Trina Dawkins v. Fundamental Clinical ( 2023 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Trina Dawkins, as Personal Representative of the Estate
    of William Dawkins, Respondent,
    v.
    Fundamental Clinical and Operational Services, LLC;
    Fundamental Administrative Services, LLC; THI of
    South Carolina, LLC; THI of South Carolina at
    Spartanburg, LLC; THI of South Carolina at Magnolia
    Manor-Spartanburg, LLC d/b/a Magnolia
    Manor-Spartanburg, Appellants.
    Appellate Case No. 2021-000707
    Appeal From Spartanburg County
    Grace Gilchrist Knie, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-392
    Submitted December 5, 2023 – Filed December 13, 2023
    AFFIRMED
    Stephen Lynwood Brown, James D. Gandy, III, Russell
    Grainger Hines, Donald Jay Davis, Jr, and Ted Ashton
    Phillips, III, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston,
    for Appellants.
    William Ashley Jordan, III, of Jordan Law Center, LLC,
    of Greenville, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Appellants' appeal the circuit court's order denying their motions
    to stay and THI of South Carolina at Spartanburg, LLC's (the Facility's) motion to
    compel to arbitration the claims of Trina Dawkins, as Personal Representative of
    the Estate of William Dawkins. On appeal, the Facility argues the circuit court
    erred by denying its motion to compel arbitration. We affirm pursuant to Rule
    220(b), SCACR.
    First, we hold the circuit court did not err in denying the Facility's motion to
    compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration
    Agreement did not merge.1 See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 
    346 S.C. 580
    ,
    596, 
    553 S.E.2d 110
    , 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an
    issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope
    Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 
    379 S.C. 620
    , 625, 
    667 S.E.2d 1
    ,
    3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is
    subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
    351 S.C. 606
    , 609-10,
    
    571 S.E.2d 711
    , 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings
    will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them.");
    Wilson v. Willis, 
    426 S.C. 326
    , 335, 
    827 S.E.2d 167
    , 172 (2019) ("Whether an
    arbitration agreement may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a
    matter subject to de novo review by an appellate court."); Est. of Solesbee by
    Bayne v. Fundamental Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 
    438 S.C. 638
    , 648-49,
    
    885 S.E.2d 144
    , 149 (Ct. App. 2023), cert. pending (finding the admission
    agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge after considering (1) the
    admission agreement provided it was governed by South Carolina law and the
    arbitration agreement provided it was governed by federal law, (2) the arbitration
    agreement recognized the two documents were separate by stating the arbitration
    agreement "shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the
    Admission Agreement," (3) the documents were separately paginated and had their
    own signature pages, and (4) signing the arbitration agreement was not a
    precondition to admission); Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 
    407 S.C. 346
    ,
    355, 
    755 S.E.2d 450
    , 455 (2014) (concluding that by their own terms, language in
    the admission agreement that "recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of [the arbitration
    agreement] and the admission agreement" and a clause allowing the arbitration
    1
    Because we hold the circuit court did not err by denying the Facility's motion to
    compel arbitration, it also did not err by denying Appellants' motions to stay.
    agreement to "be disclaimed within thirty days of signing while the admission
    agreement could not" indicated the parties' intention "that the common law
    doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg,
    LLC, 
    422 S.C. 544
    , 562-63, 
    813 S.E.2d 292
    , 302 (Ct. App. 2018) (determining an
    admissions agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge because the fact
    "the [a]dmissions [a]greement indicated it was governed by South Carolina law,
    whereas the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated it was governed by federal law[,]"
    "each document was separately paginated and had its own signature page[,]" and
    "the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated signing it was not a precondition to
    admission" evidenced the parties' intention that the documents be construed as
    separate instruments). Here, as in Solesbee and Hodge, (1) the two agreements
    were governed by different bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was
    governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law;
    (2) each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own
    signature page; (3) the Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were
    separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement "shall survive any termination or
    breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement"; and (4) the Facility
    acknowledged that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to
    admission to the Facility. Thus, the Admission Agreement and Arbitration
    Agreement did not merge. Because we find the documents did not merge, a
    controlling consideration of whether the Arbitration Agreement bound William
    Dawkins, we decline to reach the Facility's remaining arguments. See Futch v.
    McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 
    335 S.C. 598
    , 613, 
    518 S.E.2d 591
    , 598
    (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its
    resolution of a prior issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885
    S.E.2d at 149 (determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration
    agreement did not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied);
    Coleman, 407 S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here,
    appellants' equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court.");
    Hodge, 422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "equitable estoppel would
    only apply if documents were merged").
    AFFIRMED. 2
    WILLIAMS, C.J., and HEWITT and VERDIN, JJ., concur.
    2
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2023-UP-392

Filed Date: 12/13/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024