Charles S. Blackmon v. SCDHEC ( 2022 )


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  •           THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Charles S. Blackmon and South Carolinians for
    Responsible Agricultural Practices, Appellants,
    v.
    South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
    Control, and David Coggins Broilers, Respondents,
    Charles S. Blackmon and South Carolinians for
    Responsible Agricultural Practices, Appellants,
    v.
    South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
    Control, and Heath Coggins Broilers, Respondents,
    Charles S. Blackmon and South Carolinians for
    Responsible Agricultural Practices, Appellants,
    v.
    South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
    Control, and Jim Young Broilers, Respondents.
    Appellate Case No. 2017-002598
    Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
    Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge
    Opinion No. 5911
    Heard December 9, 2020 – Filed May 25, 2022
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    Robert Guild, of Robert Guild, Attorney at Law, of
    Columbia, for Appellants.
    Mitchell Willoughby and Tracey Colton Green, both of
    Willoughby & Hoefer, PA, of Columbia, for
    Respondents David Coggins Broilers, Heath Coggins
    Broilers, and Jim Young Broilers.
    Michael Smoak Traynham, of Nexsen Pruet, LLC, of
    Columbia; and Sara Volk Martinez and Stephen Philip
    Hightower, both of the South Carolina Department of
    Health and Environmental Control, of Columbia; all for
    Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and
    Environmental Control.
    LOCKEMY, A.J.: In this contested case, Charles S. Blackmon and South
    Carolinians for Responsible Agricultural Practices (collectively, Appellants)
    appeal the order of the Administrative Law Court (the ALC) affirming the South
    Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's (the Department's)
    issuance of agricultural permits to David Coggins Broilers, Heath Coggins
    Broilers, and Jim Young Broilers (collectively, Broilers). Appellants argue the
    ALC erred in (1) deferring to the Department's interpretation of regulations
    61-9.122 and 61-43 Part 200 of the South Carolina Code1 and concluding that, as a
    matter of law, Broilers were not required to apply for a separate National Pollutant
    Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit or obtain an exemption from the
    Department; (2) deferring to the Department's interpretation of regulation 61-43
    that allowed it to avoid mandated aspects of permit evaluation and precluded a
    meaningful review of the permit application; and (3) requiring Appellants to
    establish actual discharges of pollutants by existing permittees. We reverse and
    remand to the Department.
    1
    
    S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61
    -9.122 to 61-9.125 (2011 & Supp. 2021) (implementing
    the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program); 
    S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61
    -43.200.10 to 200.200 (2011 & Supp. 2021) (setting forth the
    standards for permitting of agricultural facilities other than swine).
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In 2016, Broilers each submitted an application to the Department for new
    agricultural animal facilities permits to construct and operate their proposed broiler
    facilities. Broilers collectively proposed to construct eighteen broiler houses on a
    255-acre tract located in the Little River watershed in the Mountville area of
    Laurens County. David Coggins Broilers' facility proposed to house 162,000
    broilers, and Heath Coggins Broilers and Jim Young Broilers each proposed to
    house 237,600 broilers in their respective facilities.
    As part of the application process, public notices were sent to neighboring property
    owners notifying them of Broilers' intent to apply for agricultural permitting. At
    the request of several Mountville citizens, the Department held public meetings in
    September and October of 2016. Blackmon and several other property owners in
    the Mountville area, including Margaret Sparrow, Mary Basel, Kathy Lowman,
    and Eugene Ross Stewart, formed an unincorporated association called "South
    Carolinians for Responsible Agricultural Practices" to challenge Broilers' proposed
    facilities.
    After reviewing the applications and completing "Agricultural Permitting Review
    Checklists," the Department issued Bureau of Water Agricultural Permits to all
    Broilers in November and December of 2016. Each permit provided for the
    operation of "no-discharge" facilities and contained a special condition that
    required Broilers to "[o]perate and maintain [a] waste management system in
    accordance with State and Federal law so as to prevent discharges to the
    environment." Public notices were circulated in a local publication after the
    Department issued the permits.
