Crowe v. Miller ( 2013 )


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  • THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
    CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
    EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
    THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Cynthia Crowe, Respondent,
    v.
    Michael Earl Miller, I, and Michael Earl Miller, II,
    Defendants,
    Of whom Michael Earl Miller, II, is the Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2012-212029
    Appeal From York County
    S. Jackson Kimball, III, Special Circuit Court Judge
    Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-239
    Heard May 7, 2013 – Filed June 5, 2013
    AFFIRMED
    Jonathan McKey Milling, of Milling Law Firm, LLC, of
    Columbia, for Appellant.
    Chad Alan McGowan and Ashley White Creech, both of
    McGowan, Hood & Felder, LLC, of Rock Hill, for
    Respondent.
    PER CURIAM: In this personal injury action arising from a boating accident,
    Michael Earl Miller, II, appeals the dismissal of his counterclaim against Cynthia
    Crowe. The trial court found that because Miller previously entered an Alford1
    plea to criminal charges arising from the same events that led to Crowe's civil
    action, he was collaterally estopped from asserting in his counterclaim that Crowe
    was driving the boat.2
    We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and following authorities: Rule
    220(c), SCACR ("The appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or
    judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal."); Rule 12(c),
    SCRCP ("If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
    pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be
    treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . .
    ."); State v. Herndon, Op. No. 27250 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed May 8, 2013) (Shearouse
    Adv. Sh. No. 21 at 52, 63) (recognizing "the general consensus that an Alford plea
    is merely a guilty plea with the gloss of judicial grace allowing a defendant to enter
    a plea in her best interests"); Zurcher v. Bilton, 
    379 S.C. 132
    , 137, 
    666 S.E.2d 224
    ,
    227 (2008) (holding "the entry of an Alford plea at a criminal proceeding has the
    same preclusive effect as a standard guilty plea"); Postal v. Mann, 
    308 S.C. 385
    ,
    387, 
    418 S.E.2d 322
    , 323 (Ct. App. 1992) ("It is well settled that parties are
    judicially bound by their pleadings unless withdrawn, altered or stricken by
    amendment or otherwise."). Furthermore, although Miller expressed concern
    about the propriety of considering matters outside the pleadings in deciding
    Crowe's motion to dismiss, he declined the trial court's offer to have the motion
    scheduled as one for summary judgment at a later date. Cf. Karl Sitte Plumbing
    Co. v. Darby Dev. Co. of Columbia, 
    295 S.C. 70
    , 73, 
    367 S.E.2d 162
    , 164 (Ct.
    App. 1988) (holding that despite alleged irregularities in an order of reference, a
    party's participation in the reference proceedings without taking exception to either
    1
    North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
     (1970).
    2
    Miller pled guilty under Alford to operating a water vehicle while under the
    influence of alcohol and causing severe bodily injury. See 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 50
    -
    21-113(A) (2008) ("A person who, while under the influence of alcohol . . .
    operates a moving water device, or is in actual control of a moving water device
    within this State and causes great bodily injury . . . of a person other than himself,
    is guilty of a felony . . . .").
    the reference or the master's authority waived any objection the party might have
    had to the action being referred).
    AFFIRMED.
    SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-UP-239

Filed Date: 6/5/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2024