Myers v. JKM Holdings ( 2012 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Joseph L. Myers, III, Appellant,
v.
JKM Holdings, Inc., JKM Holdings South Carolina,
LLC, and Snee Farm, Inc., a dissolved Corporation,
Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2010-177867
Appeal From Charleston County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-490
Heard June 7, 2012 – Filed August 15, 2012
AFFIRMED
Thomas R. Goldstein, of Belk Cobb Infinger &
Goldstein, PA, of Charleston, for Appellant.
Aaron Eric Edwards and Lawrence E. Richter, Jr., both
of The Richter Firm, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Joseph L. Myers, III, appeals the trial court's determination that
183 acres owned by JKM Holdings, Inc. (JKM), which had been previously used
as a golf course, can be used for purposes other than recreation. On appeal, Myers
argues (1) the restriction and covenants create a conservation easement, (2) the
deed and covenants restrict development, (3) the elements of promissory estoppel
were met, and (4) JKM holds the property in trust for the residents of Snee Farm.
We affirm the trial court.
1. As to whether a conservation easement exists, we find this issue is not
preserved for review. This issue was neither raised to nor ruled upon by the
trial court. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733
(1998) (noting to be preserved for review, an issue must be raised to and ruled
upon by the trial judge); id. (finding an issue cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal).
2. As to whether the trial court erred in determining the deed and covenants allow
development on the 183 acres, we find the supreme court's decision in
Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E.2d 46 (1968), controlling.
Here, as in Stylecraft, the granting clause conveys a fee simple absolute. Even
though the intent of the grantor was to maintain the conveyed property as
recreational, the subsequent language in the deed conditioning any potential
inconsistent use with a right of re-entry improperly cuts down the estate; thus, it
is ineffective pursuant to Stylecraft. The granting clause of the deed and the
covenants, as incorporated, do not expressly prevent future development on the
183 acres. See id., 250 S.C. 495, 498, 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 ("In a long and
unbroken line of decisions this court has approved the rule that where the
granting clause in a deed purports to convey title in fee simple absolute that
estate may not be cut down by subsequent words in the same instrument.");
Hardy v. Aiken, 369 S.C. 160, 166, 631 S.E.2d 539, 542 (2006) (noting courts
should strictly construe restrictive covenants, with all doubts resolved in favor
of the free use of the property); Matsell v. Crowfield Plantation Cmty. Servs.
Ass'n, Inc., 393 S.C. 65, 71, 710 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Words of a
restrictive covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to
them at the time of their execution."); Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4, 498
S.E.2d 862, 864 (1998) ("The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on
the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or
implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms even to accomplish what it
may be thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later
developed been foreseen by them at the time when the restriction was
written."); id. ("It is still the settled rule in this jurisdiction that restrictions as to
the use of real estate should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in
favor of free use of the property . . . .").
3. As to whether Myers is entitled to relief under a theory of promissory estoppel,
we find Myers failed to establish a promise made by either Snee Farm, Inc. or
JKM. See Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City of Columbia, 396 S.C. 338,
348, 721 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2011) ("To recover for promissory estoppel,
a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) a party made a promise unambiguous
in its terms; (2) the party to whom the promise is made reasonably relied on the
promise; (3) the reliance was expected and foreseeable by the party who made
the promise; and (4) the party to whom the promise is made sustained injury in
reliance on the promise."); Craft v. S. C. Comm'n for Blind, 385 S.C. 560, 565,
685 S.E.2d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding to recover under a theory of
promissory estoppel a party must demonstrate each element of promissory
estoppel).
4. As to whether evidence in the record establishes JKM holds the 183 acres for
the benefit of Snee Farm residents, we find Myers failed to demonstrate JKM
holds the 183 acres in trust for the residents. See Regions Bank v. Schmauch,
354 S.C. 648, 670, 582 S.E.2d 432, 444 (Ct. App. 2003) ("A fiduciary
relationship exists when one reposes special confidence in another, so that the
latter, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due
regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence.") (quoting O'Shea v.
Lesser, 308 S.C. 10, 15, 416 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1992)); Steele v. Victory Sav.
Bank, 295 S.C. 290, 293, 368 S.E.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1988) ("As a general rule,
a fiduciary relationship cannot be established by the unilateral action of one
party."); Regions Bank, 354 S.C. at 671, 582 S.E.2d at 94 ("The other party
must have actually accepted or induced the confidence placed in him.").
AFFIRMED.
PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.