Mulholland-Mertz v. Corie Crest ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Katheryna Mulholland-Mertz, Appellant,
v.
Corie Crest Homeowners Association of Spartanburg,
Inc., Richard T. Biggs, Kathleen A. Biggs, James
Hannah, and Elizabeth A. Hannah, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2012-209866
Appeal From Spartanburg County
Gordon G. Cooper, Master-in-Equity
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-224
Heard May 6, 2013 – Filed May 22, 2013
AFFIRMED
James D. Calmes, III, of Greenville, for Appellant.
A. Todd Darwin and John Hollis Inabinet, both of
Holcombe Bomar, P.A., of Spartanburg, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from Appellant Katheryna Mulholland-Mertz's
action for an injunction against Respondents to enforce restrictive covenants
applicable to real property in a residential subdivision. Pursuant to Rule 41(b),
SCRCP, the master-in-equity dismissed Mulholland-Mertz's action and entered
judgment in favor of the Respondents. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR. As to Issue 1: Johnson v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 308 S.C. 116, 118, 417
S.E.2d 527, 529 (1992) (noting pursuant to Rule 41(b), SCRCP, in a nonjury trial
"the trial judge clearly may dismiss the action even though the plaintiff may have
established a prima facie case. Rule 41(b) allows the judge as the trier of facts to
weigh the evidence, determine the facts, and render a judgment against the plaintiff
at the close of his case if justified"); id. at 118, 417 S.E.2d at 528 (affirming the
master's grant of a party's motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) and rejecting the
appellant's argument the master did not consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion); Regions Bank v. Wingard Props., Inc.,
394 S.C. 241, 249, 715 S.E.2d 348, 352 (Ct. App. 2011) (providing that in an
equity case the appellate court will affirm the findings of the trial court unless the
appellant can establish that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
findings of the trial court). As to Issues 2, 3, and 4: Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1,
4, 498 S.E.2d 862, 863-64 (1998) ("Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature,
so that the paramount rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the parties as determined from the whole document." (quotations
omitted)); id. at 4, 498 S.E.2d at 863 ("Words of a restrictive covenant will be
given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the time of their
execution."). As to Issue 5: Young v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., 397 S.C. 303,
311, 725 S.E.2d 107, 111 (2012) (declining to address additional remaining issues
when the disposition of a prior issue was dispositive of the appeal).
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.