Crabtree v. Crabtree ( 2021 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Christine Crabtree, Respondent,
v.
Donald Clinton Crabtree, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2018-001571
Appeal From Sumter County
Thomas M. Bultman, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-111
Submitted March 1, 2021 – Filed April 7, 2021
DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART
Donald Clinton Crabtree, of Lynden, Washington, pro se.
Marian Dawn Nettles, of Nettles Turbeville & Reddeck,
of Lake City, and Michael W. Self, of McDougall, Self,
Currence & McLeod, LLP, of Sumter, both for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Donald Crabtree (Husband) appeals the family court's civil
contempt order, which found Husband to be in willful, civil contempt for his failure
to pay Christina Crabtree (Wife) alimony and child support as ordered in the family
court's amended final divorce decree. On appeal, Husband raises twenty-four issues;
twenty-three of these issues are attempts to appeal rulings from the final amended
divorce decree. Husband's twenty-fourth issue is the only appeal arising from the
civil contempt order. In this issue, Husband asserts the family court erred by holding
him in civil contempt because he did not willfully violate the amended final divorce
decree by failing to pay Wife alimony and child support. We dismiss in part and
affirm in part.
1. As to the twenty-three issues Husband raises from the final amended divorce
decree, we find these issues are not within our appellate jurisdiction because (1)
Husband's notice of appeal states he is appealing Judge Bultman's July 25, 2018 civil
contempt order, not Judge Pincus' January 22, 2018 amended final divorce decree;
(2) Husband only attached the civil contempt order to his notice of appeal, not the
amended final divorce decree; and (3) even if Husband was attempting to appeal
from the amended final divorce decree, such an appeal would not be timely because
more than thirty days, at least six months, passed between Husband's receipt of the
January 22, 2018 amended final divorce decree and Husband's service of the notice
of appeal in this case on August 23, 2018. See Rule 203(b)(3), SCACR ("A notice
of appeal in a domestic relations action shall be served in the same manner provided
by Rule 203(b)(1)."); Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR ("A notice of appeal shall be served
on all respondents within thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of entry of
the order or judgment."); Rule 203(d)(1)(B), SCACR ("The notice of appeal shall be
filed with the clerk of the lower court and the clerk of the appellate court within ten
(10) days after the notice of appeal is served. The notice filed with the appellate
court shall be accompanied by the following . . . [a] copy of the order(s) and
judgment(s) to be challenged on appeal if they have been reduced to writing . . . .");
Rule 203(e)(1), SCACR ("In appeals from lower courts, the notice of appeal shall
contain the following information: (A) The name of the court, judge, and county
from which the appeal is taken. (B) The docket number of the case in the lower
court. (C) The date of the order, judgment, or sentence from which the appeal is
taken . . . ."); Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 14–15, 602 S.E.2d 772, 775
(2004) ("The requirement of service of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional, i.e., if a
party misses the deadline, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal
. . . ."). Furthermore, we note Husband has already appealed the amended final
divorce decree, this court has issued an opinion in that prior appeal regarding
Husband's twenty-three issues arising from that order, and a petition for a writ of
certiorari is pending before the supreme court as to these issues. See Crabtree v.
Crabtree, Op. No. 2020-UP-310 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 18, 2020). Therefore, we
decline to consider these issues as they (1) are not within our appellate jurisdiction
and (2) have already been considered by this court. Accordingly, we dismiss
Husband's appeal as to these issues. See State v. Devore, 416 S.C. 115, 123–24, 784
S.E.2d 690, 694–95 (Ct. App. 2016) (dismissing appellant's appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction because a proper and timely notice of appeal was not filed).
2. As to whether the family court erred in holding Husband in civil contempt for
willfully violating the amended final divorce decree by failing to pay Wife child
support and alimony, we affirm. Initially, we find Husband abandoned this issue on
appeal because he failed to cite to any supporting authority for his arguments as to
this issue. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514
(1994) (considering an issue abandoned because the appellant failed to provide
pertinent argument or supporting authority).
