James Lacera v. Department of Children, Youth, and Families ( 2022 )

April 27, 2022
Supreme Court
No. 2021-193-Appeal.
(P 20-4616M)
James Lacera :
v. :
Department of Children, Youth, and :
Families.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2021-193-Appeal.
(P 20-4616M)
James Lacera :
v. :
Department of Children, Youth, and :
Families.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Long, for the Court. The plaintiff, James Lacera (plaintiff or Mr.
Lacera), appeals from a final order of the Family Court dismissing his verified
miscellaneous petition for declaratory judgment. This case came before the Supreme
Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the
parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that
cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided without further
briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order
of the Family Court.
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Facts and Procedural History
This action for declaratory judgment stems from an investigation by the
defendant, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families, into the maltreatment
of Mr. Lacera’s biological grandchild, whom we refer to as “ML” to protect the
child’s privacy. The Family Court dismissed the case brought by Mr. Lacera on the
pleadings; therefore, we rely on the facts alleged in Mr. Lacera’s petition and accept
them as true. E.g., Warfel v. Town of New Shoreham, 178 A.3d 988, 991 (R.I. 2018).
We also take judicial notice of the parallel proceedings in the Family Court involving
DCYF’s petition for termination of parental rights and the subsequent adoption of
ML.1 See Doe v. Brown University, 253 A.3d 389, 395 (R.I. 2021).
ML was placed in DCYF custody upon allegations of abuse and neglect
against his parents. DCYF subsequently placed ML with a nonrelative foster family.
Mr. Lacera commenced efforts to obtain placement of his grandchild through
meetings with the assigned DCYF case workers; visits with ML; attempts to appear
at court hearings, with counsel; and informal efforts to intervene in Family Court
proceedings involving ML. Most notably, Mr. Lacera’s efforts included appearing
in person and with representation before a justice of the Family Court at a bench
conference to request leave to intervene in one or more of the DCYF proceedings
1
We note that Mr. Lacera does not as a factual matter dispute the final dispositions
in those proceedings.
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involving his son, who is ML’s father. The Family Court denied Mr. Lacera
permission to do so. Mr. Lacera acknowledged at arguments before this Court that
he did not attempt to intervene or obtain a denial from the Family Court from which
he could appeal, nor did he enter an appearance, file any other motion, or place
anything on the record.
Mr. Lacera maintained in his petition that, throughout this process, he was
eligible to adopt ML, and he expressed an unwavering desire to obtain placement of
ML. Moreover, Mr. Lacera has maintained that DCYF never formally excluded him
as a fit and willing relative for placement of ML.
However, on October 7, 2020, the Family Court terminated Mr. Lacera’s son’s
parental rights to ML.
On October 28, 2020, Mr. Lacera filed the present petition for declaratory
judgment against DCYF in the Family Court. Mr. Lacera sought declarations that
(1) DCYF violated its statutory obligations under G.L. 1956 § 14-1-27(c) by not
considering Mr. Lacera as a fit and willing relative for placement of ML; (2) DCYF
never formally denied Mr. Lacera’s request for placement of ML; (3) DCYF violated
its statutory obligations by not placing ML with Mr. Lacera, a fit and willing relative;
(4) Mr. Lacera had priority status for the adoption of ML as he would have had if
DCYF had granted him placement of ML initially; (5) DCYF violated its statutory
obligations by not recruiting Mr. Lacera as an adoptive party for ML; (6) DCYF was
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required to evaluate and consider Mr. Lacera as a party to adopt ML; (7) it was in
the best interest of ML to be adopted by a suitable blood relative over an unrelated
party; and (8) Mr. Lacera was entitled to any further relief the Family Court deemed
proper. On that same date, Mr. Lacera sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to stay any adoption proceedings related to ML; the trial
justice denied his motion.
On October 30, 2020, DCYF moved to dismiss the petition and opposed Mr.
Lacera’s motion for preliminary injunction, arguing that DCYF’s petition to
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Lacera’s son had been granted and a final
decision entered.
