Milton v. Richland County ( 2015 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
John Christopher Milton, Petitioner,
v.
Richland County, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2014-000580
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Memorandum Opinion No. 2015-MO-046
Heard May 20, 2015 – Filed August 5, 2015
DISMISSED
______________
Constantine George Pournaras, Kris Hines and Elizabeth
Fielding Pringle, all of Richland County Public
Defender's Office, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson & Lindemann, P.A.,
of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: We accepted this matter in our original jurisdiction1 to
determine: (1) whether prolonged detention of persons incarcerated upon the
issuance of a uniform traffic ticket violates the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution2 where the county has failed to provide a mechanism for
prompt judicial determination of probable cause within a 48-hour period following
arrest; and (2) whether, absent a prompt probable cause determination, detention
centers may detain persons arrested without a warrant longer than reasonably
necessary for booking and processing. Because there is nothing in the record to
indicate that John Christopher Milton did not receive a probable cause
determination within 48 hours of his arrest, we find Milton has failed to
demonstrate a justiciable controversy that is appropriate for our review.
Accordingly, we dismiss this matter in our original jurisdiction.
I. Factual / Procedural History
On January 23, 2014, a deputy with the Richland County Sheriff's
Department arrested Milton for trespassing at a business after notice and issued a
Uniform Traffic Ticket ("UTT").3 Milton was committed to the Alvin S. Glenn
1
S.C. Const. art. V, § 5 ("The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs or
orders of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and other original and remedial writs."); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-310 (1977)
(granting the Supreme Court authority to issue original writs); Rule 245(a),
SCACR ("The Supreme Court will not entertain matters in its original jurisdiction
when the matter can be determined in a lower court in the first instance, without
material prejudice to the rights of the parties. If the public interest is involved, or
if special grounds of emergency or other good reasons exist why the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be exercised, the facts showing the
reasons must be stated in the petition with supporting affidavits.").
2
U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
3
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10 (Supp. 2014) (authorizing law enforcement officers to
use a uniform traffic ticket to arrest for all traffic offenses and for certain specified
offenses). Section 56-7-10 was amended effective June 4, 2015; however, this
Detention Center because he could not post the $470 bond set by Richland County
Magistrate Metts. On February 18, 2014, Magistrate Howard converted the bond
from a cash or surety bond to a personal recognizance bond. As a result, Milton
was released from custody and ordered to appear in magistrate's court on March
12, 2014.4
On March 19, 2014, the Chief Public Defender for Richland County
("Petitioner"), on behalf of Milton and other similarly situated detainees, petitioned
this Court to accept a Complaint within its original jurisdiction. Petitioner
maintained that Milton and other individuals, who were arrested in Richland
County pursuant to a UTT and not a warrant, have been subjected to prolonged
detention without a prompt judicial determination of probable cause in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner sought for the Court to issue an order declaring
that: (1) a criminal defendant, who is detained as a result of a warrantless arrest,
must receive a Gerstein5 probable cause determination within 48 hours of his or
her arrest; and (2) a criminal defendant, who does not receive a judicial
determination of probable cause, may not be held by a detention center "longer
than reasonably necessary" for booking and processing. This Court, despite
mootness,6 granted the petition.
amendment does not affect the disposition of the instant case as it was amended to
include additional offenses for which a UTT may be issued.
4
On April 17, 2014, Magistrate Maurer dismissed the trespassing charge after the
business dropped the charge on the condition that Milton would not return to the
property.
5
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires
a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of
liberty following arrest."); see Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991) (interpreting Gerstein and holding that an arrestee is entitled to a probable
cause determination within 48 hours of arrest absent "a bona fide emergency or
other extraordinary circumstance").
6
See Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 568, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001) ("[A]n
appellate court can take jurisdiction, despite mootness, if the issue raised is capable
of repetition but evading review.").
II. Standard of Review
Petitioner seeks a declaration from this Court in its original jurisdiction.
Thus, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("the Act") is implicated. S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2005). Section 15-53-20 of the South Carolina
Code identifies the purpose of the Act and provides that courts "shall have power
to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-20 (2005); see Rule 57, SCRCP ("The
procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Code §§ 15–53–10
through 15–53–140, shall be in accordance with these rules, and . . . [t]he existence
of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in
cases where it is appropriate."). The Act is to be liberally construed and
administered to achieve its intended purpose "to settle and to afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations."
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-53-130 (2005).
To state a cause of action under the Act, a party must demonstrate a
justiciable controversy. Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 177 S.E.2d 551 (1970).
"A justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy which is appropriate
for judicial determination, as distinguished from a dispute or difference of a
contingent, hypothetical or abstract character." Id. at 154, 177 S.E.2d at 553.
III. Discussion
Milton acknowledges that the Richland County deputy was statutorily
authorized to arrest him using a UTT rather than a warrant.7 However, because he
was detained pursuant to a warrantless arrest, Milton asserts that he was entitled to
a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of his arrest. Although
Milton admits that he received a bond hearing within 24 hours of arrest, as required
7
Section 22-3-710 of the South Carolina Code states, "All proceedings before
magistrates in criminal cases shall be commenced on information under oath,
plainly and substantially setting forth the offenses charged, upon which, and only
which, shall a warrant of arrest issue." S.C. Code Ann. § 22-3-710 (2007).
However, this Court has held that "[s]ection 56-7-10 provides an exception to the
warrant requirement by allowing the issuance of a uniform traffic ticket to initiate
proceedings before the magistrate for specified offenses." State v. Ramsey, 409
S.C. 206, 210, 762 S.E.2d 15, 17 (2014).
by section 22-5-510 of the South Carolina Code,8 he claims that at no point during
the "bail proceedings" was there a determination of probable cause. In the absence
of this determination, Milton argues he was detained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
We find that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a justiciable controversy.
Other than Milton's own assertions, the record contains no evidence that he was
denied a probable cause determination. Because Petitioner failed to submit a
sufficient record, this case presents nothing more than a dispute of a hypothetical
character. See Helms Realty, Inc. v. Gibson-Wall Co., 363 S.C. 334, 339, 611
S.E.2d 485, 487-88 (2005) (noting that appellant has the burden of establishing a
sufficient record and declining to address the merits of a claim when facts
underlying the claim are not included in the record); Rule 210(h), SCACR
("Except as provided by Rule 212 and Rule 208(b)(1)(C) and (2), the appellate
court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal.").
Accordingly, we dismiss this matter in our original jurisdiction as it is not
appropriate for our review.
DISMISSED.
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, KITTREDGE, JJ., and Acting Justice
James E. Moore, concur.
8
S.C. Code Ann. § 22-5-510(B) (Supp. 2014) ("A person charged with a bailable
offense must have a bond hearing within twenty-four hours of his arrest and must
be released within a reasonable time, not to exceed four hours, after the bond is
delivered to the incarcerating facility." (emphasis added)). Section 22-5-510 was
amended effective June 4, 2015 regarding matters to be considered when
determining conditions of release on bond. Subsection (B) of section 22-5-510
remained unchanged.