State v. Carlisle ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Gerald Carlisle, Jr., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2008-111766
Appeal From Aiken County
J. Cordell Maddox, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-213
Heard May 7, 2013 – Filed May 22, 2013
AFFIRMED
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of
Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia;
and Solicitor James Strom Thurmond, Jr., of Aiken, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Gerald Carlisle, Jr., appeals his convictions for four counts of a
lewd act upon a child and two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a
minor, arguing1 the trial court erred in: (1) admitting into evidence expert
testimony regarding child sexual abuse when the expert did not interview or meet
the victim; (2) refusing to charge the jury on reasonable doubt; (3) its jury charge
regarding prior crimes by a child younger than eighteen years of age; and (4)
refusing to exclude evidence of prior alleged incidents of sexual abuse between
Carlisle and the victim. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony when the
expert did not interview or meet the victim: State v. Weaverling, 337 S.C. 460,
474, 523 S.E.2d 787, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Expert testimony concerning common
behavioral characteristics of sexual assault victims and the range of responses to
sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible."); id. at 475, 523 S.E.2d at 794
("There is no requirement the sexual assault victim be personally interviewed or
examined by the expert before the expert can give behavioral evidence testimony.
The fact that the expert does not personally interview the victim bears on the
weight of the behavioral evidence not on its admissibility.").
2. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on
reasonable doubt: State v. Foust, 325 S.C. 12, 16, 479 S.E.2d 50, 52 (1996)
(noting that a jury charge which is substantially correct and covers the law does not
require reversal).
3. As to whether the trial court erred in its jury charge regarding prior crimes
by a child younger than eighteen years of age: State v. Hoffman, 312 S.C. 386,
395, 440 S.E.2d 869, 874 (1994) (affirming convictions where jury charge was
substantially correct).
4. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to exclude evidence of prior
alleged incidents of sexual abuse between Carlisle and the victim: Rule 404(b),
SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
1
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Carlisle's counsel raised
the first issue and moved to be relieved as counsel. Carlisle filed a separate pro se
brief raising the second and third issues. This court denied counsel's petition to be
relieved and directed the parties to brief the fourth issue.
however, be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a common
scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent."); State v. Wallace,
384 S.C. 428, 433-34, 683 S.E.2d 275, 278 (2009) (providing the following non-
exclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether a prior bad act is
admissible under the common scheme or plan exception: (1) the age of the victims
at the time of the abuse; (2) the relationship between the victims and the
perpetrator; (3) the location where the abuse occurred; (4) the use of coercion or
threats; and (5) the manner of the abuse); State v. Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 29, 667
S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008) ("If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime,
evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing."); State v. Wilson, 345
S.C. 1, 6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (stating the appellate courts are bound by the
trial court's factual findings when considering whether there is clear and
convincing evidence of other bad acts unless they are clearly erroneous).
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.