A hearing on Mr. Lacera’s declaratory-judgment petition was initially
scheduled for February 2021. On November 20, 2020, Mr. Lacera moved to
expedite the matter, alleging that the adoption of ML by the foster family was
imminent and scheduled for December 4, 2020. The trial justice denied the motion
to expedite on an emergency basis, indicating that December 4, 2020, was not the
adoption date; that the instant matter was scheduled for February 5, 2021; and that
plaintiff was required to notify all parties involved.
On December 9, 2020, ML’s foster family finalized their adoption of ML.
Mr. Lacera’s declaratory-judgment action was continued from February
through May 2021. Finally, on June 18, 2021, a trial justice convened the parties for
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argument and to render a final decision. In addition to maintaining that the Family
Court had terminated the parental rights of Mr. Lacera’s son, DCYF also argued that
the trial justice could not reach behind the then-finalized adoption of ML. The trial
justice granted DCYF’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Family
Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure after finding that Mr. Lacera lacked
standing to maintain the petition and that there was no legal basis for him to obtain
what was tantamount to the reversal of an adoption. An order dismissing the petition
entered, and Mr. Lacera timely appealed.
Mr. Lacera maintains before this Court that he had standing to seek
declaratory relief because he sought resolution of a justiciable controversy in which
he maintained a personal stake.
Discussion
“In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, this Court applies the same
standard as the hearing justice.” Warfel, 178 A.3d at 991 (alterations omitted)
(quoting Audette v. Poulin, 127 A.3d 908, 911 (R.I. 2015)). We assume the
allegations in the petition are true and view the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Id. A Rule 12(b)(6) analysis “requires a resolution of the overarching
issue of justiciability[.]” Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259, 270 (R.I. 2012).
Moreover, we review such questions of law de novo. See N & M Properties, LLC v.
Town of West Warwick ex rel. Moore, 964 A.2d 1141, 1144 (R.I. 2009).
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Declaratory-judgment proceedings are novel statutory proceedings that
facilitate the termination of controversies and allow the trial court “to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”
N & M Properties, LLC, 964 A.2d at 1144 (quoting G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1); see
Northern Trust Co. v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Westerly, 899 A.2d 517,
520 n.6 (R.I. 2006) (mem.); Bradford Associates v. Rhode Island Division of
Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I. 2001). The decision to grant or deny declaratory
relief is purely discretionary. E.g., Providence Teachers Union v. Napolitano, 690
A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1997). However, declaratory-judgment actions still require the
trial justice to resolve issues of justiciability. N & M Properties, LLC, 964 A.2d at
1144-45. “The constituent parts of a justiciable claim include a plaintiff who has
standing to pursue the action and some legal hypothesis which will entitle the
plaintiff to real and articulable relief.” Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I.
2008) (quoting McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 226 (R.I. 2005)).
A plaintiff has standing where that plaintiff has alleged “injury in fact,
economic or otherwise.” Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317 (brackets omitted) (quoting Rhode
Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 22, 317 A.2d 124, 128
(1974)). The injury must involve a “legally cognizable and protectable interest[,]”
id., that is “concrete and particularized[.]” Id. (quoting Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699
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A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997)). In short, the plaintiff must allege a “personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy[.]” Id. (quoting McKenna, 874 A.2d at 225).
In his petition, Mr. Lacera asserted that he had statutory priority for placement
and adoption of ML pursuant to § 14-1-27(c), which provides, in pertinent part:
“When DCYF makes application to the court to take a
child into temporary custody due to allegations of abuse
and/or neglect or dependency, DCYF shall have the duty
to investigate the possibility of placing the child or
children with a fit and willing relative not residing with the
parents. DCYF shall conduct an assessment into the
appropriateness of placement of the child or children with
the relative within thirty (30) days of the child’s placement
in the temporary custody of DCYF. If the department
determines that the relative is a fit and proper person to
have placement of the child, the child shall be placed with
that relative, unless the particular needs of the child make
the placement contrary to the child’s best interests. All
placements with relatives shall be subject to criminal
records checks * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Lacera conceded at oral arguments before this Court that any such
declaration—in light of the fact that ML’s adoption has been formalized—would be
a Pyrrhic victory but nevertheless an important declaration that he was wronged by
DCYF’s actions over the past three years.
