Gregory Pencille, 312332 v. SCDC ( 2023 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Gregory Pencille, #312332, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2019-002115
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-321
Heard October 5, 2022 – Filed September 27, 2023
Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled November 1, 2023
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Appellant.
Christina Catoe Bigelow and Kensey Evans, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Gregory Pencille appeals the Administrative Law Court's
(ALC's) order summarily dismissing his appeal of the South Carolina Department
of Corrections' (SCDC's) determination that he was not entitled to the use of
religious oils. Pencille argues the ALC erred in (1) determining it did not have
jurisdiction to review his appeal, (2) granting SCDC's motion to dismiss without
admitting evidence, (3) dismissing his appeal with prejudice, and (4) refusing to
hold oral argument. We affirm as modified.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 2018, the senior chaplain at Lee Correctional Institution (Lee
Correctional) submitted a written request (the 2018 request) to the warden and
associate warden for approval to purchase religious oils for Lee Correctional's
Wiccan community's use. As noted in the 2018 request, a similar purchase request
was approved in 2014 (the 2014 request). The associate warden approved the 2018
request but the warden denied it without explanation. Thereafter, Pencille, the
Wiccan coordinator at Lee Correctional, submitted a written request seeking
reconsideration of the denial. Pencille alleged the warden discriminated against
the Wiccan religion by denying the 2018 request while allowing other religious
communities at Lee Correctional to use religious oils. The warden did not respond
to Pencille's inmate request.
Pencille subsequently filed a step one grievance, alleging Lee Correctional
administrative staff discriminated against the Wiccan community by refusing to
respond to his requests for use of religious oils in the Wiccan community's
religious services. He requested approval of the use of religious oils in the Wiccan
community's services and that corrective action be taken against the administrative
staff. In support of his request, he cited to SCDC Policy PS-10.05 (2015), the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA),1 and federal caselaw addressing claims raised under
RFRA and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)2
and constitutional challenges to state prison regulations. The warden denied
Pencille's step one grievance, explaining the previous warden denied the 2018
request "due to security reasons."
Pencille filed a step two grievance, arguing the denial of his requests was
unconstitutional and against SCDC policy by citing to his step one grievance.
SCDC denied Pencille's step two grievance, stating the warden's denial of his 2018
request was pursuant to SCDC Policy PS-10.05, which provided:
Within the limitations imposed on [SCDC] as a result of
1
42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4.
2
42 U.S.C §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5.
its safety and security needs, [SCDC] will be committed
to upholding and facilitating the constitutional rights
afforded to inmates to religious freedom. Inmates will be
given the opportunity to practice their religious faith to
the extent that such practice does not interfere with the
security and safety of the institution, staff, or others.
[SCDC] will provide necessary programs to facilitate the
practice of any recognized religion based on inmate
request, need, and available resources.
Pencille appealed SCDC's denial of his step two grievance to the ALC, arguing
SCDC violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by
denying the Wiccan community access to sacramental oil for security reasons,
while allowing other religious groups to use sacramental oil. In support of his
argument, Pencille referred to the caselaw cited in his step one grievance. In his
supporting memorandum to the ALC, Pencille framed his argument as whether
SCDC "violate[d his and the Wiccan community's] religious rights, protection of
liberty and property, equal protection, and due process" as "protected by the
[United States] constitution, State Constitution, 1st and 14th Amendments, 42
U.S.C.A., and SCDC Policy PS-10.05." Specifically, Pencille asserted evidence
showed SCDC burdened the free exercise of his religion by not allowing him
access to oils necessary to practice his religion and by transferring him to a
correctional institution where the practice of the Wiccan religion was
"non-existent" and the chaplain was "prejudiced" against the religion. SCDC filed
a motion to dismiss, contending Pencille's allegations did not implicate a state-
created liberty interest and therefore, the ALC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear his claims. In his response to SCDC's motion to dismiss, Pencille argued
constitutional violations caused by state agency actions implicated a state-created
liberty interest.
The ALC summarily dismissed Pencille's appeal with prejudice, finding Pencille's
"desire to obtain religious oils d[id] not implicate a state-created liberty interest."
