Dr. Begg’s prior attorney; and
Mary Begg, Dr. Begg’s office manager.
The trial justice summarized the testimony of Dr. Nager, noting that, after
Dr. Nager’s inspection, appellant provided the documents that Dr. Nager had
reported as missing from the patient files, and that Dr. Nager insisted that those
documents were not in the files when he had inspected them.1 She also referenced
the testimony of Ms. Esposito, who, at the direction of the investigative committee,
requested the complete patient records from the files that Dr. Nager had examined
1
The record before us discloses that Dr. Begg, Ms. Begg, and attorney Beretta
were all present at Lincoln Dental during the inspection. Attorney Beretta had
pulled ten patient files for Dr. Nager to review, but Dr. Nager declined to inspect
those files and instead independently asked for the latest twelve or thirteen patient
files to review. Attorney Beretta was present for the inspection and called Ms.
Begg into the room once it began and when Dr. Nager noted the absence of
HIPAA forms. After Dr. Nager concluded his inspection and left Lincoln Dental,
attorney Beretta and Ms. Begg spoke about the missing HIPAA forms and
periodontal charting information, and Ms. Begg began going through the files and
insisted that the items were not missing. Two months later, after appellant
received Dr. Nager’s inspection report, attorney Beretta and Ms. Begg went
through the files and allegedly pulled out and copied the documents that Dr. Nager
reported as missing from the files. At appellant’s insistence, the Board received
these copies—which were compiled by attorney Beretta and Ms. Begg—and
decided to request the full patient files in order to resolve the alleged discrepancies
between Dr. Nager’s report and appellant’s subsequent production, to no avail.
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and attorney Beretta had supplemented. Ms. Esposito testified that such a request
was routinely made by the Board. The trial justice noted that attorney Beretta
subsequently rejected Ms. Esposito’s records request because the Board had not
sought the records by subpoena. She cited Ms. Begg’s testimony that it was only
after Dr. Nager had completed his inspection and left Lincoln Dental that Ms. Begg
located all but one of the missing documents in the patient files and provided that
information to attorney Beretta. The trial justice reviewed the charges issued
against Dr. Begg, the procedural history of the case, the claims of error, and the
standard of review. She then rejected the administrative appeal.
As to the appellant’s contention that the Board was without subject-matter
jurisdiction over this case because appellees failed to follow the allegedly
mandatory inspection and notice provisions set forth in § 5-31.1-11(b)(3), the trial
justice found that, although a report was not left with Dr. Begg on the day of the
inspection, one was provided “in short order.” As such, she found that the “failure
to leave a particular list behind on that day” did not deprive appellees of subject-
matter jurisdiction because the statutory requirement was directory, not mandatory,
and could not result in a loss of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Next, the trial justice addressed appellant’s claim that the decision “was
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantive evidence that was
presented.” First, she found that the Board had “accepted the testimony of Dr.
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Nager” about his inspection—“which they had every right to do”—and that it was
well within the Board’s authority to find that Dr. Begg had violated the relevant
regulatory and statutory provisions in failing to maintain proper patient records.
Turning to the argument that appellant could decline the Board’s request for
the complete patient files in the absence of a subpoena, the trial justice found that,
although § 5-31.1-4 gives the Board subpoena power and “as much as it may be
the better practice” to issue a subpoena, the Board was not required to do so.
Accordingly, she found that Dr. Begg did not “have the authority to refuse” the
Board’s record request and “that there was, in fact, sufficient evidence to support
the finding as it relates to Count 2.”
Finally, as to Dr. Begg’s position that the sanctions levied against him were
arbitrary and capricious, the trial justice acknowledged that the Superior Court
could not “substitute its judgment for what should be an appropriate sanction[,]”
and that the court’s function was to determine whether there was “legally
competent evidence to support an agency’s decision,” including the sanction. She
then went on to acknowledge that “on first blush, th[e sanction] did seem harsh[,]”
but she added that “there were other things going on[,]” including the fact that Dr.