We acknowledge the statutory rights contained in § 14-1-27. We are
constrained, however, to conclude that those rights were divested when the Family
Court terminated the parental rights of Mr. Lacera’s son on October 7, 2020. See
G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7 (the termination of parental rights “terminate[s] any and all legal
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rights of the parent to the child”) (emphasis added). A termination of parental rights
is “drastic and irreversible[,]” In re Manuel P., 252 A.3d 1211, 1218 (R.I. 2021)
(quoting In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d 1040, 1051 (R.I. 2020)), and far-reaching.
Mr. Lacera’s legal status as grandparent to ML stemmed solely from the legal
status of Mr. Lacera’s son as ML’s father. See Suster v. Arkansas Department of
Human Services, 858 S.W.2d 122, 124-25 (Ark. 1993) (holding that a grandparent
did not have standing to intervene in pending proceedings because the grandparent’s
rights under a grandparent visitation statute were derivative of the parent’s rights
and were accordingly extinguished when a termination of parental rights was
effected against the parent from whom the grandparent’s rights derived); In re
Interest of Ditter, 326 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Neb. 1982) (holding that paternal
grandparents’ rights to statutory visitation were divested when the father’s parental
rights were terminated and that, therefore, the grandparents did not have standing to
maintain an action for visitation); In re Kristy L., 787 A.2d 679, 683, 685-86 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that grandparents did not have standing to bring a habeas
action to obtain custody of their biological grandchild because the grandparents’
rights were derivative of the parent’s rights, which were terminated); cf. In re
Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359, 1360 (R.I. 1983) (holding that the termination of a father’s
rights via an adoption was conclusive upon the legal rights of “all who might claim
by, through, or under” the father, including extinguishing visitation rights of the
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paternal grandfather under Rhode Island’s grandparents’ visitation statute). Contra
Puleo v. Forgue, 610 A.2d 124, 125-26 (R.I. 1992) (holding in the context of an
adoption that the adoption did not affect or limit a pre-existing grant of visitation
under the grandparents’ visitation statute without further action by the court).
Therefore, once Mr. Lacera’s son no longer retained his legal status as ML’s father,
Mr. Lacera no longer had a “legally cognizable and protectable interest” under
§ 14-1-27(c). Bowen, 945 A.2d at 317. Accordingly, Mr. Lacera did not have
standing to seek adjudication of his rights to ML when he filed the petition in the
Family Court on October 28, 2020.
We reject as disingenuous, however, DCYF’s argument both before the
Family Court in the first instance and before this Court on appeal that, because the
adoption of ML was finalized, the case was moot. In the Family Court, DCYF
opposed the resolution of Mr. Lacera’s petition prior to finalization of the adoption
proceedings by moving to dismiss and opposing Mr. Lacera’s motion for injunctive
relief to stay the adoption proceedings; DCYF then argued that the petition was moot
due to the subsequent adoption—an insincere position. DCYF is the sole authority
in the State of Rhode Island designated to provide comprehensive social services for
children and their families, G.L. 1956 § 42-72-2(5), and we are troubled by its stance
in this case.
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We remind DCYF that its work implicates and may even irreparably
extinguish solemn constitutional and statutory rights, and all agency actions inside
and outside the courts should reflect the grave nature of the department’s task. E.g.,
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) (“When the State initiates a parental
rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe [a] fundamental liberty
interest, but to end it.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The integrity
of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Ninth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Family Court and remand
the record.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
James Lacera v. Department of Children, Youth, and
Title of Case
Families.
No. 2021-193-Appeal.
Case Number
(P 20-4616M)
Date Opinion Filed April 27, 2022
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long
Source of Appeal Providence County Family Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Merola
For Plaintiff:
Patrick F. Dowling, Jr., Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendant:
Benjamin Copple
Department of Children, Youth, and Families
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)