SCDSS v. Calkin ( 2019 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    South Carolina Department of Social Services,
    Respondent,
    v.
    Tyler Lambert and Kathlynn L. Calkin, Defendants,
    Of Whom Tyler Lambert is a Respondent,
    and Kathlynn L. Calkin is the Appellant.
    In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
    Appellate Case No. 2018-000046
    Appeal From Lexington County
    W. Greg Seigler, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-048
    Submitted January 7, 2019 – Filed January 28, 2019
    AFFIRMED
    Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of
    Union, for Appellant.
    Allison Bullard McNair, of Building Families LLC, of
    Columbia, for Respondent Tyler Lambert.
    Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Respondent South
    Carolina Department of Social Services.
    Robin Page, Law Office of Robin Page, LLC, of
    Columbia, for the Guardian ad Litem.
    PER CURIAM: Kathlynn Calkin (Mother) appeals the family court's order
    terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter (Child). On appeal, Mother
    argues the family court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence supported
    termination of parental rights (TPR) on the following grounds: (1) Mother failed to
    remedy the conditions that led to removal, and (2) Child was in foster care for
    fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The family court also found TPR
    was in Child's best interest. We affirm.
    On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
    novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 
    392 S.C. 412
    , 414-15, 
    709 S.E.2d 666
    , 667 (2011);
    Lewis v. Lewis, 
    392 S.C. 381
    , 386, 
    709 S.E.2d 650
    , 652 (2011). Although this
    court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not required to ignore the
    fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better
    position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their
    testimony. Lewis, 
    392 S.C. at 385
    , 
    709 S.E.2d at 651-52
    .
    The family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of twelve statutory
    grounds is satisfied and TPR is in the best interest of the child. 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570
     (Supp. 2018). The grounds for TPR must be proven by clear and
    convincing evidence. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 
    336 S.C. 248
    , 254, 
    519 S.E.2d 351
    , 354 (Ct. App. 1999).
    We find clear and convincing evidence shows Mother failed to remedy the
    condition causing Child's removal. See § 63-7-2570(2) (providing a statutory
    ground for TPR is met when a child has been removed from the parent, has been
    out of the home for six months following the adoption of a placement plan, and the
    parent has not remedied the conditions that caused the removal). In March 2013,
    the family court found Mother neglected Child after Child was admitted to the
    hospital with a severe head injury at four months old.1 Mother was ordered to
    1
    Tyler Lambert later pled guilty to criminal charges in connection with Child's
    injury, and his parental rights were also terminated.
    demonstrate her ability to safely and appropriately parent Child and meet Child's
    needs. Due to Child's diagnosis of autism, Child has profound needs that require
    thirty hours of therapy per week in addition to therapy she receives at school.
    Child's therapists testified it was important that Child's caregiver be involved in
    Child's therapy in order to incorporate the therapy into Child's everyday care and
    learn techniques for caring for Child. However, substantial evidence demonstrated
    Mother failed to meaningfully participate in Child's therapy or reach out to Child's
    caregivers in order to become more involved. Moreover, Child's Guardian ad
    Litem (the GAL) indicated Mother had not adjusted her lifestyle to meet the needs
    of Child. Accordingly, we find clear and convincing evidence supports this
    ground.2
    Additionally, we find TPR is in Child's best interest.3 See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
    v. Smith, 
    343 S.C. 129
    , 133, 
    538 S.E.2d 285
    , 287 (Ct. App. 2000) (providing the
    best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in a TPR case); 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620
     (2010) ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's
    interest and the parental rights conflict."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W.,
    
    402 S.C. 324
    , 343, 
    741 S.E.2d 739
    , 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must
    consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when
    determining whether TPR is appropriate."). Child's needs are extensive, and
    although Mother has taken steps to obtain stability and engage in Child's life, she
    failed to demonstrate a commitment to Child's therapeutic needs. Child has lived
    with her foster parents essentially her entire life, she has thrived in their care, and
    they are willing to adopt Child. Child does not adjust well to change; indeed,
    Child's therapist testified it could cause Child irreparable harm to suddenly remove
    her from her familiar surroundings and disrupt the strict schedule and routine her
    foster parents currently provide. Furthermore, Mother has failed to put in place
    2
    Because we find clear and convincing evidence supports this ground, we decline
    to address Mother's arguments pertaining to the TPR ground that Child was in
    foster care fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. See S.C. Dep't of Soc.
    Servs. v. Headden, 
    354 S.C. 602
    , 613, 
    582 S.E.2d 419
    , 425 (2003) (declining to
    address additional grounds for TPR when clear and convincing evidence supported
    TPR on another ground).
    3
    Although Mother did not appeal this finding by the family court, we address it
    because it concerns the rights of a minor Child. See Ex parte Roper, 
    254 S.C. 558
    ,
    563, 
    176 S.E.2d 175
    , 177 (1970) ("[W]here the rights and best interests of a minor
    child are concerned, the court may appropriately raise, ex mero motu, issues not
    raised by the parties.").
    safeguards for a successful transition if reunification occurred. This case has been
    lingering for nearly six years. Stability and consistency is in Child's best interest.
    Thus, TPR is in Child's best interest so she may be available for adoption.
    AFFIRMED.4
    KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.
    4
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019-UP-048

Filed Date: 1/28/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024