Nonetheless, on the merits, we find Husband willfully violated the amended final
divorce decree, which ordered him to pay Wife $1,600 in alimony and $1,404 in
child support per month. Wife established a prima facie case of civil contempt and
Husband did not meet his burden to establish a defense or inability to comply with
the amended final divorce decree. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Johnson, 386 S.C.
426, 435, 688 S.E.2d 588, 592 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Once a moving party makes out a
prima facie case of contempt by pleading the order and showing its noncompliance,
the burden shifts to the respondent to establish his defense and inability to comply.");
Daily v. Daily, Op. No. 5801 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 10, 2021) (Shearouse Adv.
Sh. No. 5 at 29, 41) ("The burden of proof for civil contempt is clear and convincing
evidence."). Wife established a prima facie case of contempt by having the family
court take judicial notice of the amended final divorce decree, which ordered
Husband to timely pay Wife child support and alimony, and providing the family
court with Sumter County Clerk of Court records showing Husband owed her
$296.80 in child support and $7,255.75 in alimony at the time of the hearing on the
rule to show cause.1
As noted by the family court in its civil contempt order, Husband did not establish
his inability to comply with the clear order requiring him to pay alimony and child
support in the amended final divorce decree. The evidence showed Husband
continued to try to start his own software business for three years instead of
searching for a job commensurate with his extensive education and work experience,
resulting in Husband having little to no income. During this extended period of
unemployment, Husband made only sporadic payments of child support and
alimony. He testified if Wife had not filed a petition to show cause, he would not
1
At the time Wife filed her petition to show cause, Husband owed her $2,148.40 in
child support and $3,895.75 in alimony.
have made any payments until the parties' house in Washington State sold. Thus,
evidence supports the finding that Husband has been voluntarily unemployed for
three years, and based on his own testimony, he has not made good faith efforts to
pay the court ordered support obligations to Wife during this period of voluntary
unemployment. As such, we find his failure to pay Wife child support and alimony
willful. See Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 351, 306 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1983)
("Contempt occurs when a parent ordered to pay child support voluntarily fails to
pay. When the parent is unable to make the required payments, he is not in
contempt."); Smith-Cooper v. Cooper, 344 S.C. 289, 301, 543 S.E.2d 271, 277 (Ct.
App. 2001) (finding a husband's failure to comply with court ordered support
obligations was not willful because (1) the husband was unable to pay as ordered
due to involuntary periods of unemployment, (2) he continued to pay the obligations
to the extent he was able during these periods of involuntary unemployment, and (3)
he had a job at the time of the contempt hearing and was willing to pay the amount
owed to his ex-wife in accordance to a court ordered schedule); see also Kelley v.
Kelley, 324 S.C. 481, 489, 477 S.E.2d 727, 731 (Ct. App. 1996) (providing in
imputed income cases, courts "closely examine the payor's good-faith and
reasonable explanation for the decreased income," and "[e]fforts to frustrate support
obligations are not tolerated, nor are prolonged periods of unemployment generally
countenanced" (emphasis added); id. ("[C]ourts are reluctant to invade a party's
freedom to pursue the employment path of their own choosing or impose
unreasonable demands upon parties. Nonetheless, even otherwise unreviewable
career choices are at times outweighed by countervailing considerations,
particularly child support obligations. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added)).
Finally, we note Husband argues the family court's June 26, 2018 consent order2
permitted him to sell the parties' Washington house and Wife to reach into her Roth
IRA to support herself and the parties' four minor children until Husband sold the
Washington house, at which time he would he would pay Wife the child support and
alimony he owed. However, there is no evidence the consent order obligated Wife
to use her own Roth IRA funds to cover Husband's support obligations for some
unknown amount of time until he sells the Washington house, nor is there any
evidence the consent order relieved Husband of his support and alimony obligations
as set forth in the amended final divorce decree. Accordingly, there is clear and
convincing evidence that Husband willfully violated the final amended divorce
2
Appellant did not include this order in the record on appeal.
decree by failing to pay Wife child support and alimony as ordered. We therefore
affirm the contempt ruling.
DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.3
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.