Angradi v. Lail ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Martha Lynne Angradi and Donald Scott McLorie,
individually and on behalf of their minor child, Jessie M.,
Respondents,
v.
Edgar Jack Lail and Leola Lail, Sylvester Golden,
Golden Property, LLC, Nationwide Homes, and
Fayssoux Real Estate, Defendants,
Of whom Sylvester Golden and Golden Property, LLC,
are the Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2011-196048
Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-162
Heard February 5, 2013 – Filed April 17, 2013
AFFIRMED
Jerry Leo Finney and Stephanie Ruotolo Fajardo, of the
Finney Law Firm, Inc., of Columbia, for Appellants.
Richard S. Stewart, of Greenville, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Sylvester Golden and Golden Property, LLC (collectively,
Golden Property) appeal the circuit court's (1) denial of their motions for a directed
verdict on Martha Lynne Angradi and Donald Scott McLorie's (collectively, the
purchasers) fraud claim; (2) denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) on the purchasers' fraud claim; and (3) ruling precluding
Mr. Golden from testifying that the house at issue passed an inspection before the
purchasers bought the home. We affirm.
1. We affirm the circuit court's denial of Golden Property's motions for a directed
verdict on the purchasers' fraud claim. Initially, we note that Golden Property has
presented numerous arguments in favor of their assertion that the circuit court
erred in denying their directed verdict motions. However, the only argument
Golden Property raised at trial in support of their directed verdict motions was that
the purchasers had no right to rely on Mr. Golden's representations because Mr.
Golden was not the owner of the house. Accordingly, the remainder of Golden
Property's arguments on appeal are not preserved for our review. See Holly Woods
Ass'n of Residence Owners v. Hiller, 392 S.C. 172, 189, 708 S.E.2d 787, 796 (Ct.
App. 2011) (holding "the appellant's failure to raise a particular issue in its directed
verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue"); see also Rule 50(a),
SCRCP ("A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds
therefor.").
As to Golden Property's argument that is preserved, namely that the purchasers had
no right to rely upon Mr. Golden's representations because he was not the owner of
the home, we find the circuit court did not err in denying Golden Property's
directed verdict motions. In the context of fraud, "[t]he right to rely must be
determined in light of the plaintiffs['] duty to use reasonable prudence and
diligence under the circumstances in identifying the truth with respect to the
representations made to [them]." Armstrong v. Collins, 366 S.C. 204, 219, 621
S.E.2d 368, 375 (Ct. App. 2005). In the instant case, we find that evidence
supported a finding that the purchasers reasonably relied upon his representations
regarding the condition of the house. Specifically, it is undisputed that Mr. Golden
assembled the house, and evidence supported a finding that he represented himself
as the owner of the house. Further, although he was not on the title to the house,
Mr. Golden had a financial interest in selling the home based on his relationship
with the owner, Edgar Lail. Specifically, Mr. Golden testified that Lail purchased
the house for less than its value and agreed to pay Mr. Golden "some remaining
funds whenever the house sold." Pursuant to this agreement, Lail paid him
$11,900 upon the sale of the house. Mr. Golden's ongoing relationship with Lail
was more akin to a partnership than that of merely a listing agent and seller.
Accordingly, evidence supported a finding that the purchasers reasonably relied
upon Mr. Golden's representations concerning the house. Based on the above
evidence, the circuit court did not err in denying Golden Property's motions for a
directed verdict on the purchasers' fraud claim.
2. We affirm the circuit court's denial of Golden Property's JNOV motion. The
facts cited above supporting the denial of Golden Property's motions for a directed
verdict on the purchasers' fraud claim also support the jury's verdict in favor of the
purchasers on their fraud claim. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in
denying Golden Property's JNOV motion. See Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279,
300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 419 (Ct. App. 2000) ("A motion for JNOV may be granted
only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict. The jury's
verdict will not be overturned if any evidence exists that sustains the factual
findings implicit in its decision." (citation omitted)).
3. Golden Property's claim that the circuit court erred in precluding Mr. Golden
from testifying that the house at issue passed an inspection by Greenville County
authorities is not preserved for appellate review. Golden Property failed to proffer
testimony regarding a satisfactory inspection of the house during trial and solely
relied upon the circuit court's in limine ruling in presenting their case. Our
supreme court and this court have emphasized that even when the circuit court
grants a motion in limine, it is not a final ruling on the admissibility of the
evidence. Accordingly, the party opposing the motion must subsequently proffer
the evidence during trial in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. See
S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Galbreath, 315 S.C. 82, 83 n.2, 431
S.E.2d 625, 627 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that our "[s]upreme [c]ourt has
indicated that even where a motion in limine is granted, it is not the final ruling on
the admissibility of the evidence," and that, accordingly, the party opposing a
motion in limine that is granted must subsequently proffer the evidence during trial
to preserve the issue for appellate review).
AFFIRMED.
HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.