State v. Charvix L. Wright ( 2024 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Charvix Lavoy Wright, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2021-001537
Appeal From Spartanburg County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-001
Submitted November 1, 2023 – Filed January 3, 2024
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of
Spartanburg, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Charvix Lavoy Wright appeals his convictions for voluntary
manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime and aggregate sentence of thirty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Wright
argues (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for immunity
under the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act) when it failed to
properly act as a fact-finder on the request, and (2) alternatively, the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to find Wright immune from prosecution under the
Act because he proved by a preponderance of the evidence he acted in self-defense.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
1. We hold Wright's argument the trial court failed to properly act as a fact-finder
on his self-defense claim is not preserved for appellate review because his
objection was not sufficiently specific as to bring the trial court's attention to the
nature of the exact error. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691,
693-94 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must
have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court]. Issues not raised and ruled
upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."); State v. Johnson, 363
S.C. 53, 58, 609 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2005) ("[An] objection should be addressed to
the trial court in a sufficiently specific manner that brings attention to the exact
error.").
2. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Wright failed
to establish he was entitled to immunity under the Act. See State v. Curry, 406
S.C. 364, 370, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013) ("A claim of immunity under the Act
requires a pretrial determination using a preponderance of the evidence standard,
which this court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard of review."); State
v. Glenn, 429 S.C. 108, 116, 838 S.E.2d 491, 495 (2019) ("A trial court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is based on an error of law, or when grounded in factual
conclusions, is without evidentiary support."). For Wright to be granted immunity
from prosecution, he was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
all the elements of self-defense except the duty to retreat. See State v. Jones, 416
S.C. 283, 301, 786 S.E.2d 132, 141 (2016) (stating if section 16-11-440(C) of the
South Carolina Code (2015) is applicable, "the defendant must demonstrate the
elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat, by a preponderance of the
evidence"). To establish self-defense, four elements must be present:
First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on
the difficulty. Second, the defendant must have actually
believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or
sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in
such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based
upon his belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent
man of ordinary firmness and courage would have
entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was
in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as
would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness and
courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself
from serious bodily harm or losing his own life. Fourth,
the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding
the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious
bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular
instance.
State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 46, 317 S.E.2d 452, 453 (1984). As to whether Wright
was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury—or
reasonably feared that he was—Wright presented evidence the gun was fired in
close proximity to Victim due to stippling around the wound; the autopsy report
indicating the gun was fired at an upward angle, which Wright argues supports his
claim he fired the gun to defend himself from Victim lunging at him with a knife;
and his own testimony relaying his version of events. However, the trial court
found Wright's testimony was not credible based on its inconsistencies with the
evidence presented by the State; namely, Wright testified he hugged and kissed
Victim—who had a significant amount of blood on her body—after she was shot,
but Wright had no blood on him, and while Wright claimed Victim was armed with
a knife, its location at the crime scene and the absence of blood on it appeared
inconsistent with its alleged use by Victim. See State v. Johnson, 413 S.C. 458,
467, 776 S.E.2d 367, 371 (2015) ("Credibility findings are treated as factual
findings, and therefore, the appellate inquiry is limited to reviewing whether the
trial court's factual findings are supported by any evidence in the record."); Black
v. Hodge, 306 S.C. 196, 198, 410 S.E.2d 595, 596 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The fact that
testimony is not contradicted directly does not render it undisputed."). As to
whether Wright was without fault in bringing upon the difficulty, Wright testified
Victim grabbed a knife after he pushed an AC unit in through the window onto the
floor, at which point he armed himself with a gun and threatened to be unfaithful to
Victim. Thus, because the trial court's finding that Wright failed to prove
self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence is supported by evidence in the
record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright's
motion for immunity under the Act.
AFFIRMED. 1
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
MCDONALD and VINSON, JJ., and BROMELL HOLMES, A.J., concur.