Trina Dawkins v. Fundamental Clinical ( 2023 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Trina Dawkins, as Personal Representative of the Estate
of William Dawkins, Respondent,
v.
Fundamental Clinical and Operational Services, LLC;
Fundamental Administrative Services, LLC; THI of
South Carolina, LLC; THI of South Carolina at
Spartanburg, LLC; THI of South Carolina at Magnolia
Manor-Spartanburg, LLC d/b/a Magnolia
Manor-Spartanburg, Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2021-000707
Appeal From Spartanburg County
Grace Gilchrist Knie, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-392
Submitted December 5, 2023 – Filed December 13, 2023
AFFIRMED
Stephen Lynwood Brown, James D. Gandy, III, Russell
Grainger Hines, Donald Jay Davis, Jr, and Ted Ashton
Phillips, III, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston,
for Appellants.
William Ashley Jordan, III, of Jordan Law Center, LLC,
of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Appellants' appeal the circuit court's order denying their motions
to stay and THI of South Carolina at Spartanburg, LLC's (the Facility's) motion to
compel to arbitration the claims of Trina Dawkins, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of William Dawkins. On appeal, the Facility argues the circuit court
erred by denying its motion to compel arbitration. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.
First, we hold the circuit court did not err in denying the Facility's motion to
compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration
Agreement did not merge.1 See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580,
596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an
issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope
Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1,
3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is
subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10,
571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings
will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them.");
Wilson v. Willis, 426 S.C. 326, 335, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019) ("Whether an
arbitration agreement may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a
matter subject to de novo review by an appellate court."); Est. of Solesbee by
Bayne v. Fundamental Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 438 S.C. 638, 648-49,
885 S.E.2d 144, 149 (Ct. App. 2023), cert. pending (finding the admission
agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge after considering (1) the
admission agreement provided it was governed by South Carolina law and the
arbitration agreement provided it was governed by federal law, (2) the arbitration
agreement recognized the two documents were separate by stating the arbitration
agreement "shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the
Admission Agreement," (3) the documents were separately paginated and had their
own signature pages, and (4) signing the arbitration agreement was not a
precondition to admission); Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 407 S.C. 346,
355, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (concluding that by their own terms, language in
the admission agreement that "recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of [the arbitration
agreement] and the admission agreement" and a clause allowing the arbitration
1
Because we hold the circuit court did not err by denying the Facility's motion to
compel arbitration, it also did not err by denying Appellants' motions to stay.
agreement to "be disclaimed within thirty days of signing while the admission
agreement could not" indicated the parties' intention "that the common law
doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg,
LLC, 422 S.C. 544, 562-63, 813 S.E.2d 292, 302 (Ct. App. 2018) (determining an
admissions agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge because the fact
"the [a]dmissions [a]greement indicated it was governed by South Carolina law,
whereas the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated it was governed by federal law[,]"
"each document was separately paginated and had its own signature page[,]" and
"the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated signing it was not a precondition to
admission" evidenced the parties' intention that the documents be construed as
separate instruments). Here, as in Solesbee and Hodge, (1) the two agreements
were governed by different bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was
governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law;
(2) each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own
signature page; (3) the Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were
separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement "shall survive any termination or
breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement"; and (4) the Facility
acknowledged that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to
admission to the Facility. Thus, the Admission Agreement and Arbitration
Agreement did not merge. Because we find the documents did not merge, a
controlling consideration of whether the Arbitration Agreement bound William
Dawkins, we decline to reach the Facility's remaining arguments. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885
S.E.2d at 149 (determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration
agreement did not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied);
Coleman, 407 S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here,
appellants' equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court.");
Hodge, 422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "equitable estoppel would
only apply if documents were merged").
AFFIRMED. 2
WILLIAMS, C.J., and HEWITT and VERDIN, JJ., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.