AequiCap Insurance v. Best ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
AequiCap Insurance Company, Appellant,
v.
Eddie Reese Best, Travis Scott d/b/a Fiscal Transport,
F.I.S.C.A.L. Transportation, LLC, Estate of James
Buchanan, and Roger Pelotte, Defendants,
Of whom Estate of James Buchanan and Roger Pelotte
are Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2010-180986
Appeal From Bamberg County
Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-116
Heard March 5, 2013 – Filed March 20, 2013
AFFIRMED
Robert D. Moseley, Jr., C. Fredric Marcinak, III, and
Joseph W. Rohe, all of Smith Moore Leatherwood, LLP,
of Greenville, for Appellant.
John S. Nichols, of Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson &
Delgado, LLC, of Columbia, and Daniel W. Luginbill, of
Wilson, Luginbill & Kirkland, LLC, of Bamberg, both
for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action filed by
Appellant AequiCap Insurance Company (AequiCap), seeking a ruling as to its
duties and obligations to Travis Scott, Fiscal Transport, Eddie Best, and
Respondents Estate of James Buchannan and Roger Pelotte.1 The trial court found
the following: (1) the preapproval provision in the endorsement requiring all
drivers of the insured vehicle to be approved prior to coverage is void; (2) Best is
afforded liability coverage in the amount of $1,000,000 for any liability related to
his operation of the vehicle in question; and (3) Scott is afforded liability coverage
in the amount of $1,000,000 for any liability related to his alleged ownership or
maintenance of the vehicle in question. On appeal, AequiCap argues the trial court
erred because (1) the preapproval endorsement in the insurance policy properly
excludes coverage in amounts exceeding those required by the South Carolina
Financial Responsibility Act, and (2) the applicable minimum limit of coverage is
$75,000 because the insured was exempt from commercial motor carrier insurance
requirements. We affirm.
1. As an additional sustaining ground, Respondents argue AequiCap did not
appeal the trial court's ruling that if the preapproval provision applied to limit
coverage for Best, the provision would not limit coverage for Scott, as the named
insured, for any liability related to his maintenance of the vehicle in question.
Thus, Respondents argue this finding is the law of the case. Because AequiCap
did not appeal the trial court's finding that the preapproval provision does not limit
coverage for Scott's liability under the policy, we affirm. See Jones v. Lott, 387
S.C. 339, 346, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010) ("Under the two issue rule, where a
decision is based on more than one ground, the appellate court will affirm unless
the appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the
law of the case."); Transp. Ins. Co. & Flagstar Corp. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund,
389 S.C. 422, 432, 699 S.E.2d 687, 692 (2010) (noting an issue is deemed
abandoned if the argument in the brief is not supported by authority or is only
conclusory); I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d
1During the pendency of this appeal, AequiCap, a Florida company, became
insolvent and was placed into a receivership by the Florida courts. However,
AequiCap was a member of the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance
Guaranty Association; thus, the underlying claim is being managed by the
Guaranty Association. See S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-60 (2002).
716, 723 (2000) ("The appellate court may review respondent's additional reasons
and, if convinced it is proper and fair to do so, rely on them or any other reason
appearing in the record to affirm the lower court's judgment."); Spivey ex rel.
Spivey v. Carolina Crawler, 367 S.C. 154, 161, 624 S.E.2d 435, 438 (Ct. App.
2005) (declining to address issues raised in the appellant's reply brief because a
reply brief may not be used to argue issues not raised in the appellant's initial
brief).
2. As to AequiCap's remaining issues on appeal, we decline to address these issues
because the above finding is dispositive of the appeal. See Young v. Charleston
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 397 S.C. 303, 311, 725 S.E.2d 107, 111 (2012) (declining to
address additional remaining issues when the disposition of a prior issue was
dispositive of the appeal).
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.