South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council ( 2021 )


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  •          THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Supreme Court
    South Carolina Public Interest Foundation, Amy Hill, and
    Rebecca Bonnette, Individually, and on behalf of all
    others similarly situated, Appellants,
    v.
    Calhoun County Council, Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2019-001016
    Appeal from Calhoun County
    Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge
    Opinion No. 28008
    Heard October 15, 2020 – Filed February 10, 2021
    AFFIRMED
    James G. Carpenter, of Carpenter Law Firm, PC, of
    Greenville, for Appellants.
    Charles Douglas Rhodes, III, Michael Wade Allen, Jr., and
    R. Patrick Flynn, all of Pope Flynn, of Columbia; Robert
    E. Tyson, Jr. and Benjamin Rogers Gooding, both of
    Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia, all
    for Respondent.
    Joshua C. Rhodes, General Counsel, and John K.
    DeLoache, Senior Staff Attorney, both of South Carolina
    Association of Counties, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae
    South Carolina Association of Counties.
    JUSTICE HEARN: This case concerns the scope of the thirty-day limitations
    period set forth in Section 4-10-330(F) under the Capital Project Sales Tax Act ("the
    Act"). 
    S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-10-300
     to -390 (2019). Voters in Calhoun County
    approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one
    percent sales and use tax—a penny tax—to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly
    five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not
    authorized pursuant to section 4-10-330. The County responded that the statute of
    limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the
    Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and
    did not address the merits. We affirm, holding the statute of limitations has run.
    FACTS
    During the November 2018 general election, the voters of Calhoun County,
    by a margin of 57% to 43%, approved a referendum imposing a penny tax to fund
    fifteen projects. These proposed projects ranged from the construction of water
    distribution lines, to fire stations, to dredging and beautification of recreational and
    fishing facilities. At issue in this appeal are the following four projects:
    4.     Calhoun County-Sandy Run Fire District Ladder Truck Project-
    to include the acquisition and equipping of a new ladder truck in the
    Sandy Run Fire District. To support the northern portion of Calhoun
    County, particularly industry located therein. $350,000
    11.    Calhoun County Emergency Communications Project-to
    include the constructing, acquiring, and equipping of facilities and
    equipment to provide 800 MHz radio service for emergency service
    providers in Calhoun County. $500,000
    12.   Calhoun County Ambulance Project-to include the acquisition
    and equipping of ambulances to be operated by Calhoun County
    Emergency Services Department. $165,000
    13.    Calhoun County Sandy Run Fire District Tanker Truck Project-
    to include the purchase of the fire truck to serve the Sandy Run area.
    $267,000
    On November 26, 2018, the County adopted a resolution declaring the results
    of the referendum. More than four months later, on April 3, 2019, the Foundation
    filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an order that the four projects exceeded
    the scope of the Act and therefore were invalid, and to enjoin the collection of the
    penny tax. The tax collection began May 1, 2019. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-
    motions for summary judgment, and the circuit court held a hearing. The Foundation
    contended penny tax proceeds could not be used for the four projects because none
    of them was specifically included in the Act. The County disagreed, arguing for a
    more expansive reading of the statute. The County also noted the Act expressly
    contains a thirty-day statute of limitations. In response, the Foundation argued the
    limitations period only applies to procedural challenges alleging election
    irregularities, not those which involve the substance of an approved project.
    Regarding the merits, the County contended the four projects clearly fell within the
    Act, as they were sufficiently tethered to an enumerated project. The circuit court
    ultimately concluded the thirty-day statute of limitations barred the Foundation’s
    claims, and therefore did not reach the merits. The Foundation filed a direct appeal
    pursuant to Rule 203(d)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv), SCACR.
    ISSUE
    Did the circuit court err in determining section 4-10-330(F)'s thirty-day
    limitations period barred this action?
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    When reviewing a circuit court's order from a motion for summary judgment,
    appellate courts sit in the same position as the circuit court. Turner v. Milliman, 
    392 S.C. 116
    , 121-22, 
    708 S.E.2d 766
    , 769 (2011). When the parties file cross-motions
    for summary judgment, the issue becomes a question of law for the Court to decide
    de novo. Wiegand v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 
    391 S.C. 159
    , 163, 
    705 S.E.2d 432
    , 434
    (2011). Additionally, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the Court
    to review de novo. DomainsNewMedia.com, LLC v. Hilton Head Island-Bluffton
    Chamber of Commerce, 
    423 S.C. 295
    , 300, 
    814 S.E.2d 513
    , 516 (2018).
