In the Matter of William D. Rhoad , 411 S.C. 236 ( 2015 )


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  •                    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Supreme Court
    In the Matter of William D. Rhoad, IV, Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2014-002478
    Opinion No. 27482
    Submitted December 1, 2014 – Filed January 21, 2015
    PUBLIC REPRIMAND
    Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Ericka M.
    Williams, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of
    Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
    William D. Rhoad, IV, Esquire, of Bamberg, pro se.
    PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplinary
    Counsel and respondent have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent
    (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
    Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
    Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to
    the imposition of a confidential admonition or public reprimand with conditions.
    We accept the Agreement and issue a public reprimand with conditions as stated
    hereafter in this opinion. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows.
    Facts
    Matter I
    Client A retained respondent to represent him in a case against an insurance
    company. Respondent was also retained to represent Client A's wife in a personal
    injury case. Respondent failed to keep Client A and his wife reasonably informed
    regarding the status of their cases. When Client A and his wife became dissatisfied
    with respondent's services, they terminated respondent's representation and
    requested a return of their files.
    Respondent has not returned the files to Client A or his wife. Respondent asserts
    that the files have not been returned because, in spite of his best efforts and the
    efforts of his staff, neither the file for Client A nor his wife can be located.
    Matter II
    Complainant B retained respondent for representation in a slip and fall case. On
    behalf of Complainant B, respondent signed a consent motion to strike the case
    from the active court docket pursuant to Rule 40(j), SCRCP. The consent order to
    strike the case was signed by the trial judge on October 30, 2008. At respondent's
    request, opposing counsel consented to and signed a consent order to restore the
    case to the active docket just prior to the expiration of the one year deadline.
    Respondent failed to file the consent order and the case was not restored within the
    one year period. Complainant B's case eventually settled for far less than the
    original offer of settlement.
    Matter III
    Respondent represented Client C in a domestic matter. A final hearing was held in
    Family Court on February 4, 2013. Respondent was instructed by the Family
    Court judge to prepare the divorce decree. On June 25, 2013, the Clerk of Court
    sent a notice to respondent and opposing counsel notifying them that the case was
    more than 365 days old and would be dismissed if a request for a final hearing was
    not made within thirty days. Respondent did not advise the Clerk of Court or the
    Family Court that a final hearing had been held in February and respondent did not
    submit a final order to the judge as instructed. An order of dismissal was signed by
    the Chief Administrative Judge on July 31, 2013. Client A learned of the dismissal
    when she attempted to get a copy of her divorce decree from the Clerk of Court's
    office.
    Respondent represented Client D in a domestic matter. A final hearing was
    scheduled in Family Court for October 22, 2013. Client D appeared for the
    hearing, but respondent failed to appear despite notice of the hearing from the
    Court, the scheduling clerk, and email correspondence from opposing counsel.
    Client D proceeded with the hearing pro se. At the conclusion of the hearing,
    Client D informed the Family Court that he was unable to make contact with
    respondent and his telephone messages to respondent had not been returned.
    Respondent acknowledges that he was notified of the correct date and time for the
    hearing but mistakenly believed the hearing was scheduled for 2:00 in the
    afternoon, instead of the correct time in the morning.
    On October 29, 2013, the Notice of Investigation was mailed to respondent
    requesting a response within fifteen days. When no response was received, ODC
    sent respondent a letter by certified mail on December 2, 2013, reminding
    respondent of his obligation to respond and citing In the Matter of Treacy, 
    277 S.C. 514
    , 
    290 S.E.2d 240
    (1982). Respondent's response was received on December 3,
    2013.
    Law
    Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of
    the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.1 (lawyer shall
    provide competent representation to client); Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with
    reasonable diligence and promptness in representing client); Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall
    keep client reasonably informed about status of matter and promptly comply with
    reasonable requests for information); Rule 1.16(c) (lawyer must comply with
    applicable law requiring notice to or permission of tribunal when terminating a
    representation); Rule 1.16(d) (upon termination of representation, lawyer shall take
    steps as reasonably practicable to protect client's interests such as surrendering
    papers to which client entitled); Rule 3.4(c) (lawyer shall not knowingly disobey
    obligation under rules of tribunal); Rule 8.1(b) (lawyer shall not knowingly fail to
    respond to lawful demand for information from disciplinary authority); Rule 8.4(a)
    (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct);
    and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct
    prejudicial to administration of justice).
    Respondent also admits he has violated the following Rules for Lawyer
    Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for
    discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct).
    Conclusion
    We find respondent's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.1 Accordingly, we
    accept the Agreement and publicly reprimand respondent for his misconduct.
    1
    Respondent's disciplinary history includes a deferred disciplinary agreement in
    2011 which cites some of the same Rules of Professional Conduct contained in the
    In addition, respondent shall pay the costs incurred in the investigation and
    prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the
    Commission) within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion. Further, he shall
    complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School within nine (9)
    months of the date of his opinion and provide certification of completion of the
    program to the Commission no later than ten (10) days after the conclusion of the
    program.
    PUBLIC REPRIMAND.
    TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ.,
    concur.
    current Agreement. In the Matter of Toney, 
    396 S.C. 303
    , 
    721 S.E.2d 437
    (2012)
    (Court can consider prior deferred disciplinary agreement involving similar
    misconduct in concluding lawyer's disciplinary history demonstrates pattern of
    misconduct).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 27482

Citation Numbers: 411 S.C. 236, 768 S.E.2d 220

Filed Date: 1/21/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023