State v. Patterson ( 1990 )

Chandler, Justice;

In 1985, Appellant Raymond Patterson (Patterson) was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing. State v. Patterson, 290 S.C. 523, 351 S.E. (2d) 853 (1986). Patterson was resentenced to death and we affirmed. State v. Patterson, 299 S.C. 280, 384 S.E. (2d) 699 (1989).

On January 9, 1990, 110 S. Ct. 709, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded to this Court for further consideration in light of Griffith v. Kentucky,¹ which held that Batson v. Kentucky² applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal or not yet final.³

ISSUE

The sole issue is whether a Batson violation occurred during Patterson’s 1985 trial.

DISCUSSION/FACTS

Batson holds that the State may not exercise peremptory jury strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Upon a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a racially neutral reason for the challenge. 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723, 90 L. Ed. (2d) at 88. The Trial Court must then determine whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. “Since the trial judge’s findings ... largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.” 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21, 106 S. Ct. at 1724, n. 21, 90 L. Ed. (2d) at 89, n. 21. (Citation omitted.)

Patterson is black. The State exercised a peremptory challenge to strike the only black juror qualified, Emiline Leaphart. The Solicitor explained that he had placed Leaphart in the same category as a white juror, Susan Smith Enlow, who was also struck. He noted that black law enforcement officers participating in jury selection agreed that Leaphart should be struck. Patterson’s trial counsel admitted that Leaphart was a juror favorable to the defendant, irrespective of color; the Trial Judge remarked that “she was somewhat of a weak juror____I believe the State would have stricken a juror of that type had they been white or black.”

Patterson nevertheless maintains that the State’s articulated reason was pretext, in that Juror Leaphart expressed less reticence to impose the death penalty than did Juror Enlow.

Admittedly, Juror Enlow’s voir dire testimony reveals a reluctance to impose a death sentence. However, she stated there was no reason she could not vote for the death penalty and could do so if the facts warranted. Although Juror Leap-hart maintained no opposition toward capital punishment, her voir dire responses vacillated. When asked whether, after hearing evidence justifying the death penalty, she could impose such a sentence, she stated “I still would have to wait.”

In two recent decisions, we addressed alleged Batson violations in which the defendant contended the State’s articulated reason for a jury strike was pretext.

In State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E. (2d) 891 (1989), the State’s reason for striking three black females was that each had been a patient of a doctor who was to be a witness at trial. We found the stated reason racially neutral; however, when the Solicitor seated a white juror who had also been treated by the same physician, he flawed the very criterion upon which the black jurors were struck.

Contrasted with the obvious, conspicuous Batson violation in Oglesby are the facts controlling our recent decision in State v. Woodruff, 300 S.C. 265, 387 S.E. (2d) 453 (1989). There, we recognized the often subjective nature of juror voir dire responses in capital cases, and the dilemma facing solicitors who must select jurors willing to impose the death sentence under appropriate circumstances.

The citizen-juror in capital cases, confronted with being a participant in the sentencing to death of a human being, comes face to face with a decision both awesome and agonizing. An individual juror’s voir dire responses may vacillate between extreme opposition to the death penalty, on the one hand, and willingness to impose it, on the other.

In Woodruff, we stated:

Given the severity of capital punishment, coupled with the searching voir dire interrogation pursued by solicitors and defense counsel, it is understandable that juror responses regarding the death penalty are frequently marked by inconsistency and vacillation. We hold that, under such circumstances, the solicitor may view the entirety of a juror’s voir dire responses in determining whether to accept or reject a prospective juror. Where, as here, the responses are susceptible of more than one conclusion, we decline to substitute our own opinion for that of the Solicitor.

300 S.C. 267, 387 S.E. (2d) at 454.

We reaffirm Woodruff and emphasize the distinction between the objectively discernable violation in Oglesby versus the decision of a Solicitor to strike a juror based upon his interpretation of that juror’s subjective responses.

Here, the Solicitor’s rationale for striking Juror Leaphart is supported by the record and its reasonable inferences. Accordingly, there was no Batson violation.

Affirmed.

Gregory, C.J., and Harwell and Toal, JJ., concur. Finney, J., dissents in separate opinion.

1 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708 93 L. Ed. (2d) 649 (1987).

2 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 69 (1986).

3 Batson was decided April 30, 1986. Patterson’s direct appeal was decided December 29, 1986.