In the Matter of Paul Winford Owen, Jr. , 417 S.C. 85 ( 2016 )


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  •                    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Supreme Court
    In the Matter of Paul Winford Owen, Jr., Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2016-001060
    Opinion No. 27650
    Submitted June 23, 2016 – Filed July 20, 2016
    PUBLIC REPRIMAND
    Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and William
    C. Campbell, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of
    Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
    John P. Freeman, Esquire, of Columbia, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office
    of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent
    (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
    Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
    Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to
    the imposition of an admonition or public reprimand with conditions. We accept
    the Agreement and issue a public reprimand with conditions as set forth hereafter
    in this opinion. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows.
    Facts
    By order dated October 27, 2015, respondent was sanctioned by the Honorable
    David R. Duncan, a judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
    South Carolina, and assessed a fine of $5,000.00. The sanction arose out of
    respondent's conduct in a bankruptcy court hearing held on August 25, 2015. At
    the time of the hearing, the parties were in binding arbitration and respondent's
    arguments were still under consideration by the arbitrator. Nevertheless, during
    the bankruptcy hearing, respondent made arguments based on the United States
    Supreme Court decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, 574 U.S. ___,
    
    135 S.Ct. 790
    , 
    190 L.Ed.2d 650
     (2015). Respondent admits the arbitration
    proceeding was the sole forum before which to raise his argument under Jesinoski
    and that he should not have presented the Jesinoski argument to the bankruptcy
    court. As a result of respondent's conduct, the bankruptcy court and opposing
    party were required to endure a proceeding which was groundless.
    Further, respondent admits that, at the hearing, he told Judge Duncan he was
    proceeding at the direction of the Bankruptcy Trustee when, in actuality, he was
    responsible for the argument. Respondent later wrote a letter to Judge Duncan in
    which he called attention to his misstatement and apologized to all concerned.
    Respondent acknowledges the Court deserves no less than complete, candid
    disclosures which are truthful at the time they are made. He agrees his
    misstatement regarding the Bankruptcy Trustee was not excused by his corrective
    disclosure in his letter to the bankruptcy court.
    Law
    Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of
    the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.1 (lawyer shall
    provide competent representation); Rule 3.1 (lawyer shall not bring or defend
    proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is basis in law and
    fact for doing so that is not frivolous); Rule 3.3 (lawyer shall not knowingly make
    false statement of fact to tribunal); Rule 3.4 (lawyer shall not knowingly disobey
    obligation under rules of tribunal); 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer
    to violate Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(d) (lawyer shall not engage in
    conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e)
    (lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).
    Respondent also admits he has violated the following Rules for Lawyer
    Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for
    discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct).
    Conclusion
    We find respondent's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.1 Accordingly, we
    accept the Agreement and publicly reprimand respondent for his misconduct.
    Within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall pay the costs
    incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the
    Commission on Lawyer Conduct (Commission). Within six (6) months of the date
    of this opinion, respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program
    Ethics School and shall provide proof of completion of the program to the
    Commission no later than ten (10) days after the program has concluded.
    PUBLIC REPRIMAND.
    PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
    1
    Respondent's disciplinary history includes an admonition issued in 2007. See
    Rule 7(b)(4), RLDE (admonition may be used in subsequent proceeding as
    evidence of prior misconduct solely upon issue of sanction). Further, in 2005, he
    entered into a deferred disciplinary agreement which cites some of the Rules of
    Professional Conduct respondent admits violating in the current matter. See In the
    Matter of Toney, 
    396 S.C. 303
    , 
    721 S.E.2d 437
     (2012) (Court can consider prior
    deferred disciplinary agreement involving similar misconduct in concluding
    lawyer's disciplinary history demonstrates pattern of misconduct).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 27650

Citation Numbers: 417 S.C. 85

Filed Date: 7/20/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023