In support of its decision, the ALC cited to Slezak v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections,3 stating our supreme court found in that case "an inmate's interest in
'religious tapes' did not implicate a state-created liberty interest." The ALC further
found Pencille's allegations regarding his transfer were not properly before the
ALC because federal RLUIPA claims do not implicate a state-created liberty
3
361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004).
interest. It noted that under Skipper v. South Carolina Department of Corrections,4
the ALC has limited authority to interfere with inmate housing decisions.
Pencille filed a response to the ALC's order, arguing dismissal with prejudice was
procedurally flawed and it was presumed that all issues not addressed in SCDC's
motion were granted in his favor. Pencille stated his response was "not in any way
or form to be construed as a motion to reconsider." The ALC did not respond to
Pencille's response.
After filing his notice of appeal with this court, Pencille filed a "motion to stay,
issuance of writ of supersedeas, and petition to compel a response" with the ALC.
Pencille also requested the ALC, under SCALC Rule 10, require SCDC to respond
to his allegations and grievances. The ALC denied Pencille's motion, finding
Pencille's arguments were abandoned. On the merits, the ALC found SCALC Rule
10 did not apply to Pencille's case because it involved an appeal, not a contested
case; summary dismissal was appropriate because the ALC lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Pencille's appeal; Pencille's appeal did not involve any matter that
would cause the ALC to exercise its discretion and hold oral arguments; and
Pencille failed to establish a writ of supersedeas was necessary to preserve the
jurisdiction of the appeal or prevent the issue from becoming moot. This appeal
followed.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did SCDC violate Pencille's and the Wiccan community's religious, protection
of liberty and property, equal protection, and due process rights, which are
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, federal statute, and SCDC internal policy?
2. Did the ALC err in granting SCDC's motion to dismiss without admitting
evidence?
3. Did the ALC err in dismissing Pencille's appeal with prejudice?
4. Did the ALC err in refusing to hold oral arguments to further the record?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
4
370 S.C. 267, 272, 633 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Ct. App. 2006).
Section 1-23-610(B) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2022) sets forth the
standard of review for this court when sitting in review of a decision by the ALC.
See S.C. Dep't of Corr. v. Mitchell, 377 S.C. 256, 258, 659 S.E.2d 233, 234 (Ct.
App. 2008).
The court of appeals may . . . reverse or modify the
decision if the substantive rights of the petitioner have
been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or
decision is:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B). "The review of the administrative law [court]'s
order must be confined to the record." Id. "In an appeal of the final decision of an
administrative agency, the standard of appellate review is whether the AL[C]'s
findings are supported by substantial evidence." Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.,
379 S.C. 411, 417, 665 S.E.2d 231, 234 (Ct. App. 2008). "However, when the
issue on review raises a question of law, this court 'may reverse the decision of the
ALC where it is in violation of a statutory provision or it is affected by an error of
law.'" Torrence v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 433 S.C. 633, 642-43, 861 S.E.2d 36, 41
(Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't
Control, 411 S.C. 16, 28, 766 S.E.2d 707, 715 (2014)).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Pencille argues the ALC erred in summarily dismissing his claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction when his claim implicated a state-created liberty
interest. We agree in part and disagree in part.
Initially, as to Pencille's arguments under the South Carolina Religious Freedom
Act (SCRFA)5 and section 24-27-500 of the South Carolina Code (2007),6 we find
these claims are unpreserved for appellate review. In his brief of appellant filed
with this court, Pencille cites to these state statutes as well as federal RFRA and
RLUIPA statutes and caselaw in support of his state-created liberty interest
argument; however, his state claims were neither raised to nor ruled upon by the
ALC. Although Pencille cited to federal RFRA and RLUIPA statutes and caselaw
on his inmate grievance forms and in his filings to the ALC, he failed to cite to
SCRFA or section 24-27-500. The ALC did not expressly rule on Pencille's
SCRFA claim. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733
(1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [ALC] to be preserved for
appellate review."); see also I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406,
422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) ("[T]he losing party generally must both present
his issues and arguments to the lower court and obtain a ruling before an appellate
5
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (2005). Under SCRFA,
The State may not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, unless the State demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person is:
(1) in furtherance of a compelling state interest; and
(2) the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling state interest.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-32-40.
