Harrison v. SC Wind and Hail Underwriting Association ( 2021 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD
NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
James Smith Harrison, Jr., Employee, Appellant,
v.
SC Wind and Hail Underwriting Association, Employer,
and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Carrier,
Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2017-001518
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
Opinion No. 2021-UP-117
Heard September 14, 2020 – Filed April 14, 2021
REVERSED
William L. Smith, II, of Chappell, Smith & Arden of
Columbia, for Appellant.
W. Strat Stavrou, Jr., and J. Gabriel Coggiola, both of
Willson, Jones, Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Columbia, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation case, James Smith Harrison, Jr.
(Claimant) seeks review of the order of the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina
Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) denying his request for
modification of his vacation/retirement home (second home). We reverse the order
of the Commission.
Claimant suffered severe compensable injuries during a fall from a stepladder onto
a concrete floor on February 27, 2012. Claimant must use a four-prong cane to
walk. His physician prescribed work restrictions, and "stair lifts for homes"
because Claimant is unable to climb stairs. His physician also prescribed
modifications to all bathrooms for handicapped accessibility. Claimant's primary
residence in Columbia was modified by Respondents. Claimant's second home is a
beach house in Litchfield Beach. Before the accident, Claimant intended to retire
in a few years and spend eight or nine months a year at the second home. Claimant
testified that because of his injuries, his use of the second home has been "very
limited" because the first floor is only accessible by stairs. Claimant testified that
if he had not suffered the on-the-job injury, he would not need the second home
modified.
The issue before the Commission was a medical benefit award sought by Claimant
to modify the second home under South Carolina Code Section § 42-15-60 (2015),
which was denied. The Commission found:
3. In the present case, Claimant currently resides in his
permanent primary home, which he has owned for
several years. 4. At the time of the hearing,
[Respondent] had already agreed to the recommended
uplift and modifications of his primary residence as
requested by the Claimant. 5. Claimant testified he
plans to retire in a few years and move to his retirement
home, which will need to be uplifted and modified to
accommodate his restrictions. 6. Modifications to
Claimant's retirement home would be unfair and unduly
burdensome on [Respondent] when Claimant currently
has a permanent primary residence in which he resides.
7. Claimant's request for modifications to his vacation
home is speculative. 8. At such time as Claimant
converts the vacation home into his primary residence,
nothing in this [o]rder precludes Claimant from seeking
benefits to [upfit] the residence at that time.
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides a reviewing court “may
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5)(e)
(Supp. 2020); see also Gadson v. Mikasa Corp., 368 S.C. 214, 221, 628 S.E.2d
262, 266 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Pursuant to the APA, this [c]ourt's review is limited to
deciding whether the appellate panel's decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence or is controlled by some error of law."). "[Q]uestions of law are reviewed
de novo." S. C. Dep't of Revenue v. Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc., 397 S.C. 256,
260, 725 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2012).
The Commission found modifications to Claimant's second home are not a
reasonable and necessary medical cost under Section 42-15-60(A), which requires
an employer of an injured employee to "provide medical, surgical, hospital, and
other treatment . . . as reasonably may be required". The Commission noted
Thompson v. S. C. Steel Erectors, 369 S.C. 606, 632 S.E.2d 874 (Ct. App. 2006)
was not applicable to the present case.
Claimant states he owns two homes that he fully utilized before the accident, and
as a direct result of the accident he can no longer use the second home. He claims
the Commission's order means he must sell or maintain a home that he cannot
safely use. Claimant argues the Commission erred as a matter of law in finding
Thompson does not apply here. We agree.
In Thompson, the insurance carrier had previously paid $35,000 to modify
Thompson's rental home. Id. at 610, 632 S.E.2d at 877. Thompson was planning
to buy a new home and had saved $8,000 towards the purchase. Id. at 620, 632
S.E.2d at 882. The Court found the Commission erred in denying Thompson's
request for a separate award to modify his new home. Id. Thus, the Court
approved the modification of two homes, the second one having not been
purchased yet. The Thompson court stated "the modifications are necessitated
solely by Thompson's admittedly compensable injury. The bottom line is that
Thompson cannot live in the proposed home without the modifications to
accommodate his paraplegia. . . . Because . . . the new home . . . would [not]
benefit Thompson without these additional modifications, we hold the Commission
erred." Id. at 619, 632 S.E.2d at 882.
In the case before us, affirming the Commission's decision would force Claimant to
choose between keeping his primary residence or realizing his dream of retiring to
his second home. Claimant would not be able to fully utilize both homes as he did
before the accident. Here, as in Thompson, the proposed modifications are
necessitated solely by Claimant's compensable injury, and the second home cannot
benefit Claimant without the modifications. Further, in Thompson, the second set
of modifications were awarded to a home that had not yet been purchased. Here,
Claimant owned the second home at the time of the injury, and his retirement is not
speculative.
"Because South Carolina adopted large portions of the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation legislation, we rely on North Carolina precedent in Workers'
Compensation cases." Stephen v. Avins Const. Co. 324 S.C. 334, 340, 478 S.E.2d
74, 77 (Ct. App. 1996). Our finding in this case is also supported by Timmons v.
N. C. Dep't of Transp., 473 S.E.2d 356 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). The employer in
Timmons had previously modified the claimant's home and the claimant moved to
a new home. Id. at 357. The court found the claimant was entitled to have the
employer pay for the additions to the new home to accommodate the claimant's
disabilities, and such additions were contemplated as "other treatment" under the
Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 359.
We find that under the specific facts of this case, modifications to Claimant's
second home are contemplated by the Workers' Compensation Act as reasonable
and necessary medical costs. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. S. C. Second Injury
Fund, 363 S.C. 612, 622, 611 S.E.2d 297, 302 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting a statute as
a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with
the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers).
REVERSED.
HUFF, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.