State v. Jones ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Jamario Quinton Jones, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2012-210189
Appeal From Anderson County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-040
Submitted December 1, 2013 – Filed January 29, 2014
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, of
Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jennifer Ellis Roberts, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006)
("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with
the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight. A defendant is entitled
to a directed verdict when the [S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense
charged. When reviewing a denial of a directed verdict, this [c]ourt views the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate. If
there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably
tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [c]ourt must find the case was
properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Stuckey, 347 S.C. 484, 499 n.7, 556
S.E.2d 403, 411 n.7 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Because [appellate courts] consider only the
existence of evidence in reviewing the denial of a directed verdict, . . . witness
credibility is not a proper inquiry for our consideration."); State v. Moore, 374 S.C.
468, 476, 649 S.E.2d 84, 88 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Armed robbery occurs when a
person commits robbery while either armed with a deadly weapon or alleging to be
armed by the representation of a deadly weapon."); State v. Frazier, 386 S.C. 526,
532, 689 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2010) ("Armed robbery is defined as the felonious or
unlawful taking of money, goods, or other personal property of any value from the
person of another or in his presence by violence or by putting such person in
fear."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(A) (2003) (providing "[a] person is guilty of
burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with
intent to commit a crime in the dwelling" and the existence of an aggravating
circumstance, including the person is armed with a deadly weapon); S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-23-490(A) (2003) (providing a person is guilty of possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime if he "is in possession of a
firearm or visibly displays what appears to be a firearm or visibly displays a knife
during the commission of a violent crime and is convicted of committing or
attempting to commit a violent crime as defined in [s]ection 16-1-60 [of the South
Carolina Code (2003)]"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (2003) (defining armed
robbery and first-degree burglary as violent crimes).
AFFIRMED.1
SHORT, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.