    DISCUSSION
    The Foundation contends the thirty-day limitations period set forth in section
    4-10-330(F) only applies to procedural challenges, such as a lawsuit asserting voting
    irregularities. Because the focus of the Foundation's lawsuit is on the substance of
    the referendum—whether the projects fall outside the scope of the Act—it argues
    the statute of limitations does not apply. Conversely, the County asserts section 4-
    10-330(F) does not distinguish between procedural and substantive challenges. We
    agree with the County.
    Section 4-10-330 of the South Carolina Code authorizes a county governing
    body to establish a commission that designates projects to be included on a
    referendum for the voters' consideration during an election. Specifically, the
    provision requires the ordinance set forth the purpose of the penny tax funds, which,
    "may include the following types of projects: (b) courthouses, administration
    buildings, civic centers, hospitals, emergency medical facilities, police stations, fire
    stations, jails, correctional facilities, detention facilities, libraries, coliseums,
    educational facilities under the direction of an area commission for technical
    education, or any combination of these projects[.]" 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 4-10
    -
    330(A)(1)(b). Additionally, section 4-10-330(E) requires in part, "The election
    commission shall conduct the referendum under the election laws of this State,
    mutatis mutandis,1 and shall certify the result no later than November thirtieth to the
    county governing body and to the Department of Revenue." In this appeal, we are
    required to determine the import of section 4-10-330(F), which states,
    Upon receipt of the returns of the referendum, the county governing
    body must, by resolution, declare the results thereof. In such event, the
    results of the referendum, as declared by resolution of the county
    governing body, are not open to question except by a suit or proceeding
    instituted within thirty days from the date such resolution is adopted.
    Specifically, the key language set forth in this provision is "the results of the
    referendum. . . ." 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the
    General Assembly. Amisub of S.C., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control,
    
    407 S.C. 583
    , 597, 
    757 S.E.2d 408
    , 416 (2014). "Where the statute's language is
    plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear, definite meaning, the rules of statutory
    interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning."
    Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 
    393 S.C. 332
    , 342, 
    713 S.E.2d 278
    , 283 (2011).
    Accordingly, courts will "give words their plain and ordinary meaning without resort
    1
    Black's Law Dictionary provides, "mutatis mutandis: All necessary changes having
    been made; with the necessary changes ." Mutatis Mutandis, Black's Law
    Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
    to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation." State v.
    Sweat, 
    386 S.C. 339
    , 350, 
    688 S.E.2d 569
    , 575 (2010) (citation omitted).
    To begin, section 4-10-330(F) does not contain any express language limiting
    "the results of the referendum" to only procedural aspects, such as the vote count.
    While the Foundation contends the plain language of the phrase inherently creates
    this distinction, especially when viewed in comparison to the preceding subsection
    which describes election procedure, we disagree. It is not the province of this Court
    to engraft an additional provision onto a statute which is ostensibly clear on its face.
    State v. Cty. of Florence, 
    406 S.C. 169
    , 180, 
    749 S.E.2d 516
    , 522 (2013) (declining
    to "augment the statutory language" to include a requirement that is not contained in
    the statute at issue); Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 
    397 S.C. 532
    , 540, 
    725 S.E.2d 693
    , 698 (2012) (noting "when a statute is clear on its face, it is 'improvident to
    judicially engraft extra requirements to legislation'"). Further, when we look outside
    of subsection 4-10-330(F), the rest of the provision addresses the substance of the
    referendum, as demonstrated by the title of section 4-10-330, delineated as,
    "Contents of ballot question; purpose for which proceeds of tax to be used." See
    S.C. Energy Users Comm. v. S.C. Elec. & Gas, 
    410 S.C. 348
    , 357 n.5, 
    764 S.E.2d 913
    , 917 n.5 (2014) ("This Court may, of course, consider the title or caption of an
    act in determining the intent of the Legislature.") (citation omitted). Therefore, it
    would be entirely inconsistent for the limitations period to only apply to the vote
    count when section 4-10-330 addresses which projects are authorized to receive
    penny tax funds.
    In addition to the absence of any qualifying language limiting the thirty-day
    limitations period to only procedural challenges, we find further support in our
    jurisprudence involving other abbreviated statutes of limitations. In Hite v. Town of
    West Columbia, landowners challenged the town's annexation of property,
    contending the town did not satisfy the statutory requirement to obtain a petition
    signed by a majority of the property owners whose property was subject to the
    annexation. 