Begg’s files previously had been inspected in 2014 and he was “found to have
deficient recordkeeping[,]” that there had been a complaint from a former
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employee,2 and that he “refused to provide the investigating committee with a
complete set of patient files[.]” The trial justice also noted that Dr. Nager
concluded—as a result of his inspection of Dr. Begg’s patient files—“that there
were twelve files [inspected] and almost all of them had one, if not several,
recordkeeping deficiencies[,]” and that Dr. Begg ultimately “decided to
discontinue cooperating with the investigation.” Accordingly, the trial justice
concluded that Dr. Begg failed to meet his burden of proof on all claims under
§ 42-35-15, and she denied the appeal.
The trial justice granted Dr. Begg’s motion to stay the decision pending
review by this Court. Final judgment entered in favor of appellees. This Court
granted Dr. Begg’s petition for writ of certiorari on November 19, 2018. For the
following reasons, we reject Dr. Begg’s appellate contentions.
Standard of Review
This Court’s review of a judgment of the Superior Court in administrative
proceedings “is limited to questions of law.” Iselin v. Retirement Board of
Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1048 (R.I. 2008)
(quoting Rossi v. Employees’ Retirement System, 895 A.2d 106, 110 (R.I. 2006)).
As such, “questions of law—including statutory interpretation—are reviewed de
2
The record reflects that on May 13, 2015, DOH received a complaint from a
former employee of Dr. Begg, alleging that she voluntarily left her position at
Lincoln Dental in March 2015 due to “unsafe working conditions and safety and
health violations.”
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novo.” City of Pawtucket v. Laprade, 94 A.3d 503, 513 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Iselin,
943 A.2d at 1049). In doing so, “we apply the ‘some’ or ‘any’ evidence test and
review the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to
support the findings.” Endoscopy Associates, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of
Health, 183 A.3d 528, 532 (R.I. 2018) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted) (quoting Sartor v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 542 A.2d
1077, 1083 (R.I. 1988)). This Court does not “weigh the evidence, but rather
determine[s] whether the trial justice was legally justified” in his or her decision.
Id. (quoting Interstate Navigation Co. v. Division of Public Utilities and Carriers,
824 A.2d 1282, 1286 (R.I. 2003)).
Analysis
Before this Court, appellant asserts three claims of error. First, he claims
that DOH lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings
due to its failure to comply with the allegedly mandatory inspection and notice
protocols set forth in § 5-31.1-11. Second, he argues that § 5-31.1-4 requires
appellees to seek confidential patient healthcare information by subpoena and they
may not demand production of such information through informal letter requests.
Finally, he asserts that the sanctions imposed were wholly disproportionate to the
charge and were therefore arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. We
address each of these arguments seriatim.
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A
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
The appellant first asserts that “the Board failed to satisfy the statutory
prerequisites to obtaining subject matter jurisdiction” because it “failed to provide
the statutorily mandated inspection report at the conclusion of inspecting
Dr. Begg’s office[.]” In making this argument, Dr. Begg relies on the language of
§ 5-31.1-11(b)(3), which provides that “[a]t the conclusion of the inspection and
prior to leaving the dental office premises the board inspectors shall provide the
dentist whose office has been inspected with a copy of the completed inspection
form, noting areas of deficiency or follow-up[.]” Doctor Begg argues that because
§ 5-31.1-11(b)(3) uses the word “shall,” and, he contends, the statute “is penal in
nature[,]” compliance is mandatory. According to appellant, because DOH failed
to comply, the Board was divested of subject-matter jurisdiction. We reject this
contention.
It is well settled by this Court that “[a] claim of lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction ‘questions the very power of the court to hear the case.’” Rogers v.
