John Doe v. Bishop of Charleston ( 2023 )

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
John Doe, Appellant,
v.
Bishop of Charleston, a Corporation Sole, and The
Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston, in his official
capacity, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2020-000804
Appeal From Charleston County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 6009
Heard June 15, 2023 – Filed August 2, 2023
AFFIRMED
Lawrence E. Richter, Jr., of The Richter Firm, LLC, of
Mount Pleasant, and David K. Haller, of Haller Law
Firm, of Charleston, both for Appellant.
Richard S. Dukes, Jr., of Turner Padget Graham &
Laney, PA, of Charleston, and R. Hawthorne Barrett, of
Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Columbia, both
for Respondents.
WILLIAMS, C.J.: John Doe (Appellant) filed this action against the Diocese of
Charleston and the Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston (collectively,
Respondents) alleging that as a child in 1970, he was sexually molested by two
teachers at Sacred Heart Catholic School, a parochial school operated by the
Respondents. Appellant argues the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment based on the doctrine of charitable immunity. We affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2018, Appellant filed this action against Respondents, alleging that as a
child around the ages of 12 to 14 (i.e., around 1969 to 1971), he was sexually
molested by two teachers at Sacred Heart Catholic School. Appellant asserted
claims for relief based on sexual abuse, outrage, negligence/gross negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent
concealment, civil conspiracy, negligent retention or supervision, breach of
contract, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. Respondents
filed multiple motions for summary judgment based upon the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact regarding: (1) the defense of common law charitable
immunity; (2) the defense of the statute of limitations; and (3) the defense of res
judicata. Respondents additionally argued there was no genuine issue of material
fact regarding the elements of each claim asserted by Appellant.
The circuit court heard oral argument on Respondents' dispositive motions based
on charitable immunity, the statute of limitations, and res judicata pursuant to a
2007 class action settlement. The circuit court granted Respondents summary
judgment based on the doctrine of charitable immunity. Appellant filed a Rule
59(e), SCRCP, motion requesting the circuit court alter or amend its order. The
circuit court denied Appellant's Rule 59(e) motion and this appeal followed.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment to Respondents based on
the doctrine of charitable immunity?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment
motion, this court applies the same standard that governs
the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 399 S.C. 483, 490, 732 S.E.2d 205, 208–09 (Ct.
App. 2012). "In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence
and all reasonable inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at 490, 732 S.E.2d at 209.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the circuit court misapplied the law of charitable immunity as it
existed at the time of Appellant's injury when his right of action accrued.
Appellant asserts that although his causes of action accrued no later than 1970, the
circuit court erred in determining that the charitable immunity defense in 1970
provided a complete defense to the types of claims asserted in this case. Appellant
argues the law regarding charitable immunity that controlled in 1970 was the same
law that controlled in 1973, when a unanimous South Carolina Supreme Court
explained in Jeffcoat v. Caine, 261 S.C. 75, 198 S.E.2d 258 (1973), that the
doctrine of charitable immunity had never extended beyond tort claims based on
"mere negligence." As such, Appellant contends the scope of the doctrine of
charitable immunity at the time of the injury would not have afforded Respondents
exemption from liability.
"This Court has consistently ruled that the abrogation of immunities defenses is to
be applied prospectively only." Hupman v. Erskine Coll., 281 S.C. 43, 44, 314
S.E.2d 314, 315 (1984). To determine whether the doctrine applies, the triggering
event is when the cause of action arose. See Laughridge v. Parkinson, 304 S.C. 51,
54, 403 S.E.2d 120, 121 (1991). In determining whether the doctrine of charitable
immunity protected Respondents at the time of the alleged abuse, the analysis is
twofold: (1) we must determine whether the immunity applied at the time of the
alleged injury and (2) whether the corporation had, at the relevant time, a
charitable rather than commercial purpose. See Eiserhardt v. State Agric. & Mech.
Soc'y of S.C., 235 S.C. 305, 311, 111 S.E.2d 568, 571 (1959); Laughridge, 304
S.C. at 54, 403 S.E.2d at 121. Because Appellant does not contest that
Respondents are classified as a charitable organization, we are only tasked with
determining whether the law of charitable immunity in 1970 provided exemption
from liability. We find it did.
The doctrine of charitable immunity was first announced by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Lindler v. Columbia Hospital of Richland County, 98 S.C. 25,
27, 81 S.E. 512, 512 (1914). Lindler involved alleged injuries suffered by a paying
patient in a hospital supported, in part, by charity. Id. at 27, 81 S.E. at 513. The
court held, "A charitable corporation is not liable to injuries, resulting from the
negligent or tortious acts of a servant, in the course of his employment, where such
corporation has exercised due care in his selection." Id. at 27, 81 S.E. at 512. The
court explained its rationale stating "[t]he true ground upon which to rest the
exemption from liability is that it would be against public policy to hold a
charitable institution responsible for the negligence of its servants, selected with
due care." Id. at 28, 81 S.E. at 513.
