SCDSS v. Cherry and James Couillard ( 2023 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    South Carolina Department of Social Services,
    Appellant,
    v.
    Cherry Couillard and James Couillard, Respondents.
    In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
    Appellate Case No. 2022-000799
    Appeal From Richland County
    Monét S. Pincus, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-054
    Submitted February 1, 2023 – Filed February 8, 2023
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
    REMANDED
    Dennis M. Gmerek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
    Brett Lamb Stevens, of Stevens Law, LLC, of Columbia,
    for Respondent Cherry Couillard.
    Catherine Townes Johnson, of Law Office of Catherine
    T. Johnson, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondent James
    Couillard.
    PER CURIAM: The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) appeals
    the family court's final order dismissing its abuse and neglect action against Cherry
    Couillard (Mother) as moot and ordering DSS to change its internal case finding
    from "indicated" to "unfounded." On appeal, DSS argues (1) the case is not moot
    because it could have collateral consequences to Mother, and (2) the family court
    erred in ordering DSS to change its internal finding without holding an evidentiary
    hearing. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the family court for
    factual findings.
    1. We hold the family court correctly found the child custody issue was moot
    because, at the time of the hearing, the child had reached the age of majority. See
    Sloan v. Greenville County, 
    380 S.C. 528
    , 535, 
    670 S.E.2d 663
    , 667 (Ct. App.
    2009) ("An appellate court will not pass judgment on moot and academic
    questions; it will not adjudicate a matter when no actual controversy capable of
    specific relief exists."); Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley, Inc., 
    369 S.C. 20
    , 26, 
    630 S.E.2d 474
    , 477 (2006) (explaining a case is moot when "a judgment rendered by
    the court will have no practical legal effect upon an existing controversy because
    an intervening event renders any grant of effectual relief impossible for the
    reviewing court"). However, we hold the appeal as a whole is not moot because
    DSS's internal case finding could have collateral consequences to Mother. See
    Curtis v. State, 
    345 S.C. 557
    , 568, 
    549 S.E.2d 591
    , 596 (2001) ("[I]f a decision by
    the trial court may affect future events, or have collateral consequences for the
    parties, an appeal from that decision is not moot . . . .").
    2. We hold the family court erred in ordering DSS to change its internal finding
    without factual findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-930
    (A) (2010) ("Reports of child abuse and neglect must be classified
    in the department's data system and records in one of three categories: Suspected,
    Unfounded, or Indicated."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-930
     (B)(1) (2010) ("Indicated
    findings must be based upon a finding of the facts available to the department that
    there is a preponderance of evidence that the child is an abused or neglected child.
    Indicated findings must include a description of the services being provided the
    child and those responsible for the child's welfare and all relevant dispositional
    information."); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-930
    (B)(2) (2010) ("If the family court
    makes a determination . . . that the indicated finding is not supported by a
    preponderance of evidence that there was any act of child abuse or neglect, the
    case classification must be converted to unfounded . . . ."). Here, the family court
    made no determination as to whether a preponderance of the evidence supported
    DSS's internal finding. Thus, we reverse the family court's directive that DSS
    change its internal case finding from "indicated" to "unfounded" and remand to the
    family court for findings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 1
    WILLIAMS, C.J., THOMAS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2023-UP-054

Filed Date: 2/8/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024