Rogers, 18 A.3d 491, 493 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Pine v. Clark, 636 A.2d 1319, 1321
(R.I. 1994)). However, we have recognized “a distinction between subject-matter
jurisdiction and the authority of the court [or tribunal] to proceed.” Gallop v. Adult
Correctional Institutions, 182 A.3d 1137, 1142 (R.I. 2018). The appellant has
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incorrectly identified the issue in this case as an issue of a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.3
By enacting chapter 31.1 of title 5 of the general laws, the General
Assembly specifically vested jurisdiction in the Board to, inter alia,
“investigate all complaints and charges of unprofessional
conduct against any licensed dentist, * * *
“[t]o appoint one or more dentists * * * to act for the
members of the board in investigating the conduct or
competence of any licensed dentist, * * *
“[and t]o direct the director to revoke, suspend, or impose
other disciplinary action[.]” Sections 5-31.1-4(2), (4), (5).
Thus, contrary to Dr. Begg’s assertions, appellees are charged with the
responsibility of overseeing proceedings stemming from complaints against
licensed dentists, including conducting investigations, reaching factual
conclusions, and imposing appropriate discipline. Section 5-31.1-4. The issue in
this case is not whether the Board is vested with subject-matter jurisdiction over
licensed dentists, but, rather, whether in light of the procedural requirements of
§ 5-31.1-11(b)(3) the Board has the authority to adjudicate the charges levied
against appellant. See Rogers, 18 A.3d at 493 (recognizing that once a tribunal’s
3
At oral argument, counsel for appellant valiantly attempted to reframe the issue
into one of lack of authority to proceed with the prosecution rather than lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction; that is, counsel argued that the failure to comply with
G.L. 1956 § 5-31.1-11(b)(3) deprived DOH of the authority to continue any
disciplinary proceedings. We are of the opinion that the Board was, in this
circumstance, authorized to investigate and adjudicate the charges against
appellant.
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“subject-matter jurisdiction properly has been invoked, it is virtually impossible to
divest the [tribunal] of such jurisdiction”).
In § 5-31.1-11(b)(3), the General Assembly prescribed that, when the Board
undertakes an inspection of a dental office, “[a]t the conclusion of the inspection
and prior to leaving the dental office premises the board inspectors shall provide
the dentist whose office has been inspected with a copy of the completed
inspection form, noting areas of deficiency or follow-up[.]” In determining
whether a particular statutory provision is mandatory or directory in nature, this
Court has “consistently taken the position that the intention of the Legislature
controls[.]” State v. Carcieri, 730 A.2d 11, 15 (R.I. 1999).
Although “use of the word ‘shall’ contemplates something mandatory or the
imposition of a duty[,]” In re Estate of Chelo, 209 A.3d 1181, 1184 (R.I. 2019)
(quoting Castelli v. Carcieri, 961 A.2d 277, 284 (R.I. 2008)), “where the language
[of a statute] is directed at public officers or where the [L]egislature does not
provide a sanction for the failure to meet that requirement,” the statute may be
deemed directory “so long as substantial rights of the parties are not prejudiced.”
Whittemore v. Thompson, 139 A.3d 530, 548 (R.I. 2016); see Cummings v. Shorey,
761 A.2d 680, 685, 686 (R.I. 2000) (finding statute that provided that tax assessors
“shall certify, in writing, to the department of administration * * * when the
[townwide] revaluation is completed” to be directory). Accordingly, where “the
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act is performed but not in the time or in the precise manner directed by the statute,
the provision will not be considered mandatory if the purpose of the statute has
been substantially complied with and no substantial rights have been jeopardized.”
1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 25:3 at 587-88 (7th ed. 2007).