The doctrine of charitable immunity was discussed next in Vermillion v. Woman's
College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916). The court in Vermillion
considered whether a charitable entity was liable to a plaintiff who paid for entry to
musical entertainment in its auditorium balcony, which subsequently fell. Id. at
199, 88 S.E. at 649. The defendant claimed exemption from liability on the ground
that it was a public charity. Id. The court held that charitable immunity rendered
charitable entities exempt from liability "for the torts of their superior officers and
agents as well as for those of their servants or employ[ee]s, whether these be
selected with or without due care." Id. at 202, 88 S.E. at 650. The court's rationale
was that, in some instances, the rights of the individual must yield to the public
good, and charities should not face ruin to compensate one or more individuals. Id.In the case of Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 343–44, 47 S.E.2d
788, 790 (1948), the court held that a charitable organization or institution was not
liable under the workers compensation act. In determining whether the immunity
doctrine applied, the court stated "the question has been settled in this jurisdiction
by adoption of the rule of full immunity of such institutions from the torts of their
agents and servants." Id. at 343, 47 S.E.2d at 790.
In Bush v. Aiken Electric Cooperative Inc., 226 S.C. 442, 449–50, 85 S.E.2d 716,
719–20 (1955), the court held that even though a rural, electric co-operative was a
non-profit organization, it was not a charitable corporation immune from tort
liability. The court stated "[u]nder our decisions institutions of this kind, on
grounds of public policy, enjoy full immunity from tort liability" and cited Lindler,
Vermillion, and Caughman. Id. at 448, 85 S.E.2d at 719. However, the Bush court
reiterated the Caughman court, stating "the writer desires to repeat the observation
made in Caughman[], to the effect that he seriously doubts the soundness of the
rule giving charitable institutions immunity from tort liability." Id. at 451, 85
S.E.2d at 720.
In Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Society of South Carolina, 235
S.C. at 311–12, 111 S.E.2d at 571–72, the court reaffirmed the defense of
charitable immunity though it refused to extend immunity to activities outside the
scope of the charitable organization's mission. The court found the charitable
immunity doctrine inapplicable to a commercial venture conducted by a charitable
corporation, stating, "we do not think immunity should be extended to a situation
where the activity out of which the alleged liability arose is primarily commercial
in character and wholly unconnected with the charitable purpose for which the
corporation was organized. This view is supported by the overwhelming weight of
authority." Id. at 312, 111 S.E.2d at 572. However, the court reiterated the
principle that South Carolina has "adhered to the general rule laid down in
Lindler[], of full immunity of charitable institutions from the torts of their agents
and servants," yet has also "refrained from extending this immunity to a degree
never contemplated when the rule was adopted." Id. at 311, 111 S.E.2d at 571.
Finally, in Decker v. Bishop of Charleston, 247 S.C. 317, 325, 147 S.E.2d 264, 268
(1966), the court applied charitable immunity to a tort claim against the Diocese
and declared the church to be a true charity entitled to immunity from suit
altogether. More importantly, the Decker court went through an exhaustive
analysis of the history of charitable immunity in South Carolina, stating:
For us to withdraw immunity from charitable institutions
at this time, against the existing background of decisions
of the court would, in effect, be an act of judicial
legislation in the field of public policy. Whether some
change in our rule is advisable is a question to be
considered and resolved by the law making body.
Id.Appellant relies almost exclusively on Jeffcoat v. Caine in arguing that charitable
immunity did not apply to intentional torts at the time of the alleged abuse. The
court in Jeffcoat addressed whether the South Carolina Baptist Hospital could be
liable for false imprisonment, an intentional tort. Id. at 77–78, 198 S.E.2d at 259.
While the court declined to extend charitable immunity to exempt charitable
organizations from liability for intentional torts, the court refused to overturn
Lindler, Vermillion, and Decker. Id. at 79–80, 198 S.E.2d at 260. Appellant relies
on the court's following statements:
There can be no doubt that the decisions in Lindler,
Vermillion, and Decker contain broad general
expressions to the effect that charitable institutions are
exempt from all tort liability. However, the broad
statement of a rule of complete exemption from tort
liability was unnecessary to a decision in those cases, and
the rule of charitable immunity has never been extended
by our decisions beyond the facts in Lindler, Vermillion,
and Decker. . . . These decisions point up the fact that
this Court, while adhering in the past to the rule that
charitable institutions are exempt from liability for mere
negligence, has in every instance refused to further
extend the rule. Therefore, the application of the
immunity doctrine in a case of intentional tort is not
required by precedent, nor, we conclude, by reason or
justice.
