Raglins Creek Farms, LLC v. Nancy D. Martin ( 2023 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Raglins Creek Farms, LLC, Respondent,
    v.
    Nancy Dunn Martin, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2017-001795
    Appeal From Richland County
    Joseph M. Strickland, Master-in-Equity
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-062
    Heard December 8, 2022 – Filed February 15, 2023
    REVERSED
    Joey Randell Floyd, Wesley Dickinson Peel, and Chelsea
    Jaqueline Clark, all of Bruner Powell Wall & Mullins,
    LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.
    John W. Wells, of Baxley, Wells & Benson, of Lugoff;
    and Michael Brent McDonald, of Bundy McDonald,
    LLC, of Summerville, both for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: This case concerns an alleged easement to use a dirt road, known
    as Shady Grove Road, across the lands of Nancy Dunn Martin. She appeals the
    master-in-equity's order finding easements by grant and prescription in favor of
    Raglins Creek Farms, LLC (Respondent) and that the road was a public road. She
    argues that all of these findings were incorrect and that the action was barred by
    three different statutes of limitation.
    We agree the master erred in finding easements by grant and prescription and that
    the road was public. We decline to address the statutes of limitation as our reasoning
    on the merits is dispositive.
    Standard of Review
    "The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law
    action and subject to an any evidence standard of review when tried by a judge
    without a jury." Pittman v. Lowther, 
    363 S.C. 47
    , 50, 
    610 S.E.2d 479
    , 480 (2005).
    "In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried without a jury, the findings of fact of
    the judge will not be disturbed upon appeal unless found to be without evidence
    which reasonably supports the judge's findings." Kelley v. Snyder, 
    396 S.C. 564
    ,
    571, 
    722 S.E.2d 813
    , 817 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of
    Greenville, 
    266 S.C. 81
    , 86, 
    221 S.E.2d 773
    , 775 (1976), abrogated by In re Est. of
    Kay, 
    423 S.C. 476
    , 
    816 S.E.2d 542
     (2018)).
    Prescriptive Easement
    Even under our any evidence standard of review, the evidence in the record does not
    support the master's finding of a prescriptive easement. See Murrells Inlet Corp. v.
    Ward, 
    378 S.C. 225
    , 232, 
    662 S.E.2d 452
    , 455 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating an easement
    is a right given to a person to use the land of another for a specific purpose); Frierson
    v. Watson, 
    371 S.C. 60
    , 67, 
    636 S.E.2d 872
    , 875 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding an
    easement may arise in three ways: (1) by grant; (2) from necessity; and (3) by
    prescription); Boyd v. Bellsouth Tel. Tel. Co., 
    369 S.C. 410
    , 419, 
    633 S.E.2d 136
    ,
    141 (2006) ("A prescriptive easement is not implied by law but is established by the
    conduct of the dominant tenement owner . . . ."); Horry County v. Laychur, 
    315 S.C. 364
    , 367, 
    434 S.E.2d 259
    , 261 (1993) (stating that to establish a prescriptive
    easement, the party asserting the right must show: (1) continued and uninterrupted
    use of the right for twenty years; (2) the identity of the thing enjoyed; and (3) use
    which is either adverse or under a claim of right); Jones v. Daley, 
    363 S.C. 310
    , 316,
    
