Charleston County DSS v. Angela E. ( 2013 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Charleston County Department of Social Services,
    Respondent,
    v.
    Angela E., Eric James W., and John Doe, Defendants,
    Of whom Angela E. is the Appellant,
    In the interest of a minor child under the age of eighteen.
    Appellate Case No. 2012-212814
    Appeal From Charleston County
    Judy L. McMahon, Family Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-172
    Submitted April 8, 2013 – Filed April 22, 2013
    AFFIRMED
    Thomas Dyllan Rankin, of The Law Office of T. Dyllan
    Rankin, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellant.
    Bonnie T. Brisbane, of Charleston County Department of
    Social Services, of North Charleston, for Respondent.
    Joshua Keith Roten, of Charleston, for Guardian ad
    Litem.
    PER CURIAM: Angela E. (Mother) appeals the family court's final order
    terminating her parental rights, which also denied her motion for a continuance.
    Mother appeals the order denying her motion for continuance, arguing the family
    court erred in finding she received notice of trial and abused its discretion in
    denying her motion for a continuance. We affirm.
    1. As to whether the family court erred in finding the notice sent to Mother at her
    Georgia address notified Mother of the trial:1 Rule 5(b)(1), SCRCP (providing in
    part, when service is required upon a party, it "shall be made by delivering a copy
    to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address or, if no address is known,
    by leaving it with the clerk of court"); id. (providing "[s]ervice by mail is complete
    upon mailing of all pleadings and papers subsequent to service of the original
    summons and complaint"); NCNB S.C. v. Floyd, 
    303 S.C. 261
    , 264, 
    399 S.E.2d 794
    , 796 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding the defendant was properly served under Rule
    5(b)(1), SCRCP, when the address to which the notice was mailed was the last
    address known to the plaintiff).2
    1
    While the family court's final order terminating Mother's parental rights states
    that: "[t]he last address that [Mother] provided to the Department of Social
    Services . . . is in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina[,]" this does not affect the merits
    of this issue because the Department sent notice of the trial to Mother at her
    Georgia address, the same address where Mother was personally served with the
    summons and complaint, and the record contains evidence that Mother's address
    has not changed since the commencement of the termination of parental rights
    action.
    2
    While Mother and the Department of Social Services contend otherwise, Rule
    17(a), SCRFC, which is entitled "Failure to File Answer," does not apply to the
    circumstances of this case because Mother filed an answer. See Rule 17(a),
    SCRFC ("In domestic relations matters, even though the defendant does not file an
    answer, notice of the time and date of the merits hearing shall be given to the
    defendant. If the defendant is not represented by counsel, notice as required by this
    rule shall be sufficient if mailed to the defendant at his last known address, by
    certified mail, return receipt requested. The defendant may be heard at the merits
    2. As to whether the family court abused its discretion in denying Mother's motion
    for a continuance: S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Broome, 
    307 S.C. 48
    , 51, 
    413 S.E.2d 835
    , 838 (1992) ("The granting or denial of a continuance is within the sound
    discretion of the trial [court] and is reviewable on appeal only when an abuse of
    discretion appears from the record."); id. at 51-52, 
    413 S.E.2d at 838
     ("[T]he denial
    of a motion for a continuance on the ground that counsel has not had time to
    prepare is rarely disturbed on appeal."); State v. Babb, 
    299 S.C. 451
    , 455, 
    385 S.E.2d 827
    , 829 (1989) (denying a motion for a continuance when shortage of time
    to prepare defense was not the fault of the trial court or the State but rather the fault
    of the defendant in failing to act).
    AFFIRMED.3
    HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
    hearing on issues of custody of children, visitation, alimony, support, equitable
    distribution, and counsel fees." (emphasis added)).
    3
    We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-UP-172

Filed Date: 4/22/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024