Singleton v. City of Georgetown ( 2019 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Willie Singleton and Julia Thomas, Heirs at Law of
Victoria Gadson, deceased, Plaintiffs,
v.
City of Georgetown Building Official Stephen Stack,
Mayor Lynn Wood Wilson, Mayor Pro Temp Brendon
M. Barber, Sr., Council Member Peggy P. Wayne,
Council Member Clarence Smalls, Council Member
Paige B. Sawyer, III, Council Member Rudolph A.
Bradley, Council Member Jack Scoville, Director of
Building Planning Sabrina Morris, Steve Thomas, City
Administrator, and The City of Georgetown, Defendants,
Of whom Willie Singleton is the Appellant/Respondent,
and
The City of Georgetown is the Respondent/Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2016-000251
Appeal From Georgetown County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-050
Submitted September 19, 2018 – Filed February 6, 2019
AFFIRMED
Bonnie Travaglio Hunt, of Hunt Law LLC, of North
Charleston, for Appellant/Respondent.
Douglas Carter Baxter, of Richardson Plowden &
Robinson, of Myrtle Beach, and Carmen Vaughn
Ganjehsani, of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, of
Columbia, for Respondent/Appellant.
PER CURIAM: In this cross-appeal arising from an action for damages related to
the demolition of a house and the destruction of personal property therein, Willie
Singleton argues the circuit court erred in (1) denying his motion for recusal and
(2) directing a verdict in favor of the City of Georgetown (the City) on his claim
for damages related to the demolished house. The City argues the circuit court
erred in (1) denying its motion for a directed verdict as to damages for Singleton's
personal property, (2) denying its motion for a new trial absolute, (3) denying its
motion for remittitur, and (4) admitting into evidence a consent agreement
disciplining a City building official (the Consent Agreement). We affirm pursuant
to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
I. Singleton's Appeal
1. The circuit court properly denied Singleton's motion for recusal because
Singleton failed to provide any supporting evidence that would cause the circuit
court's impartiality to be reasonably questioned. See Koon v. Fares, 379 S.C. 150,
156, 666 S.E.2d 230, 234 (2008) ("A judge should disqualify himself in a
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including
instances where he has a personal bias or prejudice against a party."); Rule 3(E)(1),
CJC, Rule 501, SCACR ("A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned . . . ."); Christensen v. Mikell, 324 S.C. 70, 74, 476 S.E.2d 692, 694
(1996) ("To compel recusal, the alleged bias of the judge must be personal, as
distinguished from judicial, in nature."); Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 524, 599
S.E.2d 114, 118 (2004) ("Under South Carolina law, if there is no evidence of
judicial prejudice, a judge's failure to disqualify himself will not be reversed on
appeal."); id. ("It is not sufficient for a party seeking disqualification to simply
allege bias; the party must show some evidence of bias or prejudice.").
2. The circuit court did not err in directing a verdict for the City as to Singleton's
claim for damages regarding the demolished house because Singleton failed to
provide any evidence he owned the house. See Rule 50(a), SCRCP ("When upon a
trial the case presents only questions of law the judge may direct a verdict.");
Winters v. Fiddie, 394 S.C. 629, 644, 716 S.E.2d 316, 324 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In
deciding whether to grant or deny a directed verdict motion, the trial court is
concerned only with the existence or nonexistence of evidence."); McKaughan v.
Upstate Lung & Critical Care Specialists, P.C., 421 S.C. 185, 189, 805 S.E.2d
212, 214 (Ct. App. 2017) ("When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a directed
verdict motion, this court will reverse if no evidence supports the trial court's
decision or the ruling is controlled by an error of law." (quoting Burnett v. Family
Kingdom, Inc., 387 S.C. 183, 188, 691 S.E.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 2010))); S.C.
Code Ann. § 62-3-101 (Supp. 2018) ("Upon the death of a person, his real property
devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will . . . or in the absence
of testamentary disposition, to his heirs . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-102 (Supp.
2018) ("The intestate share of the surviving spouse is: (1) if there is no surviving
issue of the decedent, the entire intestate estate; (2) if there are surviving issue,
one-half of the intestate estate."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-103 (Supp. 2018)
(providing the part of the intestate estate that does not pass to the surviving spouse
is equally divided among the issue of the decedent if they are all of the same
degree of kinship).
II. The City's Appeal
1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Singleton, the evidence
supports the circuit court's denial of the City's directed verdict motion regarding
Singleton's personal property. See Winters, 394 S.C. at 644, 716 S.E.2d at 324 ("In
deciding whether to grant or deny a directed verdict motion, the trial court is
concerned only with the existence or nonexistence of evidence."); Roddey v.
Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 415 S.C. 580, 588, 784 S.E.2d 670, 675 (2016) ("When
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view all evidence and
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if
the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, the trial court
should submit the case to the jury."); Fickling v. City of Charleston, 372 S.C. 597,
603, 643 S.E.2d 110, 114 (Ct. App. 2007) ("When considering a motion for a
directed verdict, neither the appellate court nor the trial court has authority to
decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony and evidence.");
McClary v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 291 S.C. 506, 511, 354 S.E.2d 405, 408 (Ct.