    After the Department declined Appellants' requests to hold a final review
    conference as to Broilers' permits, Appellants filed a request for a contested case
    hearing with the ALC as to each permit.2 The ALC granted the parties' request to
    consolidate the three cases for purposes of the contested case hearing.
    Broilers moved for partial summary judgment, arguing they were not required to
    seek NPDES permits for the facilities because the agricultural permits the
    Department issued to them prohibited the discharge of pollutants into the waters of
    the state. Broilers asserted the Department was therefore not required to follow the
    2
    Appellants challenged each of the permits on five grounds. The only ground
    raised on appeal concerns the discharge of pollutants into waters of the state.
    procedure set forth in regulation 61-9.122.23(d)(2)3 for determining whether the
    facilities had "no potential to discharge."
    The ALC held a merits hearing. Appellants presented the testimony of several
    witnesses, including Dr. David Hargett, who testified as an expert in soil and water
    resource management; William Chaplin, an employee of the Department, who
    testified he reviewed Broilers' permit applications; and Christopher Mosley, a staff
    member of Agri-Waste Technology, Inc., who testified he prepared the
    Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plans (CNMPs) for each of the three
    applications. Mosley explained that in drafting each of the CNMPs, his team used
    soil maps, topographical maps, and satellite imagery, and conducted site visits.
    The CNMPs provided the number of broilers to be housed at the facilities, the
    amount of litter that would be produced, Broilers' plan for disposing of that litter,
    and the setback distances for the facilities.
    The ALC accepted proposed orders from Appellants, Broilers, and the Department.
    The ALC granted partial summary judgment in favor of Broilers and the
    Department (collectively, Respondents), concluding an NPDES permit was not
    required and the Department was not required to determine whether the facilities
    had no potential to discharge.
    Although the ALC found "the plain language of [regulation] 61-9.122.23
    define[d]" Broilers as concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), it
    concluded "the Department's application of [regulation] 61-43 part 200 in keeping
    with the regulation of CAFOs under the NPDES provisions [wa]s entitled to
    deference." Specifically, the ALC deferred to the Department's interpretation of
    regulations 61-43.200 and 61-9.122.23 that by issuing an agricultural permit
    pursuant to regulation 61-43.200, the Department also determined the facility had
    no potential to discharge into the waters of the state under regulation 61-9.122.23.
    The ALC reasoned that because permits issued pursuant to regulation 61-43.200
    were "no-discharge" permits—and as such did not allow the facilities to discharge
    pollutants—there was an inherent determination the facilities had "no potential to
    discharge." See Regs. 61-43.200.20(B) ("Permits issued under this regulation are
    3
    Regs. 61-9.122.23(d)(2) (providing "[a]n owner or operator of a Large
    [concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO)] need not seek coverage under an
    NPDES permit otherwise required by this section once the owner or operator has
    received from the Department notification of a determination under paragraph (f)
    of this section that the CAFO has 'no potential to discharge' manure, litter, or
    process wastewater").
    no-discharge permits."). The ALC thus concluded the permits prohibited Broilers
    from discharging pollutants into waters of the state and because Broilers did not
    seek to discharge pollutants into waters of the state, they were not required to apply
    for or obtain an NPDES permit as a matter of law. Additionally, the ALC opined,
    "Even if facts later reflect that [Broilers] are obligated to seek or obtain an NPDES
    permit because they are 'new source' CAFOs, that obligation would not occur until
    'at least 180 days prior to the time that the CAFO[s] commence[d] operation'" and
    therefore, this issue was not ripe for consideration. The ALC considered
    Appellants' remaining arguments and affirmed the Department's issuance of the
    permits. The ALC found the Department complied with the regulatory
    requirements in reviewing and issuing the permits. However, the ALC increased
    the setbacks of the facilities to move them farther from the Little River.4 Finally,
    the ALC added a condition to the permits that provided, "The Permits shall be
    conditioned upon each of the permittees obtaining a stormwater permit that
    addresses whether the setback limitation should exceed the minimum
    requirements." This appeal followed.
