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SHORT, J., concurs in result.
I concur with the majority that the judgment must be reversed based on the trial court’s error in allowing Allison to assei't truth, even though he did not affirmatively plead truth as a defense. I write separately, however, because I believe
*329 the trial court also erred in failing to direct a verdict on the issue of slander per se.In light of the attendant circumstances, I find Allison’s statements charged Parrish with the commission of a crime of moral turpitude. See Flowers v. Price, 192 S.C. 373, 378, 6 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1940) (considering extrinsic circumstances to determine if words are slanderous per se). At the meeting, Allison stated that Parrish “conned” his mother into signing over her land and “conned” her out of her insurance money. Extrinsic circumstances included Allison’s intent to discredit Parrish by many references to her alleged dishonesty including the statement that she was a liar. The words spoken are actionable if they convey to the minds of the listeners, and would naturally be understood to mean, the plaintiff has committed a crime. Id. at 377, 6 S.E.2d at 752. Any words actually or impliedly stating the plaintiff’s guilt, or raising a strong suspicion of it in the minds of the hearers, are sufficient. Porter v. News & Courier Co., 237 S.C. 102, 108, 115 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1960). See Herring v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 222 S.C. 226, 235, 72 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1952) (finding statement that an employee is “short,” made during an audit and coupled with immediate firing, actionable per se).
Considering the context in which Allison’s statements were made, I conclude the statement that Parrish “conned” Allison’s mother out of her house and insurance money charged Parrish with the commission of a crime of moral turpitude such as obtaining property by false pretenses. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-240 (2003) (“A person who by false pretense or representation ... obtains from another person any . .. money ... or other property ... is guilty of a: (1) felony ... if the value of the property is five thousand dollars or more....”). Obtaining property under false pretenses is a crime of moral turpitude. State v. Moore, 128 S.C. 192, 199, 122 S.E. 672, 674 (1924); Carruth v. Brown, 202 Ga.App. 656, 415 S.E.2d 470, 471 (1992). Under these circumstances, I find Allison’s statements charged Parrish with the commission of a crime of moral turpitude and the trial court erred in denying Parrish’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of slander per se.
Document Info
Docket Number: 4322
Judges: Anderson, Williams, Short
Filed Date: 12/19/2007
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/14/2024