In the case at bar, the plain language of § 5-31.1-11(b)(3), when viewed in
the context of the entire statutory scheme, including the powers and duties
delegated to the Board, leads us to conclude that the requirement to leave a copy of
the inspection form before leaving the dental office is directory. First, the notice
provision is directed at a representative of the state. See West v. McDonald, 18
A.3d 526, 535 (R.I. 2011) (recognizing that statutory provisions aimed at public
officials are often directory because “it is deemed preferable not to prejudice
private rights or the public interest where the fault for delay rests with a public
officer” (quoting Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 23, 118
R.I. 160, 164-65, 372 A.2d 1273, 1275 (1977))). In addition, a public official’s
failure to adhere to the notice provision does not carry a sanction in the statutory
scheme, nor does the notice provision represent the essence of the enactment, but
rather serves as “a guide for the conduct of business and for orderly procedure,
rather than a limitation of power[.]” Singer & Singer, § 25:3 at 584. Finally, no
substantial rights of appellant were prejudiced because, as found by the trial
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justice, Dr. Begg was provided with a copy of the inspection report “in short
order[,]” and his attorney followed up with that report by providing the Board with
additional materials. It is clear that the trial justice did not err in declaring the
language of § 5-31.1-11(b)(3) to be directory rather than mandatory. Accordingly,
although Dr. Nager failed to leave a copy of his inspection report with Dr. Begg
prior to leaving Lincoln Dental, this procedural defect did not deprive appellees of
the authority to investigate and adjudicate the charges against Dr. Begg.
B
Subpoena Requirement
Next, appellant argues that the trial justice erred in affirming the decision
with respect to Count 2 because, he alleges, “DOH failed to legally request
confidential patient documents from Dr. Begg.” Based on our review of the
record, it is clear that the Board did not utilize the subpoena power provided to it
by §§ 5-31.1-4 and 5-31.1-14 in its May 25, 2016 request for the complete patient
records, nor was it required to do so. The May 25, 2016 letter requesting copies of
the entire patient files which Dr. Nager reviewed was precipitated by appellant’s
counsel appearing at DOH on May 4, 2016, with copies of selective documents
allegedly retrieved from those files, including HIPAA forms and periodontal
charting information. These were the very documents Dr. Nager had found to be
missing during his inspection. Clearly, the contents of the patient files reviewed by
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Dr. Nager and the documents provided by appellant’s counsel fall within HIPAA.
However, appellant had no objection to producing those documents favorable to
his defense, and in fact did so voluntarily.
It was not until the Board requested the complete patient files that appellant
objected to producing the records and raised the subpoena requirement as a
protective shield. Thus, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that appellant
was willing to produce those patient files he deemed helpful to him, but declined to
otherwise cooperate with the Board’s investigation and produce the full patient
files. Moreover, appellant’s counsel’s six-page June 21, 2016 response to the
Board’s May 25, 2016 letter manifested an intent to refuse to comply with the
Board’s request even in the face of a subpoena. The response indicated that the
Board had “no valid legal basis” to request the patient files and “lack[ed] authority
to request a second review” of the patient files, and that the request violated both
federal and state law. Nowhere in the response did appellant indicate that he
would acquiesce to the Board’s request if a subpoena was issued. Nevertheless, we
are of the opinion that the Board is not required to utilize its subpoena power to
obtain confidential healthcare records in conducting its investigation.
The Legislature created the Board and vested it with the power to
“investigate all complaints and charges of unprofessional conduct against any
licensed dentist[.]” See § 5-31.1-4(2). In furtherance of this objective, the Board
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and its committees are authorized to “issue subpoenas * * * in connection with any
investigations, hearing, or disciplinary proceedings” to compel production of
documents, written records, and the attendance of witnesses at an investigative
hearing. Section 5-31.1-4(6)(i). As noted by the trial justice, while it may have
been preferable for the Board to have issued a subpoena in the present case, there
is nothing in the statutory scheme that requires it to do so. Accordingly, based on
the clear and unambiguous language of § 5-31.1-4, the Board could compel
appellant to produce patient records with a subpoena, but it was not required to do
so.
