Roopra v. Spartanburg Automotive ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Daljit Roopra, Respondent,
v.
Spartanburg Automotive, Inc., and Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company, Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2013-000312
Appeal From Spartanburg County
Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-018
Heard December 10, 2013 – Filed January 15, 2014
AFFIRMED
O. Shayne Williams, of Turner Padget Graham & Laney,
PA, of Greenville, and Carmelo Barone Sammataro, of
Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Columbia, for
Appellants.
Ben C. Harrison and Jeremy Andrew Dantin, both of
Harrison White Smith & Coggins, PC, of Spartanburg,
for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation action, Spartanburg Automotive,
Inc. and its carrier, Specialty Risk Services, Inc.1, appeal the Appellate Panel's
disability ratings for Daljit Roopra's left shoulder and neck, arguing those ratings
are excessive and fail to account for a prior disability award for a previous
shoulder injury. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
1. As to whether the Appellate Panel erred in finding a disability rating of 39%
to Roopra's shoulder and 4% to his neck because it gave little or no regard to his
physicians' impairment ratings: Wise v. Wise, 394 S.C. 591, 597, 716 S.E.2d 117,
120 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The Appellate Panel's decision must be affirmed if
supported by substantial evidence in the record."); Stone v. Traylor Bros., 360 S.C.
271, 274, 600 S.E.2d 551, 552 (Ct. App. 2004) (providing this court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the Appellate Panel as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact, but may reverse when the decision is affected by an
error of law); Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430,
432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984) ("[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding
from being supported by substantial evidence."); Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C.
448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000) (holding in workers' compensation cases, the
Appellate Panel is the ultimate finder of fact); Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360
S.C. 276, 290, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that when the evidence
conflicts on a factual issue, the findings of the Appellate Panel are conclusive);
Bass v. Kenco Grp., 366 S.C. 450, 458, 622 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The
final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is
reserved to the [A]ppellate [P]anel."); Potter v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. 7, 395 S.C.
17, 24, 716 S.E.2d 123, 127 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[I]t is not for this court to balance
objective against subjective findings of medical witnesses, or to weigh the
testimony of one witness against that of another. That function belongs to the
Appellate Panel alone." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fishburne v. ATI Sys.
Int'l, 384 S.C. 76, 86, 681 S.E.2d 595, 600 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The extent of an
injured workman's disability is a question of fact for determination by the
Appellate Panel and will not be reversed if it is supported by competent
evidence."); Sanders v. MeadWestvaco Corp., 371 S.C. 284, 291, 638 S.E.2d 66,
70 (Ct. App. 2006) ("While an impairment rating may not rest on surmise,
1
The caption identifies Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as the carrier as a
result of a scrivener's error by the circuit court.
speculation or conjecture . . . it is not necessary that the percentage of disability or
loss of use be shown with mathematical exactness." (alteration by court) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Tiller v. Nat'l Health Care Ctr. of Sumter, 334 S.C.
333, 340, 513 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1999) ("[W]hile medical testimony is entitled to
great respect, the fact finder may disregard it if there is other competent evidence
in the record."); id. ("[M]edical testimony should not be held conclusive
irrespective of other evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. ("Expert
medical testimony is designed to aid the [Appellate Panel] in coming to the correct
conclusion; therefore, the [Appellate Panel] determines the weight and credit to be
given to the expert testimony."); id. ("Once admitted, expert testimony is to be
considered just like any other testimony."); Sanders, 371 S.C. at 292, 638 S.E.2d at
70 ("[T]he Appellate Panel is not bound by the opinion of medical experts and may
find a degree of disability different from that suggested by expert testimony."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. As to whether Roopra was required to demonstrate a loss of earning capacity
because the shoulder was not a scheduled injury at the time he was injured:
Stone v. Roadway Express, 367 S.C. 575, 582, 627 S.E.2d 695, 698 (2006) ("Only
issues raised [to] and ruled upon by the commission are cognizable on appeal.");
Wigfall v. Tideland Utils., Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 103, 580 S.E.2d 100, 101 (2003)
(finding an issue unpreserved when it was raised for first time in front of the circuit
court, the circuit court did not rule on the issue, and no Rule 59, SCRCP, motion
was made on the issue); Clark v. Aiken Cnty. Gov't, 366 S.C. 102, 108, 620 S.E.2d
99, 102 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An issue not raised in the application for review is not
preserved for the [Appellate Panel's] consideration."); Creech v. Ducane Co., 320
S.C. 559, 564, 467 S.E.2d 114, 117 (Ct. App. 1995) (providing only issues within
an application for review of the single commissioner's decision are preserved for
the Appellate Panel).
3. As to whether the Appellate Panel abused its discretion in finding a 39%
disability rating to Roopra's shoulder because it failed to consider his prior 20%
rating: Palmetto Alliance, 282 S.C. at 432, 319 S.E.2d at 696 ("[T]he possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.");
Shealy, 341 S.C. at 455, 535 S.E.2d at 442 (holding in workers' compensation
cases, the Appellate Panel is the ultimate finder of fact); Hargrove, 360 S.C. at
290, 599 S.E.2d at 611 (noting that when the evidence conflicts on a factual issue,
the findings of the Appellate Panel are conclusive); Bass, 366 S.C. at 458, 622
S.E.2d at 581 ("The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be
accorded evidence is reserved to the [A]ppellate [P]anel."); Potter, 395 S.C. at 24,
716 S.E.2d at 127 ("[I]t is not for this court to balance objective against subjective
findings of medical witnesses, or to weigh the testimony of one witness against
that of another. That function belongs to the Appellate Panel alone." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.