    ISSUES ON APPEAL
    1. Did the ALC err in deferring to the Department's interpretation of regulations
    61-9 and 61-43 in concluding Broilers were not required either to obtain an
    NPDES permit or request a determination by the Department that their operations
    had "no potential to discharge"?
    2. Did the ALC err in deferring to the Department's interpretation of regulation
    61-43 that allowed the Department to avoid mandated aspects of permit evaluation,
    thus precluding meaningful review of agricultural permit applications?
    3. Did the ALC err in imposing a burden upon Appellants to prove actual
    discharges of pollutants into waters of the state by existing agricultural permittees?
    4
    To address the complaints Basel—one of the property owners—raised during the
    public comment period, Chaplin required David Coggins and Jim Young to move
    their proposed facilities farther from Basel's property, which would have resulted
    in the facilities being closer to the Little River. The ALC's ruling reversed this
    accommodation and required the facilities to be moved back to their originally
    proposed location, farther from the Little River.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This court may reverse a decision of the ALC "if the substantive rights of the
    petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision
    is . . . affected by [an] error of law . . . [or is] arbitrary or capricious or
    characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
    
    S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610
    (B)(d),(f) (Supp. 2021). This court reviews questions
    of law de novo. S.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc., 
    397 S.C. 256
    , 260, 
    725 S.E.2d 480
    , 483 (2012). "The construction of a regulation is a
    question of law . . . ." 
    Id.
     (quoting 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 245).
    "[W]e will reject [an] agency's interpretation if it is contrary to the regulation's
    plain language." Id. at 261, 
    725 S.E.2d at 483
    .
    LAW AND ANALYSIS
    I. NPDES Permits
    Regulation 61-9.122.1(b)(1) defines the scope of the NPDES permit requirement
    and provides it "requires permits for the discharge of 'pollutants' from any 'point
    source' into 'waters of the State.'" Regs. 61-9.122.1(b)(1). Paragraph (b)(4)
    provides that a "concentrated animal feeding operation [(CAFO)] as defined in
    section 122.23" is a "point source[]" that requires an NPDES permit "for
    discharges." Regs. 61-9.122.1(b)(4)(i). Regulation 61-9.122.23(a) provides
    CAFOs, as defined in regulation 61-9.122.23(b), are point sources "that require
    NPDES permits for discharges or potential discharges," and regulation
    61-9.122.21(a)(1) states, "All [CAFOs] . . . have a duty to seek coverage under an
    NPDES permit, as described in section 122.23(d)." (emphasis added); see
    also Regs. 61-9.122.2(b) (stating a "[d]ischarge of a pollutant" means "[a]ny
    addition of any pollutant or combination of pollutants to waters of the State from
    any point source"); 
    id.
     (providing a "point source" includes "any . . . [CAFO] from
    which pollutants are or may be discharged" (emphasis added)); 
    id.
     ("'Point source
    discharge' means a discharge [that] is released to the waters of the State by a
    discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
    a . . . [CAFO] . . . from which waste is or may be discharged.").
    Paragraph (d) of this regulation states a CAFO owner or operator "must seek
    coverage under an NPDES permit" unless it has "received from the Department
    notification of a determination under paragraph (f)" that it "has 'no potential to
    discharge' manure, litter, or process wastewater." Regs. 61-9.122.23(d)(1)-(2).
    Paragraph (f)(1) provides,
    The Department, upon request, may make a case-specific
    determination that a Large CAFO has "no potential to
    discharge" pollutants to waters of the State. In making
    this determination, the Department must consider the
    potential for discharges from both the production area
    and any land application areas. . . . For purposes of this
    section, the term "no potential to discharge" means that
    there is no potential for any CAFO manure, litter, or
    process wastewater to be added to waters of the State
    under any circumstance or climatic condition. A
    determination that there is "no potential to discharge" for
    purposes of this section only relates to discharges of
    manure, litter, and process wastewater covered by this
    section.
