Cupstid v. Fogle ( 2012 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Jake E. Cupstid, Respondent/Appellant,
    v.
    Jimmie D. Fogle, Appellant/Respondent.
    Appellate Case No. 2010-161026
    Appeal From Orangeburg County
    James C. Williams, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-318
    Heard May 9, 2012 – Filed May 30, 2012
    Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled September 5, 2012
    AFFIRMED
    Michael P. Horger, Sr., of Horger & Connor, LLC, of
    Orangeburg, for Appellant/Respondent.
    James D. Nance, of Nance, McCants, & Massey, of
    Aiken, for Respondent/Appellant.
    PER CURIAM: These cross-appeals arise from a bench trial awarding damages
    and a permanent injunction to Jake E. Cupstid in his trespass action against Jimmie
    D. Fogle. Fogle appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) holding Cupstid is
    not required to prove he held legal title to the property at issue; (2) failing to find
    Cupstid is estopped to claim any interest in the disputed property; (3) permitting
    Cupstid to present an expert to testify about the law; and (4) awarding Cupstid
    actual damages, punitive damages, and a permanent injunction. Fogle further
    maintains the circuit court's clerk of court erred in entering costs before entering
    the final judgment. Cupstid appeals the amount of actual damages awarded. We
    affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:
    1. As to whether the circuit court erred in holding Cupstid is not required to prove
    he held legal title to the property: Godfrey v. Heller, 
    311 S.C. 516
    , 520, 
    429 S.E.2d 859
    , 862 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding a party failed to preserve an alleged error in an
    order when the party failed to raise the issue in a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion).
    2. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to find Cupstid is estopped to
    claim that he held title to the disputed property: Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC,
    
    394 S.C. 383
    , 406, 
    714 S.E.2d 904
    , 916 (Ct. App. 2011) (providing issues must be
    raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appeal).
    3. As to whether the circuit court erred in permitting Cupstid to present an expert
    to testify about the law: Bodiford v. Spanish Oak Farms, Inc., 
    317 S.C. 539
    , 543,
    
    455 S.E.2d 194
    , 196 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding a surveyor could testify as to an
    ultimate issue in a trial before a special referee because the surveyor had been
    ordered to report his findings to the court and the special referee could decide the
    appropriate weight to give to the testimony); see also Brown v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
    
    344 S.C. 21
    , 25-27, 
    542 S.E.2d 723
    , 725-26 (2001) (rejecting a holding by the
    court of appeals that a trial court committed harmful error in admitting "a
    potpourri" of inadmissible evidence addressing the ultimate issue in a bench trial
    because such a rule was "unnecessarily burdensome and would inhibit the trial
    judge's ability to evaluate the evidence and ascertain the truth"; the appellant failed
    to make "a sufficient showing the trial judge either affirmatively relied on the
    incompetent evidence, or could not have reached the same result without relying
    on the incompetent evidence").
    4. As to whether the circuit court erred in granting actual damages, punitive
    damages, and the permanent injunction because Cupstid failed to prove title: Cedar
    Cove Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. DiPietro, 
    368 S.C. 254
    , 258, 
    628 S.E.2d 284
    , 286
    (Ct. App. 2006) ("[A] trespass action is one at law . . . ."); Townes Assocs. Ltd. v.
    Greenville, 
    266 S.C. 81
    , 86, 
    221 S.E.2d 773
    , 775 (1976) ("In an action at law, on
    appeal of a case tried without a jury, the findings of fact of the judge will not be
    disturbed upon appeal unless found to be without evidence which reasonably
    supports the judge's findings."); Gowdy v. Gibson, 
    391 S.C. 374
    , 385, 
    706 S.E.2d 495
    , 501 (2011) (noting the circuit court in a bench trial is in a better position than
    the appellate court to evaluate the credibility of the evidence); Bodiford, 317 S.C.
    at 543 n.1, 455 S.E.2d at 197 n.1 (providing in a boundary dispute that "resort is
    generally had first to natural boundaries, next to artificial monuments, then to
    adjacent boundaries, and last to courses and distances," but the rule does not
    mandate an order of consideration or admissibility; rather, "[t]he rules for
    determining disputed boundaries . . . are subject to modification depending upon
    the particular facts of each case," and "[t]he facts of a case may therefore require
    that an inferior means of location be preferred over a higher means of location").
    5. As to Fogle's argument that the circuit court erred in granting actual damages
    because section 16-11-615 of the South Carolina Code (2003) limited Cupstid's
    recovery: Godfrey, 311 S.C. at 520, 429 S.E.2d at 862 (holding a party failed to
    preserve an alleged error in an order when the party failed to raise the issue in a
    Rule 59(e) motion).
    6. As to Fogle's argument that the circuit court erred in granting punitive damages
    because Cupstid failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Fogle
    recklessly, willfully, or intentionally invaded Cupstid's rights: Wimberly v. Barr,
    
    359 S.C. 414
    , 423, 
    597 S.E.2d 853
    , 858 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Punitive damages may
    be awarded for trespass when a defendant's acts have been willful, wanton or in
    reckless disregard of the rights of another."); see also Joyner v. St. Matthews
    Builders, 
    263 S.C. 136
    , 139-40, 
    208 S.E.2d 48
    , 49 (1974) ("[W]e cannot say that
    such was not susceptible of a reasonable inference that St. Matthews Builders, or
    Dent, was proceeding in reckless disregard of, or with a conscious failure to
    exercise due care as to, plaintiff's property and rights."); Black's Law Dictionary
    1385 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "recklessness" as "[c]onduct whereby the actor does
    not desire harmful consequence but nonetheless foresees the possibility and
    consciously takes the risk").
    7. As to Cupstid's argument that the circuit court erred in awarding $20,000 of
    actual damages because the trees' replacement cost is the proper measure of
    damages: Godfrey, 311 S.C. at 520, 429 S.E.2d at 862 (holding that a party failed
    to preserve an alleged error in an order when the party failed to raise the issue in a
    Rule 59(e) motion).
    8. As to Fogle's argument that the circuit court clerk erred in awarding costs to
    Cupstid: Jones ex rel. Jones v. Enter. Leasing Co.–Southeast, 
    383 S.C. 259
    , 268
    n.6, 
    678 S.E.2d 819
    , 824 n.6 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding an issue was not preserved
    for appeal because no new issues may be raised to this court by the appellant in the
    appellant's reply brief).
    AFFIRMED.
    WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-UP-318

Filed Date: 9/5/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024