Blue Star Rental v. Ridge Environmental ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Blue Star Rental & Sales, Inc., Appellant,
v.
Ridge Environmental, LLC, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2011-192411
Appeal from Aiken County
The Honorable Robert A. Smoak, Jr., Special Referee
Memorandum Opinion No. 2014-MO-048
Submitted October 15, 2014 – Filed December 10, 2014
REVERSED
Tucker S. Player, of Player Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, and R. Randy Edwards, of Smyrna, Georgia,
for Appellant.
Ridge Environmental, LLC, Respondent, not represented
by counsel.
JUSTICE HEARN: Following a bench trial, the court sua sponte
dismissed the plaintiff's case based on the unauthorized practice of law. The
question before us is whether the filing of a summons and complaint by a
corporation's president—a nonlawyer—renders the complaint a nullity or is an
amendable defect. We determine it is the latter and reverse and remand for a new
trial.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arose from a lease of heavy equipment between Blue Star Rental
& Sales, Inc., the lessor, and Ridge Environmental, LLC, the lessee. Blue Star
filed a complaint against Ridge for defaulting on the lease and refusing to pay for
damage to the machinery. The summons and complaint were signed by Randall
Chafin, president of Blue Star, a nonlawyer.
The first time an attorney of record appeared for Blue Star was over eleven
months later when the trial court received notice that Randy Edwards, a Georgia
attorney, had applied for admission pro hac vice. The case proceeded to trial with
Blue Star represented by both Edwards and associated South Carolina counsel
Tucker Player, apparently without objection by Ridge. The trial took more than a
day to complete.
While reviewing the pleadings prior to ruling, the trial court first noticed that
Blue Star's summons and complaint were executed by Chafin. Subsequently, the
trial court sua sponte issued an order finding Blue Star's complaint a nullity due to
the unauthorized practice of law, and dismissed its action against Ridge. Blue Star
appealed the trial court's order,1 and this Court certified the appeal pursuant to Rule
204(b), SCACR.2
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the trial court err in dismissing the plaintiff's case where an officer of
the corporation, a nonlawyer, executed the summons and complaint on behalf of
the corporation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to dismiss a case is within the purview of the trial court and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Miller, 393 S.C. 248,
1
Although represented by counsel at trial, Ridge did not participate in this appeal.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
256, 713 S.E.2d 253, 257 (2011). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the
conclusions of the trial court are either controlled by an error of law or are based
on unsupported factual conclusions." Id. (quoting Kiriakides v. Sch. Dist. of
Greenville Cnty., 382 S.C. 8, 20, 675 S.E.2d 439, 445 (2009)).
LAW/ANALYSIS
Blue Star argues the trial court erred in ruling the complaint was a nullity
because it was executed by a nonlawyer. Specifically, Blue Star argues the filing
of the complaint by an officer of the corporation created an amendable defect
which was cured by the subsequent retention of counsel. We agree.
The power to regulate the practice of law rests exclusively with this Court.
S.C. Const. art. V, § 4; S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-10 (2011); In re Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 309 S.C. 304, 305, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992). We have
declined to delineate a broad set of rules relating to the unauthorized practice of
law. See In re Unauthorized Practice of Law, 309 S.C. at 305, 422 S.E.2d at 124.
"[T]he better course is to decide what is and what is not the unauthorized practice
of law in the context of an actual case or controversy." Id.We have held the "goal of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice
of law is to protect the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible
representation." Renaissance Enter., Inc. v. Summit Teleservices, Inc., 334 S.C.
649, 652, 515 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1999); see State v. Despain, 319 S.C. 317, 320, 460
S.E.2d 576, 578 (1995) (explaining the purpose behind enjoining a nonlawyer from
preparing a family court document was "for the protection of the public from the
potentially severe economic and emotional consequences which may flow from the
erroneous preparation of legal documents or the inaccurate legal advice given by
persons untrained in the law"); see also In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1951)
("The amateur at law is as dangerous to the community as an amateur surgeon
would be.").