App. 1987) ("The reasonableness of actions to mitigate damages is ordinarily a
question for the jury."); Cisson Constr., Inc. v. Reynolds & Assocs., Inc., 311 S.C.
499, 503, 429 S.E.2d 847, 849 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The reasonableness of a party's
actions to mitigate damages is a question of fact which cannot be decided as a
matter of law when there is conflicting evidence."); Roddey, 415 S.C. at 588, 784
S.E.2d at 675 ("[I]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable
inference, the trial court should submit the case to the jury.").
2. The circuit court did not err in denying the City's motion for a new trial
absolute. See Rule 59, SCRCP ("A new trial may be granted . . . in an action in
which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials
have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the State."); Brinkley
v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 386 S.C. 182, 185, 687 S.E.2d 54, 56 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The
grant or denial of new trial motions rests within the discretion of the circuit court,
and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless its findings are wholly
unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled by error of
law."); Burke v. AnMed Health, 393 S.C. 48, 57, 710 S.E.2d 84, 89 (Ct. App. 2011)
("[A]s an appellate court, we sit neither to determine whether we agree with the
verdict nor to decide whether we agree with the trial judge's decision not to disturb
it. As described above, we employ a highly deferential standard of review when
considering the trial judge's ruling on each of the grounds for a new trial. In
exercising this deference, we recognize the unique position of the trial judge to
hear the evidence firsthand, evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and assess the
impact of the wrongful conduct on the plaintiff in terms of damages."); Brinkley,
386 S.C. at 185, 687 S.E.2d at 56 ("A circuit court may grant a new trial absolute
on the ground that the verdict is excessive or inadequate."); Burke, 393 S.C. at 56,
710 S.E.2d at 88 ("However, this power may be exercised only when the verdict 'is
shockingly disproportionate to the injuries suffered and thus indicates that passion,
caprice, prejudice, or other considerations not reflected by the evidence affected
the amount awarded.'" (quoting Becker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 339 S.C. 629,
635, 529 S.E.2d 758, 761 (2000))).
3. The circuit court did not err in denying the City's motion for remittitur because
the City did not demonstrate the verdict was excessive, nor did it provide a
compelling reason for the circuit court to invade the jury's province. See Proctor v.
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 368 S.C. 279, 320, 628 S.E.2d 496, 518 (Ct.
App. 2006) ("The trial court alone has the power to grant a new trial nisi when he
finds the amount of the verdict to be merely inadequate or excessive."); Burke, 393
S.C. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("If the trial court determines that the verdict is 'merely
excessive,' the court has the power to reduce the verdict by granting a new trial nisi
remittitur."); Proctor, 368 S.C. at 320, 628 S.E.2d at 518 ("The consideration for a
motion for a new trial nisi remittitur requires the trial judge to consider the
adequacy of the verdict in light of the evidence presented."); id. ("[C]ompelling
reasons must be given to justify invading the jury's province by granting a new trial
nisi remittitur."); Burke. 393 S.C. at 56, 710 S.E.2d at 88 ("A jury's determination
of damages is entitled to 'substantial deference.'").
4. The circuit court did not err in admitting into evidence the Consent Agreement
because it was relevant to Singleton's theory of negligence. Through the Consent
Agreement, the South Carolina Building Codes Council sanctioned a City building
official for actions taken on behalf of the City in demolishing the property at issue
in this case. See Johnson v. Sam English Grading, Inc., 412 S.C. 433, 448, 772
S.E.2d 544, 551 (Ct. App. 2015) ("The admission of evidence is within the trial
court's discretion. The court's ruling to admit or exclude evidence will only be
reversed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law."
(quoting R & G Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg'l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424,
439, 540 S.E.2d 113, 121 (Ct. App. 2000))); id. at 448, 772 S.E.2d at 552 ("To
warrant a reversal based on the admission of evidence, the appellant must show
both error and resulting prejudice." (quoting Conway v. Charleston Lincoln
Mercury Inc., 363 S.C. 301, 307, 609 S.E.2d 838, 842 (Ct. App. 2005)); Rule 401,
SCRE ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); Rule 402,
SCRE ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of South Carolina,
statutes, these rules, or by other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina."); Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); Johnson,
412 S.C. at 448, 772 S.E.2d at 552 ("The trial court has wide discretion in
determining the relevancy of evidence."); Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg,
363 S.C. 19, 26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005) ("To warrant reversal based on the
admission or exclusion of evidence, the appellant must prove both the error of the
ruling and the resulting prejudice, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability the
jury's verdict was influenced by the challenged evidence or the lack thereof.");
Winters v. Fiddie, 394 S.C. 629, 649, 716 S.E.2d 316, 327 (Ct. App. 2011)
(holding the consent order between a realtor and LLR was admissible because it
was evidence of whether she knowingly failed to disclose mold to the buyers and
"its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect").
AFFIRMED.1
KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.