    Regs. 61-9.122.23(f)(1) (emphases added).
    The CAFO owner or operator must seek coverage under an NPDES permit at least
    180 days before commencing operations and must include the information
    specified in regulations 61-9.122.21(f) and 61-9.122.21(i)(1)(i) to (ix) with its
    request. See Regs. 61-9.122.23(f)(2), (g)(4); Regs. 61-9.122.21(f),(i). Regulation
    61-9.122.21(f) requires basic information concerning the CAFO's geographical
    location, its contact information, its business activities, its principal products or
    services, and any permits or construction approvals it has received or for which it
    has applied. Regulation 61-9.122.21(i)(1)(i) to (ix) requires that a CAFO provide
    the following in addition to basic contact information:
    (iii) Latitude and longitude of the production area
    (entrance to production area);
    (iv) A topographic map of the geographic area in which
    the CAFO is located showing the specific location of the
    production area . . . ;
    (v) Specific information about the number and type of
    animals, whether in open confinement or housed under
    roof . . . ;
    (vi) The type of containment and storage . . . and total
    capacity for manure, litter, and process wastewater
    storage . . . ;
    (vii) The total number of acres under control of the
    applicant available for land application of manure, litter,
    or process wastewater;
    (viii) Estimated amounts of manure, litter, and process
    wastewater generated per year (tons/gallons); [and]
    (ix) Estimated amounts of manure, litter, and process
    wastewater transferred to other persons per year
    (tons/gallons) . . . .
    The NPDES permitting requirements also specify that a "'no potential to discharge'
    determination does not relieve the CAFO from the consequences of an actual
    discharge." Regs. 61-9.122.23(f)(5). Further, the Department retains the authority
    to subsequently require an NPDES permit if circumstances at the facility change.
    See Regs. 61-9.122.23(f)(6).
    Part 200 of Regulation 61-43 governs the permitting of animal facilities. "Permits
    issued under this regulation are no-discharge permits." Regs. 61-43.200.20(B). In
    making permitting decisions, "The Department shall act on all permits to prevent,
    so far as reasonably possible considering relevant standards under state and federal
    laws, an increase in pollution of the waters and air of the [s]tate from any new or
    enlarged sources." Regs. 61-43.200.70(E).
    Appellants contend the ALC erred by deferring to the Department's interpretation
    that its issuance of a "no-discharge" permit pursuant to part 200 of regulation
    61-43 constituted "an inherent determination that the facilities ha[d] no 'potential to
    discharge'" in keeping with regulation 61-9.122.23(f). Appellants argue that
    because the plain language of regulations 61-9 and part 200 of 61-43 are contrary
    to the Department's interpretation, this court should reverse the ALC's decision.
    They assert that, by definition, large CAFOs have a potential to discharge and the
    Department's interpretation that Broilers were not large CAFOs was contrary to the
    plain language of regulation 61-9. In addition, Appellants argue the ALC erred by
    finding as an additional sustaining ground that the issue was not ripe for judicial
    determination. We agree.
    "[O]ur deference doctrine provides that courts defer to an administrative agency's
    interpretations with respect to the statutes entrusted to its administration or its own
    regulations 'unless there is a compelling reason to differ.'" Kiawah Dev. Partners,
    II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 
    411 S.C. 16
    , 34, 
    766 S.E.2d 707
    , 718
    (2014) (quoting S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
    Control, 
    363 S.C. 67
    , 75, 
    610 S.E.2d 482
    , 486 (2005)). "We defer to an agency
    interpretation unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
    statute.'" Id. at 34-35, 766 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
    Def. Council Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 844 (1984)); see also Murphy v. S.C. Dep't of
    Health & Envtl. Control, 
    396 S.C. 633
    , 640-41, 
    723 S.E.2d 191
    , 195 (2012)
    (deferring to the Department's "construction and application" of a regulation when
    it was "both reasonable and consistent with the plain language of the regulation").