    609 S.E.2d 597
    , 600 (Ct. App. 2005) ("To establish an easement by prescription, one
    need only establish either a justifiable claim of right or adverse and hostile use."
    (alteration in original)), overruled by Simmons v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 
    419 S.C. 223
    , 229-32, 
    797 S.E.2d 387
    , 390-92 (2016) ("[A]dverse use and claim of right
    cannot exist as separate methods of proving the third element of a prescriptive
    easement as the two terms are, in effect, one and the same."); id. at 317, 609 S.E.2d
    at 600 (stating there is no requirement of exclusivity of use to establish a prescriptive
    easement); Morrow v. Dyches, 
    328 S.C. 522
    , 527, 
    492 S.E.2d 420
    , 423 (Ct. App.
    1997) (holding the party claiming a prescriptive easement bears the burden of
    proving all of the elements).
    First, no one disputes that Martin's property consists of unenclosed woodland. This
    means that all use of the road before a gate was installed across the road in 1970 is
    presumed by law to be permissive use. See State v. Miller (Miller II), 
    130 S.C. 152
    ,
    156, 
    125 S.E. 298
    , 299 (1924) ("[T]he rule requiring that in addition to proof of the
    continuous use of a road for 20 years or more in order to establish a prescriptive
    right, 'when it passes over uninclosed woodland it must also be shown that the user
    was adverse,' proceeds upon the theory, soundly grounded in conditions which are a
    matter of common knowledge in this country, that the user of a road through
    uninclosed woodland is, in effect, a user by license or permission of the owner of
    the land." (quoting State v. Miller (Miller I), 
    125 S.C. 289
    , 291, 
    118 S.E. 624
    , 625
    (1923))). The evidence did not rebut this presumption. Generic testimony—as was
    offered here—of the road's longstanding use for recreation, hunting, and general
    access without seeking the owner's explicit permission is not evidence of adverse
    use. As precedent aptly explains, people who travel such a road "commit no trespass
    (at least not until after notice to desist), and subject[] the owner to no loss or
    inconvenience. To prohibit them would be considered churlish, and would be
    ineffectual, unless a constant watch was kept to prevent them." Miller II, 
    130 S.C. at 155-56
    , 
    125 S.E. at 299
     (quoting Hutto v. Tindall, 
    40 S.C.L. (6 Rich.) 396
    , 401
    (1853)).
    Second, Respondent failed to show that its use or its predecessors' use was adverse
    after the gate was installed in 1970. Several locks were on the gate. Testimony
    established that Martin and her predecessors allowed these locks by permission and
    would periodically remove unauthorized locks. Respondent was denied access to
    the road in 2009. After that, Respondent began cutting the chain and adding its own
    lock. While this conduct would plainly notify an owner like Martin that Respondent
    claimed a right to use the road, no testimony was presented that the previous use of
    a lock by Respondent or its predecessors provided similar notice. Indeed, the
    testimony established that Respondent sought and was denied permission to use
    someone else's lock. This undercuts rather than supports the claim of longstanding
    adverse use.
    Easement by Grant
    The master erred in finding an easement by grant. See Murrells Inlet Corp., 378
    S.C. at 232, 662 S.E.2d at 455 (holding an easement is a right given to a person to
    use the land of another for a specific purpose); Frierson, 371 S.C. at 67, 636 S.E.2d
    at 875 (holding an easement may arise in three ways: (1) by grant; (2) from necessity;
    and (3) by prescription).
    Several parcels of land involved in this case were created by an 1884 partition action
    dividing a larger piece of property into twelve smaller properties. Six of the smaller
    properties were numbered one through six. The other six were lettered A through F.
    Martin's chain for three of the smaller properties—C, D, and E—are at issue here.
    The master erred in finding an easement by grant because nothing in the chain of
    title for C and E indicates an easement by grant in favor of Respondent's
    predecessors in title. There is quite literally no easement language in the chain of
    title for C. As for E, while the 1929 deed of other lots (1, 2, and 4) specifically
    includes right of way language over other property owned by the grantors—which
    at this point included E—as well as rights of way the grantors might have had over
    lands, this "other lands" language is only in the chain of title for 1, 2, and 4. It does
    not appear in the chain of title for E. A subsequent purchaser of E, such as Fletcher
    Martin in 1948 and all subsequent owners, would not have actual or constructive
    notice of an easement by grant over E because no easement is recorded in E's chain
    of title. C.f. Binkley v. Rabon Creek Watershed Conservation Dist. of Fountain Inn,
    
    348 S.C. 58
    , 71, 
    558 S.E.2d 902
    , 909 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Property owners are charged
    with constructive notice of instruments recorded in their chain of title." (emphasis
    added)).
    Public Dedication
    Here as well, we agree with Martin that Respondent failed to meet its burden of proof
    to establish dedication of a public road. Our standard of review on this issue is
    different. See Mack v. Edens, 
    320 S.C. 236
    , 239, 
    464 S.E.2d 124
    , 126 (Ct. App.
    1995) ("The determination of whether a roadway has been dedicated to the public is
    an action in equity."); 
    id.
     ("As such, we have jurisdiction on appeal to find facts in
    accordance with our own view of the preponderance of the evidence."); 
    id.
     (stating
    "proof of dedication must be strict, cogent, and convincing").
    "Dedication requires two elements. First, the owner must express in a positive and
    unmistakable manner the intention to dedicate his property to public use. Second,
    there must be, within a reasonable time, an express or implied public acceptance of
    the property offered for dedication." 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). "[T]he burden of proof
    to establish dedication is upon the party claiming it." Anderson v. Town of
    Hemingway, 
    269 S.C. 351
    , 354, 
    237 S.E.2d 489
    , 490 (1977).
    "No particular formality is necessary to effect a common law dedication." Boyd v.
    Hyatt, 
    294 S.C. 360
    , 364, 
    364 S.E.2d 478
    , 480 (Ct. App. 1988). "An intention to
    dedicate may be implied from the circumstances." 
    Id.
     "Any act or declaration on
    the part of the dedicator which fully demonstrates his intention to appropriate [his]
    land to public use, or from which a reasonable inference of his intent to dedicate may
    be drawn, is sufficient." 
    Id.
     (alteration by court) (quoting 23 Am. Jur. 2d Dedication
    § 27 (1983)). "However, absent an express grant, one who asserts a dedication must
    demonstrate conduct on the part of the landowner clearly, convincingly and
    unequivocally indicating the owner's intention to create a right in the public to use
    the property in question adversely to the owner." Id.
    "South Carolina law recognizes two types of implied dedication—'one where the
    question of implied dedication arises from the sale of land with reference to maps or
    plats; the other when the dedication arises . . . from an abandonment to or
    acquiescence in public use.'" Vick v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 
    347 S.C. 470
    , 477, 
    556 S.E.2d 693
    , 697 (Ct. App. 2001) (alteration by court) (quoting Shia v. Pendergrass,
    
