Strickland v. Temple ( 2018 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Charles E. Strickland, III, Latisha D. Strickland and
Justin R. Dillon, Petitioners,
v.
Marjorie E. Temple, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2016-000990
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appeal From Lexington County
The Honorable James O. Spence, Master-in-Equity
Memorandum Opinion No. 2018-MO-015
Submitted March 7, 2018 – Filed April 4, 2018
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Frederick Ivey Hall, III, of The Rick Hall Law Firm,
LLC, of Lexington, for Petitioners.
Rolland E. Greenburg, III, of Rolland E. Greenburg, III,
PA, and Spencer Andrew Syrett, both of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to review an order of
dismissal of the court of appeals. We grant the petition, dispense with further
briefing, and remand to the court of appeals.
Petitioners filed this action to foreclose on an equitable interest in real property
and/or terminate a conditional sales agreement and bond for title. The master-in-
equity terminated the agreement after respondent conceded she had no equitable
interest in the property. Petitioners thereafter filed a motion for a separate award
of attorney fees and Rule 11 sanctions. The master signed and filed an order
denying petitioners' requested relief on June 4, 2015. The master's assistant e-
mailed a clocked copy to counsel for both parties the same day. A second clocked
copy of the order, this time along with a Form 4, was e-mailed to counsel on June
16. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP,
on June 26. On September 1, the master denied petitioners' Rule 59(e) motion, but
found that the motion was timely filed. Petitioners then filed a notice of appeal on
September 28. The court of appeals found that petitioners' appeal was untimely
and granted respondent's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals found the ten day
period to file a motion for reconsideration began on June 4, when the order was
first e-mailed to the parties, making petitioners' Rule 59(e) motion untimely, and
ultimately making petitioners' appeal untimely, as the post-trial motion did not
operate to toll the thirty day period for service of the notice of an appeal. See Rule
59(e), SCRCP ("A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later
than 10 days after receipt of written notice of the entry of the order."); Rule
203(b)(1), SCACR ("When a timely . . . motion to alter or amend the judgment . . .
has been made, the time for appeal for all parties shall be stayed and shall run from
receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motion.").
In dismissing petitioners' appeal, the court of appeals cited Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Fallon Properties South Carolina, LLC, 413 S.C. 642, 776 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App.
2015), in which the court of appeals found that an e-mail from the office of the
master-in-equity with the order on appeal attached constituted written notice of
entry of the order under Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR, and dismissed the appeal because
the appellants served their notice of appeal more than thirty days after receipt of
the e-mail. This Court recently issued an opinion affirming, as modified, the court
of appeals decision in Wells Fargo, supra. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fallon
Properties S.C., LLC, Op. No. 27773 (Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 28, 2018). We held that
an e-mail providing written notice of entry of an order or judgment for purposes of
Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR triggers the time to appear as long as the e-mail is
received from the court, an attorney of record, or a party. However, we also held
that our ruling on this issue is to apply prospectively, and therefore remanded the
case to the court of appeals to allow the appeal to proceed on its merits.
The same rationale applies in the case at hand. Accordingly, we reverse the order
of the court of appeals and remand this matter for a ruling on the merits of
petitioners' appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, and JAMES, JJ., concur. FEW, J.,
not participating.