    220 S.C. 59
    , 63, 66 S.E.3d 427, 428 (1951). The provision at issue
    required any lawsuit to be commenced within ninety days from when the results
    were published. Despite filing suit approximately five months after the annexation,
    the landowners argued the limitations period only applied to the results of the
    election, rather than all the requirements for a valid annexation. 
    Id. at 64
    , 66 S.E.2d
    at 429. The Court disagreed, rejecting the landowners' interpretation as "too
    technical." Id. Instead, the Court held the limitations period was not confined to a
    challenge over the "casting and counting of ballots," but instead to the entire
    annexation process. Id. at 65, 66 S.E.2d at 429.
    Similarly, in Morgan, the Court upheld a thirty-day statute of limitations
    concerning a challenge to a county's decision to obtain bonds after approval from
    the voters. Morgan v. Feagin, 
    230 S.C. 315
    , 319, 
    95 S.E.2d 621
    , 623 (1956). The
    Court noted,
    Similar short statutes of limitation, applicable to actions which question
    the proceedings upon the issuance of municipal and other bonds have
    been of force in this State for many years, apparently without challenge
    heretofore. Code of 1952, Sec. 1–645, twenty days; Sec. 21–976, thirty
    days; and Sec. 47–842, thirty days. The practical necessity of them is
    obvious. Purchasers of bonds could hardly be found if the bonds were
    subject in their hands to attack for alleged illegality in the proceedings
    upon the issuance of them. Furthermore, it is within common
    knowledge that sales of bonds are frequently timed to take advantage
    of a favorable market, which might well be hindered by long delay.
    Id. at 317, 
    95 S.E.2d at 622
    . Further, the Court relied on Hite, noting the wisdom of
    such a short limitations period was not for the courts to determine but instead was a
    matter for the General Assembly. Id. at 319, 
    95 S.E.2d at 623
    .
    Finally, in State ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, the State filed a lawsuit
    challenging the city's annexation of state-owned land. 
    339 S.C. 8
    , 12, 
    528 S.E.2d 408
    , 410 (2000). The circuit court held that because the State failed to file its lawsuit
    within the ninety-day limitations period, it was barred by the statute of limitations.
    Id. at 13, 
    528 S.E.2d at 410
    . On appeal, the Court agreed, noting the limitations
    period applied to the State, and that limitation "statutes are designed to promote
    justice by forcing parties to pursue a case in a timely manner." Id. at 19, 
    528 S.E.2d at 413
    .
    While these cases did not invoke section 4-10-330(F), the same principles
    apply and further buttress our conclusion that the provision does not distinguish
    between procedural and substantive challenges. For example, section 4-10-310
    contemplates that penny tax revenue "may be used to defray debt service on bonds
    issued to pay for projects authorized in this article." 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 4-10-310
    (2019). As the Court explained in Hite, a longer delay may frustrate the
    effectiveness of obtaining favorable bonds. Therefore, it is entirely consistent for
    the General Assembly to enact a statute containing a short limitations period that is
    not limited to only challenges over the "casting and counting of ballots."2 Hite, 220
    S.C. at 65, 66 S.E.2d at 429. Regardless, any dispute over the length of the
    limitations period is beyond the purview of this Court and instead is a matter best
    left to the General Assembly.
    Because we find the limitations period applies to this lawsuit, we now turn to
    the facts of this case. It is undisputed the county adopted a resolution on November
    26, 2018, declaring the election results, meaning the thirty-day period expired in late
    December 2018. The Foundation did not file this lawsuit until April of 2019, nearly
    four months after the time period expired. Despite the Foundation's attempt to
    characterize this lawsuit otherwise, the result of the referendum is that a majority of
    voters agreed that the County should impose a penny tax to fund the fifteen items
    listed on the ballot. The Foundation's concern regarding four of the projects is a
    direct challenge to the results of the referendum—that a majority of voters cast their
    ballot in favor of funding the listed projects. Therefore, this lawsuit focuses on "the
    results of the referendum," and thus, is barred by section 4-10-330(F).
    CONCLUSION
    We hold the circuit court correctly determined that section 4-10-330(F)'s
    thirty-day limitations period applies. Accordingly, because the Foundation filed this
    lawsuit outside the limitations period, it is time-barred.3
    AFFIRMED.
    BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.
    2
    We note there has never been any allegation of deceit or nefarious conduct in this
    case, and we see absolutely no evidence of this in the record. Accordingly, equitable
    doctrines that may apply to suspend or toll a statute of limitations in certain cases,
    such as estoppel or equitable tolling, have no import here.
    3
    We express no opinion as to whether the four projects are authorized under section
    4-10-330(A)(1).