By establishing the Board and authorizing it to investigate and adjudicate
charges of unprofessional conduct against dentists, “the Legislature manifested a
desire to improve the quality of health-care services rendered in this state and to
maintain a standard of professional ethics.” In re Board of Medical Review
Investigation, 463 A.2d 1373, 1376 (R.I. 1983) (discussing the Board of Medical
Review, which is now referred to as the Rhode Island Board of Medical Licensure
and Discipline). When a medical review board undertakes an investigation, “it
seems apparent that the injury to society’s interest in probity within the medical
profession is much greater than the injury done to the patient’s interest in the
privacy of his [or her] medical records.” Id.- 16 -
The significance of the Board’s investigatory powers is also recognized in
the Confidentiality of Health Care Communications and Information Act, G.L.
1956 chapter 37.3 of title 5, which specifically provides that “[n]o consent for
release or transfer of confidential healthcare information shall be required” to
disclose patient information to the Board. Section 5-37.3-4(b)(2). As such, based
on the plain language of the statutory scheme and the overall legislative policy, we
find that the trial justice did not err in finding that appellees were not required to
subpoena the records from Dr. Begg. The Board made a reasonable request for the
full patient files after appellant had produced the very records he claimed were
privileged, and the Board was not required by statute or otherwise to subpoena the
records.
C
Sanctions
Finally, Dr. Begg submits that the two-year suspension of his license and the
mandate that he pay the cost of a monitoring service and submit quarterly reports
for the violation of § 5-31.1-10(23) in Count 2 was an abuse of discretion.
Specifically, Dr. Begg maintains that the “sanctions levied upon [him] by the DOH
are patently extreme, arbitrary and capricious.” In support of this contention, Dr.
Begg relies on the fact that DOH has never “revoked a dentist’s license for record
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keeping and production issues[,]” and that “such a harsh penalty” must be reserved
for the most extreme cases. We disagree.
In accordance with § 5-31.1-17, if a licensee “is found guilty of
unprofessional conduct as defined in § 5-31.1-10, the director, at the direction of
the board, shall impose one or more of the [enumerated] conditions[.]” Among
other sanctions, the Board is authorized to “[s]uspend, limit, or restrict his or her
license * * * to practice dentistry[.]” Section 5-31.1-17(2).4
It is undoubtedly within the Board’s power to suspend and limit the practice
of dentistry in an appropriate case. This is one such case. Doctor Begg is not a
stranger to DOH. We are satisfied that the Board relied upon competent evidence
to support its decision to suspend Dr. Begg’s license for two years and to require
him to pay for a monitoring service and submit quarterly reports. Specifically, in
crafting the sanctions, the Board considered Dr. Begg’s “own disciplinary history
and the severity of his violations as well as what would be an effective and
appropriate sanction.” The Board observed that Dr. Begg’s record-keeping was
found to be deficient both in 2014 and in 2016, and that he refused to furnish the
Board with information it had legally requested. The Board noted that the refusal
4
The Board also is authorized to require the licensee “to serve a period of
probation subject to certain conditions and requirements,” G.L. 1956 § 5-31.1-
17(3), or to “[r]equire him or her to practice under the direction of” another dentist
for a period of time. Section 5-31.1-17(7).
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was “very serious[,]” because “[s]uch action by a licensee serves to thwart a
statutory and regulatory investigation” and “inhibits and prevents the investigating
committee from doing what it is charged to do[.]” Accordingly, based on the
record before us, we conclude that legally competent evidence exists to support the
sanctions imposed by the Board.
Conclusion
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. The papers may be
remanded to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
John Begg, D.D.S. v. Nicole Alexander-Scott, M.D.,
Title of Case in her capacity as Director for the State of Rhode
Island Department of Health, et al.
No. 2018-155-M.P.
Case Number
(PC 18-1873)
Date Opinion Filed December 10, 2020
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough
For Appellant:
Jackson C. Parmenter, Esq.
Joelle C. Rocha, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
Michael Resnick, Esq.
For Appellees:
Joseph K. Alston, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)