6
See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-27-500 ("For the purposes of Chapter 32 of Title 1: (A)
A state or local correctional facility's regulation must be considered 'in furtherance
of a compelling state interest' if the facility demonstrates that the religious activity:
(1) sought to be engaged by a prisoner is presumptively dangerous to the health or
safety of that prisoner; or (2) poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or security
of other prisoners, correctional staff, or the public. (B) A state or local correctional
facility regulation may not be considered the 'least restrictive means' of furthering a
compelling state interest if a reasonable accommodation can be made to protect the
safety or security of prisoners, correctional staff, or the public.").
court will review those issues and arguments."). The issue, then, has not been
preserved for appellate review, and it would be improper for us to address it now.
To the extent Pencille expands upon his SCRFA argument in his reply brief, we
find this argument is not properly before this court. See Spivey ex rel. Spivey v.
Carolina Crawler, 367 S.C. 154, 161, 624 S.E.2d 435, 438 (Ct. App. 2005)
(declining to consider issues raised for the first time in the appellants' reply brief
when not raised in their initial brief). Accordingly, we find Pencille's SCRFA and
section 24-27-500 arguments are unpreserved.7
"Admittedly, prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, but
'[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system.'" Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (citation omitted)
(quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977).
"Courts traditionally have adopted a 'hands off' doctrine regarding judicial
involvement in prison disciplinary procedures and other internal prison matters,
although they must intercede when infringements complained of by an inmate
reach constitutional dimensions." Skipper, 370 S.C. at 274, 633 S.E.2d at 914
(quoting Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 382, 527 S.E.2d 742, 757 (2000)).
"[A]n inmate's complaint must encompass an infringement of a liberty interest that
imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate to trigger due process
guarantees and judicial review." Id.A claim that implicates a state-created liberty or property
interest is not required for the ALC to have subject
matter jurisdiction over the appeal. However, the ALC is
not required to hold a hearing in every matter and may
summarily dismiss an inmate's grievance if it does not
implicate a state-created liberty or property interest
sufficient to trigger procedural due process guarantees.
Allen v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 439 S.C. 164, 171, 886 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2023).
7
In its order summarily dismissing Pencille's claim, the ALC addressed Pencille's
allegations regarding his transfer to another correctional institution as raising a
RLUIPA claim. We find Pencille failed to raise this allegation in his step one or
step two grievance and therefore any claims relating to his transfer were not
properly before the ALC. See Gatewood v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 416 S.C. 304, 324,
785 S.E.2d 600, 611 (Ct. App. 2016) ("An issue that is not raised to an
administrative agency is not preserved for appellate review by the ALC.").
"Summary dismissal may be appropriate where the inmate's grievance does not
implicate a state-created liberty or property interest." Slezak, 361 S.C. at 331, 605
S.E.2d at 508.
Administrative matters subject to review by the ALC "typically arise in two ways:
(1) when an inmate is disciplined and punishment is imposed and (2) when an
inmate believes prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence,
sentence-related credits, or custody status." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 369, 527
S.E.2d at 750. "[S]tates may create liberty interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause, but . . . 'these interests will be generally limited to freedom from
restraint which . . . impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" Sullivan v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.,
355 S.C. 437, 442, 586 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2003) (third alteration in original)
(quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484), abrogated on other grounds by Allen, 439 S.C.
at 169, 886 S.E.2d at 673. In Prieto v. Clarke, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit clarified, "Sandin holds that, while a state statute or policy
may 'create liberty interests' giving rise to Due Process protection, this is so only if
the denial of such an interest 'imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" 780 F.3d 245, 249 (4th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); see also Halcomb v. Ravenal, 344 F.
Supp. 3d 844, 848 (D.S.C. 2018) ("To demonstrate a prisoner has such an interest,
and invoke the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, the prisoner must show (1) denial of 'an interest that can arise either from
the Constitution itself or from state laws or policies,' and that (2) this denial
imposed on him an 'atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.'" (quoting Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 202 (4th Cir.
