Ray D. Fowler v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC ( 2023 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Ray D. Fowler, Appellant,
v.
Pilot Travel Centers, LLC d/b/a Pilot Flying J- 3008
Charleston Highway, Cayce, South Carolina; Myra
Lashay Dixon; T.J. Jarre Bates; and Rico Shamar Sellers,
Defendants,
Of whom Pilot Travel Centers, LLC and Myra Lashay
Dixon are Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2022-000113
Appeal From Lexington County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-366
Submitted October 1, 2023 – Filed November 15, 2023
AFFIRMED
Gary Walton Popwell, Jr., of Lee Eadon Isgett &
Popwell, of Columbia, for Appellant.
R. Davis Howser, of Howser Newman & Besley, LLC, of
Columbia; and Andrew LaRoche Hethington, of Howser
Newman & Besley, LLC, of Charleston, both for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Ray D. Fowler appeals the circuit court's order granting
summary judgment in favor of Pilot Travel Centers, LLC d/b/a Pilot Flying J-3008
Charleston Highway, Cayce, South Carolina (Pilot) and Myra Lashay Dixon
(collectively, Respondents). Fowler argues the circuit court erred by finding his
claims were barred by the doctrines of primary implied assumption of the risk and
secondary implied assumption of the risk. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fowler, we hold the circuit
court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents under the
doctrine of primary implied assumption of the risk. See Hurst v. E. Coast Hockey
League, Inc., 371 S.C. 33, 36, 637 S.E.2d 560, 561 (2006) ("When reviewing the
grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court applies the same standard
which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary judgment is
proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); Singleton v. Sherer, 377 S.C. 185,
197, 659 S.E.2d 196, 202 (Ct. App. 2008) ("On appeal from an order granting
summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions,
and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party.").
We find the circuit court did not err in finding Respondents' duty of care did not
encompass the risk involved in fighting. See Cole v. S.C. Elec. & Gas, Inc., 362
S.C. 445, 453, 608 S.E.2d 859, 863 (2005) ("Primary implied assumption of the
risk arises when the plaintiff impliedly assumes risks inherent in a particular
activity. It is not a true affirmative defense but is another way of stating there is no
duty to the plaintiff."); Hurst, 371 S.C. at 38, 637 S.E.2d at 562-63 (holding the
defendants "did not have a duty to protect [the plaintiff], a spectator, from inherent
risks of the game of hockey" under the doctrine of implied primary assumption of
the risk when "[t]he risk of a hockey spectator being struck by a flying puck is
inherent to the game of hockey and is also a common, expected, and frequent risk
of hockey"); Cole v. Boy Scouts of Am., 397 S.C. 247, 253, 725 S.E.2d 476, 479
(2011) (holding that under the doctrine of primary implied assumption of the risk,
the defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff who was injured while playing
recreation league softball). Similar to the inherent risks of contact sports, the risk
of bodily injury is an inherent risk of engaging in a physical altercation. See Cole
v. Boy Scouts of Am., 397 S.C. at 253, 725 S.E.2d at 479 (determining that when "a
person chooses to participate in a contact sport, whatever the level of play, he
assumes the risks inherent in that sport"). Moreover, Fowler's deposition
testimony established he knew the risks involved in fighting and he voluntarily
engaged in the physical altercation in an attempt to protect Dixon. 1
AFFIRMED. 2
MCDONALD and VINSON, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
1
In light of our disposition, we decline to address Fowler's remaining arguments.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining
issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.