State v. Lott ( 2019 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Supreme Court
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Gary Eugene Lott, Petitioner.
    Appellate Case No. 2015-001981
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
    Appeal from Greenwood County
    Eugene C. Griffith Jr., Circuit Court Judge
    Memorandum Opinion No. 2019-MO-033
    Heard February 14, 2018 – Filed August 7, 2019
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
    Columbia, for Petitioner.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant
    Attorney General David A. Spencer, and Assistant
    Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, all of
    Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
    Greenwood, all for Respondent.
    JUSTICE JAMES: Gary Eugene Lott was indicted for first-degree criminal sexual
    conduct (CSC) with a minor and committing a lewd act on a minor. The young girl
    (Victim) was eleven years old at the time of the incident. Victim alleged Lott—a
    friend of her mother and step-father—had spent the night at their home and had
    touched her inappropriately while she was asleep on the couch in the living room.
    Lott denied touching Victim at any point throughout the night and denied ever
    touching Victim inappropriately.
    Lott's first-degree CSC with a minor charge was premised on (1) the sexual
    battery alleged by Victim and (2) Lott's 1996 conviction for committing a lewd act
    on a minor, in which he was required to register as a sex offender. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655
    (A)(2) (2015) (providing a person is guilty of first-degree CSC with
    a minor if "the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim who is less than sixteen
    years of age and the actor has previously been convicted of, pled guilty or nolo
    contendere to, or adjudicated delinquent for an offense listed in Section 23-3-
    430(C)[1] or has been ordered to be included in the sex offender registry pursuant to
    Section 23-3-430(D)").
    Prior to trial, Lott moved for the trial court to limit the introduction of
    evidence concerning his 1996 lewd act conviction. He argued the State sought to
    introduce this evidence "for the obvious purpose" of revealing to the jury his
    propensity to commit sexual offenses against children. Lott contended such
    introduction would constitute a violation of Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of
    1
    Although committing a lewd act on a minor is not currently on the list of qualifying
    offenses in section 23-3-430(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018), it was
    listed as a qualifying offense when Lott was indicted in 2011. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430
    (C)(11) (Supp. 2010). The lewd act statute was repealed in 2012, but
    "[t]he crime that was lewd act is now classified as [CSC] with a minor in the third
    degree." State v. McGaha, 
    404 S.C. 289
    , 293 n.3, 
    744 S.E.2d 602
    , 604 n.3 (Ct. App.
    2013). Third-degree CSC with a minor has since replaced the offense of committing
    a lewd act on a minor on the list of qualifying offenses. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 23
    -
    3-430(C)(6) (Supp. 2018).
    Evidence.2 The State argued evidence of the prior lewd act conviction was
    extremely probative because it was an element of the first-degree CSC with a minor
    charge that it was required to prove.
    To lessen the prejudicial effect of the evidence, Lott offered to stipulate that
    he had previously been convicted of a crime listed in section 23-3-430(C) and that
    he was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to his conviction.
    Alternatively, Lott proposed to bifurcate the proceedings to permit the State to prove
    the prior conviction element after the jury determined whether he was guilty of the
    underlying sexual element of the offense.
    The trial court denied Lott's requests, and the State introduced evidence of his
    1996 conviction for lewd act and evidence of his sex offender registration. The jury
    acquitted Lott of the first-degree CSC with a minor charge but convicted him of
    committing a lewd act on a minor. The trial court imposed a fifteen-year prison
    sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Lott, Op. No. 2015-UP-266 (S.C.
    Ct. App. filed May 27, 2015). We granted Lott's petition for a writ of certiorari.
    Pursuant to our recent decision in State v. Cross, Op. No. 27903 (S.C. Sup.
    Ct. filed July 24, 2019) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 30 at 33), we hold the trial court
    erred in refusing Lott's request to bifurcate the trial. A bifurcated proceeding would
    allow the State to present evidence of all elements of the crime charged and would
    remove any unfair prejudice that would arise during a unitary trial. Therefore, we
    reverse Lott's conviction and remand for a new trial on the committing a lewd act on
    a minor charge. Because Lott was previously acquitted of the first-degree CSC with
    a minor charge, he cannot be retried for this same offense. See State v. Parker, 
    391 S.C. 606
    , 612, 
    707 S.E.2d 799
    , 801 (2011) (providing that pursuant to the law of
    double jeopardy, a defendant may not be prosecuted for the same offense after an
    acquittal).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice Daniel
    Hall, concur.
    2
    See Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .").
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019-MO-033

Filed Date: 8/7/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2024