2006))), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Halcomb v. Ravenell, 992 F.3d 316 (4th Cir.
2021); Skipper, 370 S.C. at 274, 633 S.E.2d at 914 ("[A]n inmate's complaint must
encompass an infringement of a liberty interest that imposes an atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate to trigger due process guarantees and judicial
review.").
In Sullivan, an inmate challenged SCDC's denial of his admission to the Sex
Offender Treatment Program. 355 S.C. at 440, 586 S.E.2d at 125. The ALC
summarily dismissed the inmate's appeal. Id. Our supreme court found the
inmate's grievance did not arise in any of the "'typical' ways enumerated in
Al-Shabazz; it [wa]s not the result of a disciplinary proceeding and d[id] not
involve sentence-related credits or custody status. [The inmate]'s claim [wa]s most
accurately described as a 'condition of confinement claim.'" Id. at 443, 586 S.E.2d
at 127. The court affirmed the ALC's dismissal of the inmate's appeal, finding
Article XII, Section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution8 did not require SCDC to
grant the inmate enrollment in the Sex Offender Treatment Program because to do
so, would make the ALC and the judicial branch "micromanagers of the prison
system." Id. at 444, 586 S.E.2d at 127. Further, the court determined denying the
inmate access to the program "d[id] not impose an 'atypical or significant hardship'
on [the inmate] as all other inmates designated as sex offenders [we]re afforded the
same access to treatment." Id. at 445, 586 S.E.2d at 128. Nevertheless, our
supreme court noted,
[A] condition of confinement could implicate a
state[-]created liberty interest . . . . However, we adhere
to Sandin's pronouncement that "these interests will
generally be limited to freedom from restraint which . . .
imposes atypical or significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."
Id. at 445 n.5, 586 S.E.2d at 128 n.5 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Sandin,
515 U.S. at 484).
In Skipper, our supreme court held the appealing inmate did not have a liberty
interest in prison employment. 370 S.C. at 275-78, 633 S.E.2d at 915-16. The
court found the work program at issue was statutorily created; however,
participation in the work program was "a privilege, not a right." Id. at 275-76, 633
S.E.2d at 915. Further, it determined that "[the] employment program d[id] not
meet the test for a state-created liberty interest as outlined in Sandin because it
d[id] not present an atypical, significant hardship on inmates who [were] not
permitted to participate." Id. at 276, 633 S.E.2d at 915.
In Wicker v. South Carolina Department of Corrections,9 the appealing inmate
participated in the same work program at issue in Skipper. However, in Wicker,
our supreme court determined "the state's statutory mandate that inmates be paid
the prevailing wage create[d a liberty] interest, which may not be denied without
due process." 360 S.C. at 424, 602 S.E.2d at 58. Our supreme court cautioned that
its holding was "extremely limited and is not to be viewed as expanding the
8
"The General Assembly shall establish institutions for the confinement of all
persons convicted of such crimes as may be designated by law, and shall provide
for the custody, maintenance, health, welfare, education, and rehabilitation of the
inmates." S.C. Const. art. XII, § 2.
9
360 S.C. 421, 423, 602 S.E.2d 56, 57 (2004).
jurisdiction of the AL[C] in any other circumstance." Id. at 424 n.1, 602 S.E.2d at
58 n.1.
We hold Pencille's claim did not implicate a state-created liberty interest such that
it invoked the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. Similar to the
claim raised in Sullivan, Pencille's appeal raised a challenge to a condition of
confinement—his ability to practice the Wiccan religion with the use of religious
oils. See 355 S.C. at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. As noted by our supreme court in
Sullivan, state-created liberty interests are not limited to sentence calculation issues
and disciplinary decisions; thus, "a condition of confinement could implicate a
state[-]created liberty interest." Id. at 445 n.5, 586 S.E.2d at 128 n.5. "However
. . . 'these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which . . .
imposes atypical or significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.'" Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Sandin, 515
U.S. at 484). Our supreme court has adopted the standard articulated in Sandin to
determine whether a claim implicates a state-created liberty interest that affords
due process protections.10 See id. at 442, 586 S.E.2d at 126 ("[S]tates may create
liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause, but . . . . 'these
interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.'" (emphasis in original) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484)).
