Morga v. SCDMV ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Ronald Morga, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles,
Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2012-212479
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
John D. McLeod, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-431
Heard November 15, 2013 – Filed November 27, 2013
AFFIRMED
Christopher David Lizzi, of Lizzi Law Firm, PC, of
North Charleston, for Appellant.
Frank L. Valenta, Jr., Linda Annette Grice, and Philip S.
Porter, all of Blythewood, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Ronald Morga appeals the order of the Administrative Law
Court (ALC) affirming the final order of the South Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles (the Department), which sustained the suspension of his driver's license.
We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether Morga's arrest records should have been expunged: S.C.
Code Ann. § 17-1-40(A) (Supp. 2012) ("A person who after being charged with a
criminal offense and the charge is discharged . . . [or] proceedings against the
person are dismissed . . . the arrest and booking record, files, mug shots, and
fingerprints of the person must be destroyed and no evidence of the record
pertaining to the charge may be retained by any municipal, county, or state law
enforcement agency."); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-1-40(C) (Supp. 2012) (providing
subsection A "does not apply to a person who is charged with a violation of Title
50, Title 56, an enactment pursuant to the authority of counties and municipalities
provided in Titles 4 and 5, or any other state criminal offense if the person is not
fingerprinted for the violation"); State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d
621, 622 (2011) ("Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and
conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not
needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." (quotation marks
omitted)).
2. As to whether the ALC erred in affirming the suspension of Morga's driver's
license: S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(A) (Supp. 2012) ("The Department of Motor
Vehicles must suspend the driver's license . . . of . . . a person who drives a motor
vehicle and . . . has an alcohol concentration of fifteen one-hundredths of one
percent or more."); Savannah Riverkeeper v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control,
400 S.C. 196, 205, 733 S.E.2d 903, 908 (2012) ("[A]s a general rule, 'agencies
charged with enforcing statutes . . . receive deference from the courts as to their
interpretation of those laws.'" (quoting State v. Sweat, 379 S.C. 367, 385, 665
S.E.2d 645, 655 (Ct. App. 2008))); Taylor v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 368
S.C. 33, 35-36, 627 S.E.2d 751, 752 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The findings of an
administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if
unsupported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of
evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is
evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds
to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify its
action." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.