    "A decision is arbitrary if it is without a rational basis, is based alone on one's will
    and not upon any course of reasoning and exercise of judgment, is made at
    pleasure, without adequate determining principles, or is governed by no fixed rules
    or standards." Converse Power Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control,
    
    350 S.C. 39
    , 47, 
    564 S.E.2d 341
    , 345 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Deese v. State Bd.
    of Dentistry, 
    286 S.C. 182
    , 184-85, 
    332 S.E.2d 539
    , 541 (Ct. App. 1985)).
    "Regulations are interpreted using the same rules of construction as statutes."
    Murphy, 
    396 S.C. at 639
    , 
    723 S.E.2d at 195
    . "When interpreting a regulation, we
    look for the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the regulation, without
    resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the regulation's
    operation." Id. at 639-40, 
    723 S.E.2d at 195
     (quoting Converse Power Corp., 350
    S.C. at 47, 564 S.E.2d at 346)). "Whe[n] the language of a regulation is plain,
    unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, interpretation of the
    regulation is unnecessary and improper." Kiawah Dev. Partners, II, 411 S.C. at
    39, 766 S.E.2d at 720-21. "However, if applying the regulation's plain language
    would lead to an absurd result, we will interpret the regulation in a manner which
    avoids the absurdity." Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc., 
    397 S.C. at 261
    , 
    725 S.E.2d at 483
    .
    As an initial matter, we address Respondents' procedural arguments. We reject
    Respondents' assertions that Appellants failed to preserve the arguments they raise
    on appeal and that the issues are not ripe for judicial determination. As to
    preservation, Appellants advanced their arguments to the ALC that Broilers were
    required to either seek an NPDES permit or obtain an exception from the
    Department and that the Department improperly interpreted its regulations and
    failed to conduct a site-specific evaluation to determine whether Broilers had a
    potential to discharge and thus contribute to the pollution of waters of the state.
    The ALC ruled on these issues. We therefore conclude Appellants' arguments are
    preserved for our review. Herron v. Century BMW, 
    395 S.C. 461
    , 465, 
    719 S.E.2d 640
    , 642 (2011) ("[I]ssue preservation requires that an issue be raised to and ruled
    upon by the trial judge."). As to ripeness, the regulations require CAFOs to apply
    for an NPDES permit at least 180 days before the CAFO begins operation;
    however, nothing prevents a party from applying sooner. See
    Regs. 61-9.122.23(g). Further, Respondents contend Broilers were not required to
    apply for such permit, regardless of timing. Thus, we find the issue is ripe for
    judicial determination. See Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n, 
    321 S.C. 219
    , 227, 
    467 S.E.2d 913
    , 917-18 (1996) ("A justiciable controversy is a real
    and substantial controversy which is ripe and appropriate for judicial
    determination, as distinguished from a contingent, hypothetical or abstract
    dispute." (quoting Pee Dee Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 
    279 S.C. 64
    , 66, 
    301 S.E.2d 761
    , 762 (1983)).
    On the merits, we find the ALC erred in deferring to the Department's
    interpretation of regulation 61-9.122 and part 200 of regulation 61-43 and in
    concluding Broilers were not required to apply for an NPDES permit or obtain an
    exemption. See § 1-23-610(B) (providing this court may reverse the decision of
    the ALC when the decision is affected by an error of law). The Department
    determined that because it issued Broilers a no-discharge permit—which prohibits
    Broilers from discharging pollutants into the waters of the state—Broilers were
    neither required to apply for an NPDES permit nor request a determination that
    they had no potential to discharge. According to the plain language of the
    regulations, Broilers are large CAFOs by definition because they proposed to
    house between 162,000 and 237,000 broiler chickens, using a dry manure handling
    system. See Regs. 61-9.122.23(b)(2) (stating a CAFO means an animal feeding
    operation (AFO) "that is defined as a Large CAFO or as a Medium CAFO by the
    terms of this paragraph," or that the Department designates as a CAFO);
    Regs. 61-9.122.23(b)(4)(x) (providing a large CAFO is an AFO that stables or
    confines 125,000 chickens or more and uses other than a liquid manure handling
    system). Regulation 61-9.122.2 states a CAFO comprises a point source and thus
    requires an NPDES permit for discharges. See Regs. 61-9.122.1(b)(4)(i). Under
    regulation 61-9.122.23(d), large CAFOs are required to apply for an NPDES
    permit unless they obtain a determination from the Department pursuant to
    regulation 61-9.122.23(f) that they have "no potential to discharge."