Section 24-27-500 and SCDC Policy PS-10.05 create a liberty interest in religious
practice. Section 24-27-500 applies SCRFA to prison regulations and SCDC
Policy PS-10.05 provides, "Inmates will be given the opportunity to practice their
religious faith to the extent that such practice does not interfere with the security
and safety of the institution, staff, or others." Accordingly, we find inmates have
an interest in religious practice arising from state law and policy.
Although we determine the first prong of the Sandin analysis is met, we find
SCDC's denial of Pencille's request to use religious oils in the practice of his
religion for security reasons did not present an atypical or significant hardship in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sullivan, 355 S.C. at 442, 586
S.E.2d at 126; see also Halcomb, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 848 ("To demonstrate a
10
The ALC relied on our supreme court's holding in Slezak to find Pencille's claim
did not implicate a state-created liberty interest; however, we find the ALC's
reliance on this case was misplaced because the items seized by SCDC in Slezak
were "educational" cassette tapes, not "religious" cassette tapes. 361 S.C. at
331-32, 605 S.E.2d at 508.
prisoner has such an interest, and invoke the procedural protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the prisoner must show (1) denial of
'an interest that can arise either from the Constitution itself or from state laws or
policies,' and that (2) this denial imposed on him an 'atypical and significant
hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'" (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 202)); see also Prieto,
780 F.3d at 249 ("Sandin holds that, while a state statute or policy may 'create
liberty interests' giving rise to Due Process protection, this is so only if the denial
of such an interest 'imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'"). Under SCDC Policy PS-10.05,
SCDC affords inmates "the opportunity to practice their religious faith to the extent
that such practice does not interfere with the security and safety of the institution,
staff, or others." (emphasis added). While Pencille may have had an expectation in
the practice of his religion, "[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (alteration
in original) (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. at 125); see also Sullivan, 355 S.C. at 445,
586 S.E.2d at 128 (determining that denying the inmate access to the work
program "d[id] not impose an 'atypical or significant hardship' on [the inmate] as
all other inmates designated as sex offenders [we]re afforded the same access to
treatment."); Skipper, 370 S.C. at 276, 633 S.E.2d at 915 (determining "[the]
employment program d[id] not meet the test for a state-created liberty interest as
outlined in Sandin because it d[id] not present an atypical, significant hardship on
inmates who [were] not permitted to participate."). SCDC's denial of Pencille's
request for the use of religious oils was due to security concerns. Due to his
incarceration, Pencille is not entitled to the use of substances—even those used for
religious practice—deemed a security threat.
Based on the foregoing, we find Pencille's claim did not implicate a state-created
liberty interest giving rise to procedural protection under the Due Process Clause
and we therefore hold the ALC did not err in summarily dismissing Pencille's
claim.11 See Allen, 439 S.C. at 171, 886 S.E.2d at 674 ("[T]he ALC is not required
11
Pencille is correct that federal law protects inmates against government action
that imposes a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion unless the
government demonstrates a compelling interest and shows it imposed the least
restrictive means necessary to further that interest. See Nance v. Miser, 700 F.
App'x 629, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting this aspect of federal RFRA and
RLUIPA). Even so, we are not aware of any authority granting jurisdiction over
to hold a hearing in every matter and may summarily dismiss an inmate's grievance
if it does not implicate a state-created liberty or property interest sufficient to
trigger procedural due process guarantees.").
Although we affirm the ALC's holding that Pencille's claim did not implicate a
state-created liberty interest, based on our supreme court's recent clarification in
Allen, we find the ALC erred in determining it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over Pencille's claim. See Allen, 439 S.C. at 171, 886 S.E.2d at 674
("A claim that implicates a state-created liberty or property interest is not required
for the ALC to have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.").
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the ALC's order is
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.12
KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.
such a claim to the ALC, especially when that court is sitting in an appellate
capacity as it was here.
12
In light of our disposition, we decline to address Pencille's remaining arguments.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining
issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).