State v. Webb ( 2012 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Melvin Webb, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2010-165826
Appeal From Dorchester County
Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-533
Submitted September 4, 2012 – Filed September 19, 2012
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of
Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia;
and Solicitor David M. Pascoe, Jr., of Summerville, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Melvin Webb appeals his conviction of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) admitting the videotape
of a forensic interview in violation of the Confrontation Clause and (2) allowing
the victim's mother to testify. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and
the following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting the videotape of a forensic
interview in violation of the Confrontation Clause and allowing the State to
introduce the videotape of the forensic interview in violation of Webb's right to
confront witnesses against him: State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262,
265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of
discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary
support or are controlled by an error of law."); State v. Hill, 394 S.C. 280, 291, 715
S.E.2d 368, 374 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court held that the
admission of testimonial hearsay statements against an accused violates the
Confrontation Clause if: (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, and (2)
the accused has had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." (citing
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004))); id. at 291, 715 S.E.2d at 374-
75 ("However, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of
the declarant's prior testimonial statements when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial."); State v. Stokes, 381 S.C. 390, 401, 673 S.E.2d 434, 439
(2009) (stating Crawford established that when a declarant is available at trial and
subject to cross-examination, there is no Confrontation Clause violation).
2. As to whether the trial court erred in allowing the victim's mother to testify:
State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121-22, 551 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001) ("[I]n order for a
prior consistent statement to be admissible pursuant to [Rule 801(d)(1)(B), SCRE],
the following elements must be present: (1) the declarant must testify and be
subject to cross-examination, (2) the opposing party must have explicitly or
implicitly accused the declarant of recently fabricating the statement or of acting
under an improper influence or motive, (3) the statement must be consistent with
the declarant's testimony, and (4) the statement must have been made prior to the
alleged fabrication, or prior to the existence of the alleged improper influence or
motive.").
AFFIRMED.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.