    See Regs. 61-9.122.23(d)-(f). Paragraph (f) provides "the term 'no potential to
    discharge' means that there is no potential for any CAFO manure, litter, or process
    wastewater to be added to waters of the State under any circumstance or climactic
    condition." Regs. 61-9.122.23(f)(1) (emphasis added). The Department's
    conclusion that a "no discharge" permit—which prohibits a facility from
    discharging pollutants into the waters of the state—is the equivalent of a
    determination under regulation 61-9.122.23(f) that the facility has "no potential to
    discharge" is manifestly contrary to the language of the regulation, which requires
    the Department to make a case-specific evaluation. See Regs. 61-9.122.23(f)(1).
    The Department's issuance of a no-discharge permit did not satisfy this
    requirement because the Department did not specifically consider whether there
    was no potential for any CAFO manure, litter, or process wastewater from Broilers'
    proposed facilities to be added to the waters of the State "under any circumstance
    or climactic condition." See id. Simply because the no-discharge permit
    prohibited Broilers from discharging pollutants into the waters of the state did not
    mean they had no potential to discharge pollutants within the meaning of
    regulation 61-9. Rather, the Department was required to evaluate Broilers'
    proposed facilities to determine whether there was any potential to discharge.
    Thus, we conclude the ALC erred in deferring to the Department's interpretation of
    regulation 61-9 and in finding Broilers had "no potential to discharge" because the
    Department issued them no-discharge permits.
    Further, we reject the Department's argument that as a result of the Waterkeeper
    decision, it no longer has authority under regulation 61-9.122.23 to require a large
    CAFO to obtain an NPDES permit and that such CAFOs have no obligation to
    seek the Department's determination that the CAFO has no potential to discharge.
    See Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
    399 F.3d 486
     (2d Cir.
    2005). In Waterkeeper, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that, with
    respect to CAFOs, "unless there is a 'discharge of any pollutant,' there is no
    violation of the [Clean Water] Act, and point sources are, accordingly, . . . [not]
    statutorily obligated to seek or obtain an NPDES permit." 
    Id. at 504
    . The court
    explained that "in the absence of an actual addition of any pollutant to navigable
    waters from any point, there is no point source discharge, no statutory
    violation, . . . and no statutory obligation of point sources to seek or obtain an
    NPDES permit in the first instance." 
    Id. at 505
    . The South Carolina regulations at
    issue are based not only on the federal NPDES regulations but also upon the South
    Carolina Pollution Control Act, which specifically authorizes the Department to
    "prevent pollution." See Regs. 61-9.122.1(a)(1) (stating "[t]he regulatory
    provisions contained in [regulations] 61-9.122 and 124 implement
    the . . . []NPDES[] Program under . . . the Clean Water Act . . . and the South
    Carolina Pollution Control Act"); see also 
    S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-1-10
     to -350
    (2008 & Supp. 2021) (setting forth South Carolina's Pollution Control Act);
    § 48-1-20 (declaring it is "the public policy of the State to maintain reasonable
    standards of purity of the air and water resources of the State" and authorizing the
    Department to "abate, control[,] and prevent pollution" (emphasis added)). We
    acknowledge the CAFO regulation in the federal NPDES section of the Clean
    Water Act has since been amended and now provides that a CAFO must seek an
    NPDES permit only if it either discharges or proposes to discharge a pollutant. 