In its order, the trial court relied on Renaissance in holding the complaint
filed in this case was a nullity; we hold the trial court erred in reading Renaissance
so broadly. In Renaissance, the president of a corporation petitioned this Court in
order to represent his company in a case pending before the court of appeals. 334
S.C. at 650, 515 S.E.2d at 258. While holding that a nonlawyer cannot represent a
corporation before the circuit or appellate courts, we did not state that the case
must be dismissed as a nullity. Rather, due to the procedural posture of the case,
we merely remanded the case to the court of appeals for proceedings consistent
with our decision. Id. at 653, 515 S.E.2d at 259.
Further, in Brown v. Coe, 365 S.C. 137, 616 S.E.2d 705 (2005), this Court
held a personal representative of an estate could not represent the estate on appeal.
Id. at 142, 616 S.E.2d at 708. We then considered whether dismissing the case was
the proper remedy, noting there was a split of authority as to whether the
unauthorized practice of law renders a proceeding a nullity or instead amounts to
an amendable defect. Id. at 143, 616 S.E.2d at 708–09. Without ruling on this
precise issue, we denied the motion to dismiss the appeal and allowed the personal
representative a reasonable amount of time to obtain counsel based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, principally that the personal representative had
represented the estate in past appeals without objection. Id. at 144, 616 S.E.2d at
709.
Additionally, in The Roof Doctor, Inc. v. Birchwood Holdings, Ltd., 366
S.C. 637, 622 S.E.2d 746 (Ct. App. 2005), the court of appeals considered whether
the filing of a counterclaim in magistrate's court by the president of a corporation,
without proper written authorization, was a basis for voiding the magistrate's
judgment. The court noted that this Court had not yet addressed this issue but
nonetheless held that any unauthorized practice of law in that case was a "collateral
matter." Id. at 642, 622 S.E.2d at 749. Thus, cases from the appellate courts in this
state have never applied the nullity rule as the trial court did here.
In considering the effect the unauthorized practice of law had in this case,
we are persuaded by decisions from other jurisdictions which have consistently
held the filing of a complaint by a nonlawyer constitutes an amendable defect.
See, e.g., Szteinbaum v. Kaes Inversiones y Valores, C.A., 476 So. 2d 247, 250
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding the filing of a complaint by a nonlawyer did not
void the suit because "prohibiting amendment and dismissing as a nullity the
complaint would yield the ironic result of prejudicing the constituents of the
corporation, the very people sought to be protected by the rule against the
unauthorized practice of law"); Downtown Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Chicago, 979
N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 2012) (holding that a complaint filed by the president of a
corporation for administrative review was not a nullity); Save Our Creeks v.
Brooklyn Park, 682 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd, 699 N.W.2d
307 (Minn. 2005) ("[W]e conclude that the lack of an attorney's signature on a
complaint filed on behalf of a corporation does not render the complaint null or
require dismissal.").3
Accordingly, we hold that here, where an officer of a corporation filed the
complaint but the corporation thereafter retained representation throughout the
trial, the unauthorized practice of law does not operate to void the lawsuit in its
entirety, particularly absent any showing of prejudice to the opposing party.
Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Blue Star's complaint based on the
unauthorized practice of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse. Although Blue Star requests the case
be remanded for an entry of judgment on the merits, we note the trial judge in this
case is now retired. Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial.
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, and KITTREDGE JJ., concur.
3
Where courts in other jurisdictions have applied the nullity rule, they have done
so under different circumstances. See, e.g., Ex Parte Ghafary, 738 So. 2d 778(Ala. 1998) (dismissing case where a nonlawyer executrix attempted to represent
an estate in proceeding); Land Mgmt., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 368 A.2d 602(Me. 1977) (holding complaint a nullity where filed by the president of a
corporation and president represented corporation, over objection, throughout the
trial).