Id. Appellant's reliance on Jeffcoat is misplaced. First, Jeffcoat was decided three
years after the cause of action in this case arose and is therefore not an accurate
representation of the law in 1970.
At its outset, the supreme court in Lindler held that charitable immunity in South
Carolina meant that "a charitable corporation is not liable to injuries, resulting from
the negligent or tortious acts of a servant, in the course of his employment." 98
S.C. at 27, 81 S.E. at 512. Two years later, the Vermillion court echoed the court
in Lindler and stated that law of charitable immunity rendered charitable entities
exempt from liability "for the torts of their superior officers and agents as well as
for those of their servants or employ[ee]s." Id. at 202, 88 S.E. at 650. Then, the
court in Caughman stated that "the question [of charitable immunity] has been
settled in this jurisdiction by adoption of the rule of full immunity of such
institutions from the torts of their agents and servants." Id. at 343, 47 S.E.2d at
790 (emphasis added). Once more, the court in Bush stated that "[u]nder our
decisions institutions of this kind, on grounds of public policy, enjoy full immunity
from tort liability" and cited Lindler, Vermillion, and Caughman. Id. at 448, 85
S.E.2d at 719 (emphasis added).
Then, in Eiserhardt, while the court refused to extend the immunity to ventures
conducted by a charitable organization not aligned with its charitable purpose, it
again reiterated that South Carolina has "adhered to the general rule laid down in
Lindler[], of full immunity of charitable institutions from the torts of their agents
and servants." Id. at 311, 111 S.E.2d at 571 (emphasis added). Most notably, four
years before Appellant's alleged injury date, the court in Decker went through the
history of charitable immunity precedent in South Carolina and stated that
"withdraw[ing] immunity from charitable institutions at this time, against the
existing background of decisions of the court would, in effect, be an act of judicial
legislation in the field of public policy." Id. at 325, 147 S.E.2d at 268. As such,
the court believed judicial restraint was necessary to prevent the erosion of an
immunity historically based on public policy, which only the legislature should
control. Id.Jeffcoat acknowledges that the case law prior to its decision contained "expressions
to the effect that charitable institutions are exempt from all tort liability." 261 S.C.
at 79, 198 S.E.2d at 260 (emphasis added); see also Vermillion, 104 S.C. at 202, 88
S.E. at 650 ("The rule of total exemption is, perhaps, without exception, based
upon grounds of public policy."); Caughman, 212 S.C. at 343, 47 S.E.2d at 790("[T]he question has been settled in this jurisdiction by adoption of the rule of full
immunity of such institutions from the torts of their agents and servants."); Bush,
226 S.C. at 448, 85 S.E.2d at 719 ("Under our decisions institutions of this kind, on
grounds of public policy, enjoy full immunity from tort liability."). As a result,
there existed authority supporting Respondents' position that complete immunity
existed for charitable institutions in 1970. No court in this state had, at that time,
restricted the charitable immunity doctrine to such an extent as to hold
Respondents liable for intentional torts.
Further, we find Roe v. Bishop of Charleston, No. 2:21-CV-20-RMG, 2022 WL
1570810, at *2 (D.S.C. May 18, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-1754 (4th Cir. May 17, 2023).
which involves the same respondents as the instant case, instructive. Roe involved
similar circumstances to our present case. The plaintiff alleged a priest of the
Dioceses of Charleston, sometime between 1961–1966, sexually abused her. Id. at
*1. She brought claims for (1) fraudulent concealment; (2) negligence/gross
negligence/recklessness; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) outrage/intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (5) civil conspiracy; and (6) negligent retention or
supervision. Id. The defendants filed various motions for summary judgment
including one based on charitable immunity. Id. The District Court of South
Carolina discussed South Carolina's history regarding the doctrine of charitable
immunity including a discussion of Lindler, Vermillion, Eiserhardt, and Decker.
Id. at *3–4. The district court found evidence that the defendants were a charitable
organization during 1961–1966 and further found that the doctrine of charitable
immunity would have barred the entirety of the plaintiff's claims. Id. at *3.
Based on Appellant's concession of Respondents' charitable designation at the time
of the alleged injury and the precedent at the time demonstrating support of
complete immunity, we hold the circuit court properly granted summary judgment
to Respondents on the basis of charitable immunity.
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is
AFFIRMED.
GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.