State v. McCauley ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Ronald McCauley, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2010-181526
Appeal From Berkeley County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-202
Heard May 7, 2013 – Filed May 15, 2013
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Breen Richard Stevens, of Columbia,
for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This appeal arises out of Appellant Ronald Lee McCauley's
convictions for three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor,
two counts of committing or attempting a lewd act upon a child, and three counts
of unlawful conduct towards a child. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
As to Issue 1: State v. Harris, 351 S.C. 643, 652, 572 S.E.2d 267, 272 (2002) ("A
motion for severance is addressed to the trial court and should not be disturbed
unless an abuse of discretion is shown."); State v. Anderson, 318 S.C. 395, 400,
458 S.E.2d 56, 59 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Anderson's severance motion and Anderson was not prejudiced by the
admission into evidence of prior convictions because the trial court gave a
sufficient limiting instruction to the jury."); State v. Jones, 325 S.C. 310, 315-16,
479 S.E.2d 517, 520 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the State's motion to consolidate the charges of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, second-degree criminal sexual conduct, criminal
conspiracy, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor where "the offenses
charged were of the same general nature involving allegations of a pattern of
sexual abuse involving the two minor victims"). As to Issue 2: State v. Brandt,
393 S.C. 526, 542, 713 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2011) (finding a motion for directed
verdict is properly denied when there is any direct evidence or substantial
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove the defendant's guilt); State
v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 97, 544 S.E.2d 30, 36 (2001) ("In reviewing a motion for
directed verdict, the trial judge is concerned with the existence of the evidence, not
with its weight."); State v. Carlson, 363 S.C. 586, 595, 611 S.E.2d 283, 287 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("A party cannot complain of an error which his own conduct has
induced."); State v. Logan, 279 S.C. 345, 348, 306 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1983)
("Appellant can neither take advantage of an error he contributed to at trial nor
preserve a vice and, upon learning of the outcome of trial, raise it on appeal.");
State v. Chasteen, 242 S.C. 198, 201, 130 S.E.2d 473, 475 (1963) ("Even if there
were error, it was clearly invited by counsel for appellant, leaving appellant in no
position to complain.").
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.