Grant v. Goodwin ( 2012 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Horance Grant, Respondent,
    v.
    Omaro Goodwin, Appellant,
    Marjorie Grant, Respondent,
    v.
    Omaro Goodwin, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2010-173587
    Appeal From Richland County
    James R. Barber, III, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-402
    Heard June 21, 2012 – Filed July 11, 2012
    REVERSED
    J. Kennedy DuBose, Jr., and Jonathan M. Robinson, both
    of DuBose-Robinson, PC, of Camden, for Appellant.
    Hammond A. Beale, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondents.
    PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from the circuit court's order affirming the
    magistrate court's finding that Appellant Omaro Goodwin was properly served
    pursuant to Rule 4, SCRCP, and denying his motion to set aside the default
    judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP. We reverse.
    1.     As to Goodwin's Rule 60(b), SCRCP motion, we find the magistrate's court
    abused its discretion by declining to set aside the default judgment because the
    record establishes that Goodwin promptly filed his motion, presented a valid
    excuse as to why no answer was filed, and submitted an affidavit describing a
    meritorious defense. See Roberson v. S. Fin. of S.C., Inc., 
    365 S.C. 6
    , 9, 
    615 S.E.2d 112
    , 114 (2005) (noting a trial court's decision as to whether to set aside
    default judgment will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an
    abuse of discretion); Mictronics, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 
    345 S.C. 506
    , 510-
    11, 
    548 S.E.2d 223
    , 226 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In determining whether to grant a
    motion under Rule 60(b), the trial judge should consider: (1) the promptness with
    which relief is sought, (2) the reasons for the failure to act promptly, (3) the
    existence of a meritorious defense, and (4) the prejudice to the other party."); id. at
    511, 548 S.E.2d at 226 ("To establish a meritorious defense, a party is not required
    to show an absolute defense."). Moreover, the record indicates negotiations were
    ongoing between State Farm and Grant's counsel, including State Farm's request of
    a copy of any summons and complaint filed. See McClurg v. Deaton, 
    380 S.C. 563
    , 571, 
    671 S.E.2d 87
    , 92 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[A]n insurer may, under the proper
    circumstances, be entitled to an order setting aside a default judgment where the
    insurer is involved in ongoing negotiations with a claimant but is not informed that
    the defendant has been served with a summons and complaint." (citing Edwards v.
    Ferguson, 
    254 S.C. 278
    , 
    175 S.E.2d 224
     (1970))); see generally Mictronics, 345
    S.C. at 511, 548 S.E.2d at 226 (noting South Carolina's policy of favoring the
    disposition of issues on their merits rather than on technicalities).
    2.     As to whether the circuit court erred in affirming the magistrate court's
    finding of proper service, we decline to address this issue. See Young v.
    Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
    397 S.C. 303
    , 311, 
    725 S.E.2d 107
    , 111 (2012)
    (declining to address additional remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is
    dispositive of appeal).
    REVERSED.
    PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-UP-402

Filed Date: 7/11/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024