    40 C.F.R. § 122.23
     (2008). Here, the ALC determined Waterkeeper was not
    controlling, and as Broilers acknowledge, neither the Department nor the state has
    taken any action since the 2005 Waterkeeper decision to repeal or amend our state
    regulatory scheme with respect to CAFOs. South Carolina's NPDES regulations
    therefore remain in effect and Waterkeeper and the subsequent revisions to the
    federal regulations did not abrogate or otherwise repeal them.5
    We acknowledge regulation 61-9.122.23 provides that even when the Department
    determines there is no potential to discharge, Broilers would still be in violation of
    the regulation if they in fact contributed pollutants to the waters of the state.
    Regulation 61-43 likewise prohibits discharges and provides the Department
    authority to enforce compliance with the no-discharge permit. The Pollution
    Control Act provides for criminal and civil penalties when a person "throw[s],
    drain[s], run[s], or allow[s] to seep, or otherwise discharges organic or inorganic
    matter into the waters of the [s]tate" unless that discharge is "in compliance with a
    permit issued by the [D]epartment." See § 48-1-90. Nevertheless, none of these
    measures equal a finding by the Department that Broilers had no potential to
    discharge, which our regulations require to excuse a CAFO from obtaining an
    NPDES permit.
    Based on the foregoing, we find the ALC erred in deferring to the Department's
    interpretation of the regulations and in concluding Broilers were not required to
    apply for an NPDES permit because the issuance of a no-discharge permit
    constituted a determination by the Department that Broilers had no potential to
    discharge. We therefore reverse as to this issue and remand to the Department for
    further evaluation pursuant to regulation 61-9.
    5
    As to the Department's contention the regulations contained in regulation
    61-9.122 are unenforceable because they were enacted without legislative
    approval, the Department raises this argument for the first time on appeal.
    Therefore, we decline to consider this argument as an additional sustaining ground.
    See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 
    338 S.C. 406
    , 421, 
    526 S.E.2d 716
    , 724
    (2000) ("[A] respondent may raise an additional sustaining ground that was not
    even presented to the lower court, but the appellate court is likely to ignore it.").
    II. Permit Evaluation
    Appellants next contend the ALC erred by accepting DHEC's interpretation of
    certain provisions within part 200 of regulation 61-43 and requiring Appellants to
    show actual discharges from other facilities. Appellants assert that in 2004, the
    Department issued a "Total Maximum Daily Load" (TMDL) for the Little River
    because its watershed had impaired water quality due to excessive levels of fecal
    bacteria and it identified poultry facilities as possible contributors to the
    impairment. Appellants argue the Department unreasonably interpreted regulation
    61-43.200.70(F) and 61-43.200.140(B) to (C) when it concluded no additional
    requirements or setbacks were needed because "ag[riculatural] facilities are not
    considered as contributors to TMDL." Appellants contend the Department
    therefore failed to meaningfully evaluate the factors set forth in regulations
    61-43.200.70(E) to (F) and 61-43.200.140(C) in issuing permits to Broilers and
    that the ALC erred by deferring to the Department's interpretation of the
    regulations. We agree.
    Part 200 of regulation 61-43 governs the permitting of animal facilities.
    Regulation 61-43.200.70(F) provided,6
    The setback limits given in this part are minimum siting
    requirements . . . On a case-by-case basis the
    Department may require additional separation distances
    applicable to animal facilities . . . The Department shall
    evaluate the proposed site including, but not limited to,
    6
    In May 2021, part 200.70(F) was revised and now provides:
    The setback limits given in Part 200 are siting
    requirements. The Department shall evaluate the
    following factors to determine if any special conditions
    are necessary:
    1. Latitude and Longitude;
    2. Down-wind receptors; and
    3. Nutrient Management Plan.
    
    S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61
    -43.200.70(F) (Supp. 2021).
    the following factors when determining if additional
    distances are necessary:
    1. Proximity to 100-year floodplain;
    2. Geography and soil types on the site;
    3. Location in a watershed;
    4. Classification or impairment of adjacent waters;
    5. Proximity to a State Designated Focus Area;
    Outstanding Resource Water; Heritage Corridor;
    Historic Preservation District; State Approved
    Source Water Protection Area; state or national
    park or forest; state or federal research area; and
    privately-owned wildlife refuge, park, or trust
    property;
    6. Proximity to other known point source
    discharges and potential nonpoint sources;
    7. Slope of the land;
    8. Animal manure application method and
    aerosols;
    9. Runoff prevention;
    10. Adjacent groundwater usage;
    11. Down-wind receptors; and
    12. Aquifer vulnerability.
    Regulation 61-43.200.140 provides:
    A. There shall be no discharge of pollutants from the
    operation into surface [w]aters of the [s]tate (including
    ephemeral and intermittent streams). . . .
    B. On a case-by-case basis, the Department may impose
    additional or more stringent requirements for the
    management, handling, treatment, storage, or utilization
    of animal manure and other animal by-products.
    C. The following cases shall be evaluated for additional
    or more stringent requirements:
    1. Source water protection. Facilities and manure
    utilization areas located within a state approved
    source water protection area.
    2. 303(d) Impaired Waterbodies List. Facilities and
    manure utilization areas located upstream of an
    impaired waterbody.
    ....
    (emphases added); see also Regs. 61-43.200.70(E) (providing that, in making
    permitting decisions, "[t]he Department shall act on all permits to prevent, so far as
    reasonably possible considering relevant standards under state and federal laws, an
    increase in pollution of the waters and air of the State from any new or enlarged
    sources").
    Chaplin, the Department's permit reviewer, testified regarding his review of the
    proposed facilities. The record contains the checklist summaries he completed.
    Chaplin testified, and the checklist summaries reflect, that in making the permitting
    decision, the Department considered the proximity of the projects to the Little
    River—an impaired waterbody located downstream from the proposed facilities.
    Chaplin testified, however, that agricultural facilities were not considered to
    contribute to the TMDL and therefore he determined no additional requirements or
    setbacks were needed because Broilers' facilities would not increase pollution of
    the waters of the state. As the ALC recognized, the regulations require the
    Department to evaluate sensitive areas, including areas on the impaired water
    bodies list, to determine if more stringent requirements or setbacks are needed. See
    Regs. 61-43.200.140(C)(2). The Department bypassed this case-specific
    evaluation by concluding agricultural facilities are not considered to contribute to
    the TMDL. This interpretation was arbitrary because the regulations required the
    Department to evaluate specific factors to determine whether additional setbacks
    were required or additional or more stringent requirements were needed. We
    therefore find the ALC erred in deferring to the Department's interpretation. The
    Department should have evaluated the factors set forth in regulations
    61-43.200.70(F) and 61-43.200.140(C). See Regs. 61-43.200.70(E) ("The
    Department shall act on all permits to prevent, so far as reasonably possible, . . . an
    increase in pollution of the waters and air of the State from any new or enlarged
    sources.").7 Thus, we conclude the ALC erred in finding the Department complied
    with the regulatory requirements in issuing the permits.8
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude the ALC erred in affirming the Department's
    issuance of the agricultural permits when it failed to consider all factors set forth in
    part 200 of regulation 61-43 in evaluating Broilers' permit applications. We
    therefore reverse and remand to the Department for further evaluation pursuant to
    regulation 61-43.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ALC's decision to uphold the
    Department's issuance of the permits to Broilers and remand to the Department for
    further evaluation pursuant to regulations 61-9 and 61-43.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
    7
    We acknowledge Broilers' facilities, as proposed, comply with the minimum
    setback requirements. Thus, we question whether Appellants' arguments
    concerning additional setbacks are now moot under the current regulatory scheme.
    This amendment, however, did not affect Appellants' arguments concerning
    whether additional or more stringent requirements were needed under regulation
    61-43.200.140(C).
    8
    We decline to address Appellants' remaining argument the ALC erred in
    requiring "evidence proving that existing permitted facilities actually increased
    pollution to waters of the State" because our decisions as to the prior issues are
    dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 
    335 S.C. 598
    ,
    613, 
    518 S.E.2d 591
    , 598 (1999) (stating the court need not address the appellant's
    remaining issues when the disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).