DiCapua v. Guest ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jeremiah DiCapua, Appellant,
v.
Thomas D. Guest, Jr., Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2012-212110
Appeal From Horry County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-207
Submitted April 1, 2013 – Filed May 22, 2013
AFFIRMED
Jeremiah DiCapua, pro se.
Douglas Walker MacKelcan, III and David W.
Overstreet, both of Carlock, Copeland & Stair, LLP, of
Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
1. As to whether the circuit court erred in ruling the applicable statute of
limitations barred DiCapua's cause of action: Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395,
645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007) (stating that in reviewing the dismissal of an action
under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the appellate court applies the same standard of
review as the circuit court); id. ("In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint
based on a failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the
[circuit] court must base its ruling solely on allegations set forth in the
complaint."); Kelly v. Logan, Jolley, & Smith, L.L.P., 383 S.C. 626, 632, 682
S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice
action is three years." (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5) (2005))); S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-3-535 (2005) ("[A]ctions initiated under [s]ection 15-3-530(5) must be
commenced within three years after the person knew or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action."); Maher v.
Tietex Corp., 331 S.C. 371, 377, 500 S.E.2d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The statute
[of limitations] is not delayed until the injured party seeks advice of counsel or
develops a full-blown theory of recovery; instead, reasonable diligence requires a
plaintiff to act with some promptness." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Epstein v. Brown, 363 S.C. 372, 382-83, 610 S.E.2d 816, 821 (2005)
(holding the three-year limitations period for a legal malpractice claim began
running on the date the adverse verdict was entered against the client, even though
the attorney continued to represent the client throughout the appellate process).
2. As to DiCapua's arguments concerning his failure to file an affidavit from an
expert witness: Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598,
613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address
appellant's remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.1
FEW, C.J., and GEATHERS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.