Ruff v. Nunez ( 2014 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Supreme Court
    Mary Margaret Ruff, f/k/a Mary Margaret Nunez,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    Samuel Nunez, Jr., Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2013-001801
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
    Appeal From Greenville County
    The Honorable Billy A. Tunstall, Jr., Family Court Judge
    Memorandum Opinion No. 2014-MO-003
    Submitted January 8, 2014 – Filed January 29, 2014
    REVERSED IN PART
    Dianne S. Riley, of Greenville, for Petitioner.
    Bruce Wyche Bannister, of Bannister & Wyatt, LLC, of
    Greenville, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of
    Appeals' decision in Ruff v. Nunez, Op. No. 2013-UP-290 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June
    26, 2013).
    We deny the petition for a writ of certiorari as to all questions other than the
    parties' responsibility for payment of transportation costs for visitation and
    Guardian ad litem's fees. As to the issues of transportation costs for visitation and
    Guardian ad litem's fees, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, dispense with
    further briefing, and reverse the Court of Appeals' decision that petitioner is
    responsible for all such costs.
    At the final hearing, respondent proposed a visitation plan in which the parties
    would split transportation costs for visitation equally. However, the family court
    rejected this proposal and ordered that respondent only pay transportation costs for
    respondent's two-week summer visitation with the child, and that petitioner pay all
    other transportation costs, which required petitioner to pay a disproportionate
    amount in transportation costs. Based on our de novo review of the evidence, we
    find the family court abused its discretion in requiring petitioner to pay costs in the
    amount set forth in its order, and we order that the parties split all visitation
    transportation costs equally. See Argabright v. Argabright, 
    398 S.C. 176
    , 179, 
    727 S.E.2d 748
    , 750 (2012) (holding an appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in
    accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence); Cudd v. Arline,
    
    277 S.C. 236
    , 239, 
    285 S.E.2d 881
    , 883 (1981) (holding an order concerning
    visitation costs will be reversed where there is a clear abuse of discretion).
    We further find the family court abused its discretion in ordering that petitioner is
    required to pay all of the Guardian ad litem's fees, and we order that the parties
    equally split the Guardian ad litem's fees. See Shirley v. Shirley, 
    342 S.C. 324
    ,
    341, 
    536 S.E.2d 427
    , 436 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding an award of Guardian ad litem
    fees lies within the sound discretion of the family court and will not be disturbed
    on appeal absent an abuse of discretion).
    REVERSED IN PART.
    TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ.,
    concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2014-MO-003

Filed Date: 1/29/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2024