Black v. State ( 2013 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Ronald Black, Petitioner,
v.
State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2009-143366
Appeal From Charleston County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-486
Heard November 5, 2013 – Filed December 23, 2013
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia,
for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney
General Ashleigh R. Wilson, and Assistant Attorney
General Daniel Francis Gourley, II, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Ronald Black appeals his convictions for assault and battery
with intent to kill, first-degree burglary, carjacking, and kidnapping, arguing the
circuit court violated his Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel in refusing to
allow him to substitute counsel on the first day of trial. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Graddick, 345 S.C. 383,
385, 548 S.E.2d 210, 211 (2001) ("A motion to relieve counsel is addressed to the
discretion of the [circuit court] and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion."); State v. Childers, 373 S.C. 367, 372, 645 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2007)
("The movant bears the burden to show satisfactory cause for removal."); United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (holding the Sixth Amendment
provides that all criminal defendants shall enjoy the right to have assistance of
counsel for their defense); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)
("[T]he essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective
advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will
inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers."); State v. Sanders, 341
S.C. 386, 389, 534 S.E.2d 696, 697 (2000) (recognizing that "the Sixth
Amendment does not confer an absolute right to be represented by one's preferred
attorney"); State v. Sims, 304 S.C. 409, 414, 405 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1991) ("In
evaluating whether the [circuit court] abused [its] discretion in denying [the
defendant's] motion for substitution of counsel, the [circuit court] may consider
several factors: timeliness of the motion, adequacy of the [circuit court's] inquiry
into the defendant's complaint, and whether the attorney-client conflict was so
great that it resulted in a total lack of communication, thereby preventing an
adequate defense."); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1988)
(finding that once the circuit court has appropriately determined that a substitution
of counsel is not warranted, the circuit court can insist that the defendant choose
between continuing representation with his existing counsel or appearing pro se);
see also Gibson v. State, 334 S.C. 515, 523, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1999) ("A
defendant who pleads guilty usually may not later raise independent claims of
constitutional violations."); Rivers v. Strickland, 264 S.C. 121, 124, 213 S.E.2d 97,
98 (1975) ("The general rule is that a plea of guilty, voluntarily and
understandingly made, constitutes a waiver of nonjurisdictional defects and
defenses, including claims of violation of constitutional rights prior to the plea.").
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.