State v. Moore ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
James Moore, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2011-186046
Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-291
Heard June 5, 2013 – Filed June 26, 2013
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor W. Walter Wilkins, III, of
Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this criminal appeal, James Moore contends the trial court
erred in failing to charge the jury with his requested reasonable doubt definition.
He maintains the trial court's jury charge diluted the jury's burden and resulted in a
violation of his right to due process. Moore specifically objects to the trial court's
following statements: "There are few things in this world that we know with
absolute certainty. And in criminal cases our law does not require proof that
overcomes every possible doubt." We affirm.
First, we note a trial court is not prohibited from, nor required to, define reasonable
doubt. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). Our supreme court has
reinforced this position, finding a defendant's argument that a trial court erred by
refusing to define reasonable doubt altogether over the defendant's requested
charge from State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991), was
manifestly without merit. State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 126, 470 S.E.2d 366, 373
(1996); see also Manning, 305 S.C. at 417, 409 S.E.2d at 375 (suggesting the trial
court give no further definition for reasonable doubt than "[a] reasonable doubt is
the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act"),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Aleksey, 393 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248(2000).
When a trial court chooses to define reasonable doubt, our supreme court has
explicitly identified two appropriate definitions and stated trial courts should rarely
find it necessary to deviate from those approved charges. State v. Needs, 333 S.C.
134, 155-56, 508 S.E.2d 857, 868 (1998), modified on other grounds by State v.
Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 606 S.E.2d 475 (2004). The first option for a reasonable
doubt charge provides: "'A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause
a reasonable person to hesitate to act.'" Id. at 155 n.12, 508 S.E.2d at 868 n.12
(quoting Manning, 305 S.C. at 417, 409 S.E.2d at 375). The trial court also may
use the following charge or combine it with the Manning charge:
The State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have
served as jurors in civil cases where you were told that
[it] is only necessary to prove the fact is more likely true
than not, such as by the greater weight or preponderance
of the evidence. In criminal cases, the State's proof must
be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Ladies and gentlemen, proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the
Defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this
world that we know with absolute certainty. And in
criminal cases, the law does not require proof that
overcomes every possible doubt. The law doesn't
require that.
If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are
firmly convinced that the Defendant is guilty of the crime
charged, you must find him guilty. You must find him
guilty. If on the other hand you think there is a real
possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the
benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Darby, 324 S.C. 114, 115-16, 477 S.E.2d
710, 710-11 (1996) (endorsing the definition of reasonable doubt developed by the
Federal Judicial Center and cited with approval in Justice Ginsberg's concurring
opinion in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994))). "Neither charge is mandatory."
Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 315 S.C. 485, 487, 445 S.E.2d 637, 637-38 (1994));
State v. Longworth, 313 S.C. 360, 372, 438 S.E.2d 219, 225 (1993)). Again, "it is
within a trial [court]'s discretion to refuse to define reasonable doubt at all." Id.(citing Adams, 322 S.C. at 126, 470 S.E.2d at 373).
Here, the trial court charged one of the appropriate reasonable doubt definitions
provided by our supreme court, and, thus, we find there was no error.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and GEATHERS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.