State v. Martin ( 2020 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    The State, Respondent,
    v.
    Heyward Legree Martin, III, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2017-000559
    Appeal From Aiken County
    Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-272
    Submitted March 16, 2020 – Filed September 30, 2020
    AFFIRMED
    Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
    Columbia, for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
    Attorney General William Frederick Schumacher, IV, of
    Columbia; and Solicitor James Strom Thurmond, Jr., of
    Aiken, all for Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: Heyward Legree Martin, III appeals his conviction of inflicting
    great bodily injury on a child, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to allow
    testimony regarding third-party guilt. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
    and the following authorities: State v. Pagan, 
    369 S.C. 201
    , 208, 
    631 S.E.2d 262
    ,
    265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court
    and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); 
    id.
     ("An abuse of
    discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary
    support or are controlled by an error of law."); State v. Holder, 
    382 S.C. 278
    , 288,
    
    676 S.E.2d 690
    , 696 (2009) ("The admission or exclusion of testimonial evidence
    falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be
    disturbed on appeal absent abuse resulting in prejudice." (quoting State v. Brannon,
    
    341 S.C. 271
    , 277, 
    533 S.E.2d 345
    , 348 (Ct. App. 2000))); State v. Burgess, 
    391 S.C. 15
    , 22, 
    703 S.E.2d 512
    , 516 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he admissibility of evidence
    of third[-]party guilt is governed by the rule set forth in State v. Gregory, 
    198 S.C. 98
    , 
    16 S.E.2d 532
     (1941)."); Gregory, 
    198 S.C. at 104
    , 
    16 S.E.2d at 534
     (providing
    for a defendant seeking to assert third-party guilt: "[T]he evidence offered by [the]
    accused as to the commission of the crime by another person must be limited to
    such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a
    reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence; evidence which can
    have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another, or to raise a
    conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by another, is not
    admissible." (third alteration by court) (quoting 16 C.J. 560)); id. at 104-05, 
    16 S.E.2d at 535
     ("But before such testimony can be received, there must be such
    proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances, as tends clearly
    to point out such other person as the guilty party. Remote acts, disconnected and
    outside the crime itself, cannot be separately proved for such a purpose. An
    orderly and unbiased judicial inquiry as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant on
    trial does not contemplate that such defendant be permitted, by way of defense, to
    indulge in conjectural inferences that some other person might have committed the
    offense for which he is on trial, or by fanciful analogy to say to the jury that
    someone other than he is more probably guilty." (quoting 
    20 Am. Jur. 254
    ));
    Holmes v. South Carolina, 
    547 U.S. 319
    , 330 (2006) (characterizing the purpose of
    the Gregory rule as "to focus the trial on the central issues by excluding evidence
    that has only a very weak logical connection to the central issues"); State v.
    Brooks, 
    428 S.C. 618
    , 635, 
    837 S.E.2d 236
    , 245 (Ct. App. 2019) ("The Holmes
    court recognized that evidence of third-party guilt is appropriately managed by
    evidentiary rules such as Rule 403, SCRE."), cert. denied, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order
    filed Aug. 10, 2020; Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be
    excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
    prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
    undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.");
    State v. Collins, 
    409 S.C. 524
    , 534, 
    763 S.E.2d 22
    , 28 (2014) ("A trial [court]'s
    decision regarding the comparative probative value and prejudicial effect of
    evidence should be reversed only in exceptional circumstances." (quoting State v.
    Adams, 
    354 S.C. 361
    , 378, 
    580 S.E.2d 785
    , 794 (Ct. App. 2003))); Brooks, 428
    S.C. at 635, 837 S.E.2d at 245 ("The appellate court reviews the circuit court's
    Rule 403 ruling 'pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard and [is] obligated to
    give great deference to the [circuit] court's judgment.'" (alterations by court)
    (quoting Collins, 409 S.C. at 534, 763 S.E.2d at 28)).
    AFFIRMED.1
    WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and HILL, JJ., concur.
    1
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2020-UP-272

Filed Date: 9/30/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024