    222 S.C. 342
    , 347, 
    72 S.E.2d 699
    , 701 (1952)). "Only the owner of a fee simple
    interest can make a dedication." Hoogenboom v. City of Beaufort, 
    315 S.C. 306
    , 316,
    
    433 S.E.2d 875
    , 883 (Ct. App. 1992). "The owner's intention to dedicate must be
    manifested in a positive and unmistakable manner." Id. at 317, 433 S.E.2d at 883.
    "A dedication need not be made by deed or other writing, but may be effectually
    made by acts or declarations." Id. "Intent to dedicate may also be implied from long
    public use of the land to which the owner acquiesces." Id.
    Nevertheless, dedication is an exceptional mode of
    passing an interest in land, and proof of dedication must
    be strict, cogent, and convincing. The acts proved must not
    be consistent with any construction other than that of a
    dedication, and dedication may not be implied from the
    permissive, sporadic, and recreational use of property. The
    record must contain evidence the owner of the property
    clearly, convincingly, or unequivocally intended to
    dedicate the property for public use.
    Mack, 320 S.C. at 239, 464 S.E.2d at 126.
    The record contains no evidence that Martin or any of her predecessors expressed an
    intention (much less a clear and unmistakable intention) to dedicate the road to the
    public. Here, the master determined Shady Grove Road became a public road based
    on general public use, the testimony of four witnesses who said the county
    maintained the road before 1969, and two maps that show the road as a public road.
    We have already explained why public use cannot suffice—the law presumes
    neighborly accommodation in this sort of situation. See Miller II, 
    130 S.C. at 156
    ,
    
    125 S.E. at 299
     ("[T]he rule requiring that in addition to proof of the continuous use
    of a road for 20 years or more in order to establish a prescriptive right, 'when it passes
    over uninclosed woodland it must also be shown that the user was adverse,' proceeds
    upon the theory, soundly grounded in conditions which are a matter of common
    knowledge in this country, that the user of a road through uninclosed woodland is,
    in effect, a user by license or permission of the owner of the land. Hence the mere
    fact of a public use of such a road for any length of time will not sustain a claim of
    public right by prescription in the way." (quoting Miller I, 
    125 S.C. at 291
    , 
    118 S.E. at 625
    )).
    Three of the four witnesses who said the county maintained the road before 1970
    were minors when they observed the supposedly county owned motor graters
    operating on the road, and the testimony of all four came more than forty-five years
    after they saw the motor graters. None of the four witnesses explained how they
    knew the motor graters belonged to Richland County, and one witness stated county
    employees would occasionally do favors for friends or for liquor.
    Both of the maps, though created before 1970, were not created by Richland County,
    but instead by the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Federal Works
    Agency, and the South Carolina State Highway Department. Our supreme court has
    previously explained "[t]he burden of proving a dedication is not met simply by
    introducing maps which show the alleged street." Anderson, 
    269 S.C. at 355
    , 
    237 S.E.2d at 490
    . We find these maps from third parties carry less weight than the
    county's right-of-way agent's testimony that the county did not have a public
    dedication past the gate.
    When looking at the evidence in the record as a whole, it is manifest that Martin and
    her predecessors had no intention of dedicating the portion of Shady Grove Road
    passing over their property to the public. The record indicates the exact opposite
    intent—that the gate was erected to prevent people from using the road to do
    "devilment." We find by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent did not
    show the public adversely used the road, as the record indicates the public
    permissively used the road until the gate was installed in 1970, after which the only
    adverse users were Respondent, its predecessors, agents, and guests (and only after
    2009, as discussed above).
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, the master erred in finding any easement across Martin's
    property. We decline to address all other issues because the reasoning given above
    is dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 
    335 S.C. 598
    ,
    613, 
    518 S.E.2d 591
    , 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address
    remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
    The master's order finding easements by grant, prescription, and public dedication is
    REVERSED.
    KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2023-UP-062

Filed Date: 2/15/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024