State v. Herndon ( 2020 )


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  •                   THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Supreme Court
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Robin Renee Herndon, Petitioner.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-000467
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
    Appeal from Aiken County
    DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge
    Opinion No. 27986
    Heard February 12, 2020 – Filed July 1, 2020
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
    Petitioner.
    Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney
    General William F. Schumacher IV, both of Columbia;
    and Eleventh Circuit Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard III, of
    Lexington, for Respondent.
    JUSTICE KITTREDGE: In 2013, this Court held that in a criminal prosecution
    that includes circumstantial evidence:
    [T]rial courts should provide the following language as a
    circumstantial evidence charge, in addition to a proper reasonable
    doubt instruction, when so requested by a defendant:
    There are two types of evidence which are generally
    presented during a trial—direct evidence and
    circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence directly proves
    the existence of a fact and does not require deduction.
    Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and
    circumstances indicating the existence of a fact.
    Crimes may be proven by circumstantial evidence. The
    law makes no distinction between the weight or value to
    be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence,
    however, to the extent the State relies on circumstantial
    evidence, . . . the circumstances must be consistent with
    each other, and when taken together, point conclusively
    to the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.[1]
    If these circumstances merely portray the defendant's
    behavior as suspicious, the proof has failed.
    The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden rests with the
    State regardless of whether the State relies on direct
    evidence, circumstantial evidence, or some combination
    of the two.
    State v. Logan, 
    405 S.C. 83
    , 99, 
    747 S.E.2d 444
    , 452 (2013).
    1
    Originally, this sentence stated that "all of the circumstances must be consistent
    with each other," but we hereby modify the Logan charge by deleting the two
    italicized words. We make this change because we are concerned the phrase "all of
    the circumstances" could be construed to invade the fact-finding role of the jury. It
    should be left to the jury—aided by arguments of the lawyers—to determine
    whether a conflict between circumstances is sufficiently significant to give rise to
    reasonable doubt.
    Following the Logan decision, Petitioner Robin Herndon, who was then a law
    enforcement officer, shot and killed her live-in boyfriend, Christopher Rowley (the
    victim), allegedly in self-defense. Petitioner was tried for murder; the case against
    Petitioner was largely circumstantial. Petitioner requested the Logan
    circumstantial evidence charge, but the trial court refused, opting instead for the
    pre-Logan circumstantial evidence charge.
    Petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, there has been no
    contention that the trial court properly refused to give the Logan charge. Instead,
    the State contends the erroneous failure to give the Logan charge was harmless, for
    the jury instructions as a whole were substantially correct. The court of appeals
    summarily accepted the State's argument and affirmed. State v. Herndon, Op. No.
    2018-UP-458 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Dec. 12, 2018). We granted Petitioner's petition
    for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. We now reverse and
    remand for a new trial.
    I.
    The victim was prone to severe mood swings, aggression, and uncontrolled anger,
    and he admitted to his physician that he physically abused Petitioner.2 He was
    diagnosed with bipolar disorder and placed on medication.
    On the day of the incident, the victim was not taking his medication and was
    behaving in an aggressive manner, which led to an argument between Petitioner
    and the victim. Several neighbors witnessed the beginning of the argument, when
    the victim confronted Petitioner in their front yard. The argument moved inside
    the residence out of view of the neighbors. According to Petitioner, after they
    retreated into the residence, the victim repeatedly punched her, and she drew her
    service weapon and warned the victim to leave. Petitioner testified the victim then
    charged at her, swatting at the gun. The gun discharged,3 striking and killing the
    2
    The record contains compelling evidence of the victim's physical abuse of
    Petitioner aside from his own admission. As a law enforcement officer, Petitioner
    worked in the domestic violence unit, dealing extensively with battered women.
    According to her testimony at trial, her work history caused her to become deeply
    ashamed when she became a domestic violence victim herself. As a result, despite
    the contemporaneous physical evidence of abuse that was apparent to others,
    Petitioner refused to confirm she was in an abusive relationship until after the
    victim's death.
    3
    Petitioner's theory of the case was that she acted in self-defense, or, in the
    victim.
    An autopsy of the victim did not definitively determine how the fatal injury
    occurred. The pathologist concluded the trajectory of the bullet was equally
    consistent with at least two scenarios: (1) Petitioner shooting the victim as he
    walked up the steps of the house, or (2) the victim charging toward Petitioner when
    he was shot. The State elected to charge Petitioner with murder based on the first
    possible scenario.
    At trial, the State theorized Petitioner had fabricated the victim's chronic physical
    abuse toward her, placing emphasis on Petitioner's failure to report the abuse prior
    to the shooting and her habit of hiding any contemporaneous injuries. As a result,
    the State argued Petitioner was not entitled to an acquittal. Nevertheless, the trial
    court charged the jury on both self-defense and accident.
    As noted, because the State's case was circumstantial, Petitioner specifically
    requested the charge set forth in Logan. The trial court denied the request, stating
    "I'll go with the charge that's in the desk book. It seems very similar, so I will not
    charge [the Logan charge]." After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court
    sentenced Petitioner to nineteen years' imprisonment for manslaughter.4
    II.
    When requested, the Logan charge must be given in cases based in whole or part
    on circumstantial evidence. See Logan, 405 S.C. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452.
    Notwithstanding the mandatory language in Logan, erroneous jury instructions
    remain subject to an appellate court's authority to "consider[] the trial court's jury
    charge as a whole and in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial." Id. at
    90, 747 S.E.2d at 448. "To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a
    requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial . . . ." State v.
    Brandt, 
    393 S.C. 526
    , 550, 
    713 S.E.2d 591
    , 603 (2011) (citation omitted).
    "However, if the trial [court] refuses to give a specific charge, there is no error if
    alternative, the gun fired by accident after the victim hit it.
    4
    It is significant to note that—despite the State denigrating Petitioner's claims of
    physical abuse at the hands of the victim—the trial court found by a preponderance
    of the evidence that Petitioner was eligible for early parole based on the fact she
    was a victim of domestic violence. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-90
     (2015) (stating
    a victim of domestic violence convicted of an offense against a household member
    is eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of his or her prison term).
    the charge actually given sufficiently covers the substance of the request." State v.
    Mattison, 
    388 S.C. 469
    , 479, 
    697 S.E.2d 578
    , 583 (2010) (citation omitted).
    III.
    We agree with Petitioner that the "charge as a whole" approach cannot rescue this
    conviction. Over the years, the circumstantial evidence charge in South Carolina
    has evolved significantly. See Logan, 405 S.C. at 95–97, 747 S.E.2d at 450–51
    (setting forth the full history of the evolution). In relevant part, it was initially
    required that circumstantial evidence point conclusively to the guilt of the accused
    to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. See, e.g., State v. Kimbrell,
    
