Browder v. Marine ( 2012 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
David Browder, Respondent,
v.
Ross Marine, LLC, Swygert Shipyards, Inc.,
Sandblasters, Inc., Arthur R. Swygert, Jr., Arthur
Swygert, Sr. and Cathy Speights, Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2011-186727
Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-435
Heard May 8, 2012 – Filed July 18, 2012
AFFIRMED
William A. Scott, of Rogers, Townsend & Thomas, PC,
of Charleston, for Appellants.
Michael W. Sautter, of Query, Sautter, Gliserman &
Price, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: David Browder filed this action alleging a violation of the South
Carolina Payment of Wages Act (the Act) against Ross Marine, LLC, Swygert
Shipyards, Inc., Sandblasters, Inc., Arthur R. Swygert, Jr., Arthur Swygert, Sr., and
Cathy Speights (collectively, Ross Marine). The trial court granted Ross Marine's
motion to compel arbitration, and the arbitration panel awarded Browder treble
damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Browder moved to confirm the arbitration
award, and Ross Marine moved to vacate it. The trial court confirmed the award
and denied the motion to vacate. Ross Marine appealed. We affirm.
1. As to the parties' dispute regarding our standard of review, we find our
review is limited. As noted by Ross Marine, the standard of review regarding the
question of arbitrability is de novo. Partain v. Upstate Auto. Group, 386 S.C. 488,
491, 689 S.E.2d 602, 603 (2010). However, the standard of review of an appellate
court regarding the merits of an arbitration award is limited: "When a dispute is
submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator determines questions of both law and fact.
Generally, an arbitration award is conclusive and courts will refuse to review the
merits of an award. An award will be vacated only under narrow, limited
circumstances." Gissel v. Hart, 382 S.C. 235, 241, 676 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009).
2. We find no manifest disregard of the Statute of Frauds by the arbitration
panel. The Statute of Frauds provides in pertinent part: "No action shall be
brought . . . [t]o charge any person upon any agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of one year from the making thereof . . . [u]nless the agreement . .
. [is] in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith . . . ." S.C. Code
Ann. § 32-3-10 (2007). Modifications to a contract, written or oral, must likewise
fulfill the elements required for a valid contract. Roberts v. Gaskins, 327 S.C. 478,
483-84, 486 S.E.2d 771, 773-74 (Ct. App. 1997). A contract may be established
by "several writings which are connected either expressly or through internal
evidence of the subject matter and occasion." Young v. Indep. Pub. Co., 273 S.C.
107, 110, 254 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1979). Vacating an arbitration award based on
manifest disregard of the law requires more than a mere error of law or failure on
the part of the arbitrator to understand or apply the law. Lauro v. Visnapuu, 351
S.C. 507, 519, 570 S.E.2d 551, 557 (Ct. App. 2002). "An arbitrator manifestly
disregards the law when he or she appreciates the existence of a clearly governing
legal principle and decides to ignore it." C-Sculptures, LLC v. Brown, 394 S.C.
519, 523, 716 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Ct. App. 2011). It must be clear that the arbitrators
recognized the applicable law and refused to apply it. Gissel, 382 S.C. at 241, 676
S.E.2d at 323. We find no manifest disregard by the arbitration panel in regard to
the Statute of Frauds.
3. We find no manifest disregard by the arbitration panel regarding Ross
Marine's motion to reconsider based on Mathis v. Brown & Brown of South
Carolina, Inc., 389 S.C. 299, 698 S.E.2d 773 (2010), which was filed less than two
weeks after the arbitration award was filed. The trial court in Mathis awarded
damages under the Act for prospective wages. Id. at 304, 698 S.E.2d at 775. In
reversing, our supreme court examined the language of the Act, the interpretation
of similar statutes by the majority of other jurisdictions, and the argument
advanced by amici before concluding the Act did not apply to prospective wages.
Id. at 318-19, 698 S.E.2d at 783-84. At the time the arbitrators filed the award in
this case, they did not have the benefit of the Mathis decision, and the case law on
whether prospective wages were recoverable under the Act was not well defined or
explicit. "[F]or a court to vacate an arbitration award based upon an arbitrator's
manifest disregard of the law, the governing law ignored by the arbitrator must be
well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." Gissel, 382 S.C. at 241, 676 S.E.2d
at 323. We find no manifest disregard by the arbitration panel.
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur.