Doe v. Metts ( 2012 )


Menu:
  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Jane Doe, Respondent,
    v.
    James R. Metts, Sheriff, Lexington County, and Robert
    Stewart, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division,
    Appellants.
    Appellate Case No. 2009-145426
    Appeal From Lexington County
    Robin B. Stilwell, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-612
    Submitted October 2, 2012 – Filed November 14, 2012
    AFFIRMED
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
    Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy
    Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
    Attorney General David A. Spencer, of Columbia, for
    Appellants.
    James Mixon Griffin, of Lewis Babcock & Griffin, LLP,
    of Columbia, for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: In this declaratory judgment action, the Sheriff of Lexington
    County and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) (collectively,
    Appellants) appeal the trial court's order finding Jane Doe relieved from the sex
    offender registration requirements due to her pardon. We affirm pursuant to Rule
    220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Edwards v. State Law
    Enforcement Div., 
    395 S.C. 571
    , 576, 
    720 S.E.2d 462
    , 464 (2011) (holding
    Edwards' "pardon relieved [him] from all direct and collateral consequences of his
    pardoned crime, which would necessarily include placement on the sex offender
    registry and continuous compliance with its registration requirements"); 
    id.
     at 576-
    77, 
    720 S.E.2d at 464-65
     (holding the 2005 and 2008 amendments to section 23-3-
    430 of the South Carolina Code changed rather than clarified the law, and "[t]he
    purpose of the amendment evinces the legislature's intent to except the sex
    offender registry requirements from the broad relief afforded by the pardon
    statute"); 
    id. at 580-82
    , 
    720 S.E.2d at 466-67
     (declining to adopt the State's
    definition of remedial, and holding the legislature's 2005 and 2008 amendments to
    section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code are not procedural and cannot be
    retroactively applied).
    AFFIRMED.1
    SHORT, KONDUROS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-UP-612

Filed Date: 11/14/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024