    191 S.C. 238
    , 242, 
    4 S.E.2d 121
    , 122 (1939) (citing State v. Langford, 
    74 S.C. 460
    ,
    
    55 S.E. 120
     (1906); State v. Hudson, 
    66 S.C. 394
    , 
    44 S.E. 968
     (1903); State v.
    Aughtry, 
    49 S.C. 285
    , 
    26 S.E. 619
     (1897)). Subsequently, in response to guidance
    from the Supreme Court of the United States,5 the Court removed this requirement,
    instead ordering trial courts to instruct juries that circumstantial evidence must be
    given the same weight and treatment as direct evidence (the Grippon charge). See
    State v. Grippon, 
    327 S.C. 79
    , 83–84, 
    489 S.E.2d 462
    , 464 (1997); see also State v.
    Cherry, 
    361 S.C. 588
    , 601, 
    606 S.E.2d 475
    , 482 (2004) (holding the Grippon
    charge was to be the "sole and exclusive" one to be given in circumstantial
    evidence cases from that time forward).
    However, in Logan, the Court posited that there are different approaches used to
    analyze direct and circumstantial evidence. Logan, 405 S.C. at 97, 747 S.E.2d at
    451. The Court reasoned that "evaluation of circumstantial evidence requires
    jurors to find that the proponent of the evidence has connected collateral facts in
    order to prove the proposition propounded—a process not required when
    evaluating direct evidence." Id. The Court found that "defendants should not be
    restricted from requesting a jury charge that reflects the requisite connection of
    collateral facts necessary for a conviction." Id. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452.
    Therefore, we held the trial court "should" give the specific charge provided in the
    Logan decision, quoted in the introduction of this opinion, when requested. See id.
    (explaining the Court's "holding does not prevent the trial court from issuing the
    [Grippon charge]. However, trial courts may not exclusively rely on that charge
    5
    See Holland v. United States, 
    348 U.S. 121
    , 139–40 (1954) (holding if a proper
    reasonable doubt instruction is given, a jury need not be instructed that
    circumstantial evidence must be so strong as to exclude every reasonable
    hypothesis other than guilt).
    over a defendant's objection." (emphasis added)).
    We acknowledge there may be a case in which a trial court's failure to give the
    Logan charge might be harmless error, but this is not such a case. The State's case
    against Petitioner was almost exclusively circumstantial. The State relied on (1)
    eyewitness testimony prior to the shooting to suggest Petitioner was angry, and (2)
    testimony from the pathologist explaining the pathway of the bullet could have
    been caused by Petitioner shooting the victim as he walked up the stairs to the
    house. In urging this Court to find the error was harmless, the State entirely
    disregards the testimony of its own witness that it was plausible the fatal wound
    could have been caused by the victim charging Petitioner, exactly as Petitioner
    testified.6
    The competing inferences involved in this circumstantial evidence case illustrate
    well the need for the Logan charge. Because the failure to provide the Logan
    circumstantial evidence charge was not harmless and that failure manifestly
    prejudiced Petitioner, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.
    6
    As an appellate court, we must be careful not to weigh the evidence. In assessing
    the State's harmless error argument, we recognize that what we refer to as plausible
    conflicting evidence may not be viewed as such by the jury. Fundamental to a
    jury's role as fact-finder is making credibility determinations, which lie in the sole
    province of the jury. Our discussion here is for the limited purpose of explaining
    why the failure to give the Logan charge cannot be considered harmless.