Montgomery v. Richland County ( 2021 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(D)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Keith L. Montgomery, Respondent,
v.
Richland County, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2018-000894
Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 2021-UP-043
Submitted December 2, 2020 – Filed February 10, 2021
AFFIRMED
Robert David Garfield, of Crowe LaFave, LLC, and
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann & Davis, P.A.,
both of Columbia, for Appellant.
Mary P. Miles, of Law Office of Mary P. Miles, of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Richland County appeals from a jury verdict for Keith
Montgomery in a gross negligence action resulting from Montgomery being
injured while he was a prisoner housed at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center
(Detention Center) located in Columbia, South Carolina. Richland County argues
the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and denying it the opportunity to offer
evidence that Montgomery lied about the charges for which he had been detained
at the Detention Center. We affirm.1
1. Richland County argues the trial court erred in denying its directed verdict
and JNOV motions because the record contains no evidence to support a finding of
gross negligence based upon the conduct of the truck driver. Viewing the evidence
and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Montgomery, we find
Montgomery presented evidence that the truck driver was grossly negligent in his
actions by failing to exercise slight care. See RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams
L.L.P., 399 S.C. 322, 331-32, 732 S.E.2d 166, 171 (2012) ("When reviewing the
trial court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or a JNOV, this [c]ourt must
apply the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."); id. at
332, 732 S.E.2d at 171 ("The trial court must deny a motion for a directed verdict
or JNOV if the evidence yields more than one reasonable inference or its inference
is in doubt."); id. (holding this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only if no
evidence supports the ruling below); id. ("In deciding such motions, neither the
trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to
resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence."). Montgomery testified the
truck driver was on his walkie-talkie and not paying attention. He also testified the
truck driver was supposed to blow the horn when he got in the truck to let them
know he was pulling off. Because there was evidence that could support the jury's
finding of gross negligence against Richland County, the motions for directed
verdict and JNOV were properly denied. See Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist.
One, 341 S.C. 307, 310, 534 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000) ("Gross negligence is the
intentional conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do
or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do."); id. ("It is the failure
to exercise slight care."); Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 331 S.C. 192, 205, 500
S.E.2d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Where a person is so indifferent to the
consequences of his conduct as not to give slight care to what he is doing, he is
guilty of gross negligence."); Jackson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 301 S.C. 125, 127,
390 S.E.2d 467, 468 (Ct. App. 1989) ("If there is any evidence which could
support the jury's finding of gross negligence against the Department, then the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been denied."). In
deciding such motions, this court does not have the authority to decide credibility
issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence. See RFT Mgmt. Co.,
1
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR.
399 S.C. at 332, 732 S.E.2d at 171 ("In deciding such motions, neither the trial
court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to
resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence."). Therefore, we find the trial
court properly submitted this claim to the jury based upon the evidence presented,
and Richland County was not entitled to a directed verdict or JNOV on the gross
negligence claim.
2. Richland County argues the trial court erred in denying it the opportunity to
offer evidence that Montgomery lied about the charges for which he had been
detained at the Detention Center. The trial court has wide discretion in
determining the relevancy of evidence, and this court will not reverse its decision
to admit or reject evidence absent an abuse of that discretion. See Moore v. Moore,
360 S.C. 241, 257, 599 S.E.2d 467, 475 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he admission of
evidence is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."); id.("[T]his court will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings absent a clear abuse
of discretion."); id. at 257-58, 599 S.E.2d at 476 ("The trial [court] has wide
discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence, and [its] decision to admit or
reject evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.");
Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005)
("An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a
factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support."). Richland County was
allowed to question Montgomery about his previous eight bookings at the
Detention Center. Thus, Richland County was able to show Montgomery's bias or
prejudice against the Detention Center and his motive to misrepresent the facts of
his claim, which was its initial reasoning for questioning Montgomery about his
other bookings at the Detention Center. Therefore, we find the trial court did not
commit an error of law or abuse its discretion by excluding the re-cross
examination testimony on the actual charges for which Montgomery had been
detained.
AFFIRMED.2
THOMAS, HILL, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.