State v. Dunn ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Edward M. Dunn, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2012-212242
Appeal From Richland County
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-249
Heard May 7, 2014 – Filed June 25, 2014
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Edward M. Dunn appeals his convictions for kidnapping, armed
robbery, and first-degree burglary. Dunn argues the trial court erred in refusing to
suppress all evidence flowing from the retention and use of his DNA profile. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v.
Moore, 377 S.C. 299, 308-09, 659 S.E.2d 256, 261 (Ct. App. 2008) ("[A]
warrantless search will withstand constitutional scrutiny where the search falls
within one of a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule." (quoting State v. Bultron, 318 S.C. 323,
331-32, 457 S.E.2d 616, 621 (Ct. App. 1995)); id. at 309, 659 S.E.2d at 261
("These exceptions include . . . consent." (citing State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454,
456–57, 462 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1995)); State v. Mattison, 352 S.C. 577, 584, 575
S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Whether a consent to search was voluntary or
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances." (citing State v. Wallace, 269
S.C. 547, 238 S.E.2d 675 (1977)); State v. Dorce, 320 S.C. 480, 482, 465 S.E.2d
772, 773 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The issue of voluntary consent, when contested by
contradicting testimony, is an issue of credibility to be determined by the trial
judge."); Mattison, 352 S.C. at 585, 575 S.E.2d at 856 ("A trial judge's conclusions
on issues of fact regarding voluntariness will not be disturbed on appeal unless so
manifestly erroneous as to be an abuse of discretion." (citing State v. Rochester,
301 S.C. 196, 391 S.E.2d 244 (1990)); id. (finding no abuse of discretion in the
trial court's ruling that appellant's consent was voluntarily given where appellant
consented to the police officer's request to search him without imposing any limits
on the scope of the search, no evidence indicated appellant was incompetent, and
the record revealed no threats or coercion); State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 648,
541 S.E.2d 837, 843 (2001) ("Under our state constitution, suspects are free to
limit the scope of the searches to which they consent."); Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (noting the scope of the consent is measured by a test of
"'objective' reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?"); State v.
McCord, 349 S.C. 477, 485, 562 S.E.2d 689, 693 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding no
improper search or seizure occurred as the appellant's expectation of privacy "was
extinguished when he voluntarily gave the blood sample to federal authorities
without any limitation on the scope of his consent"). 1
1
As to Dunn's arguments that (1) the contract for taking his DNA was voided and
illegal, (2) he never ratified the contract as an adult, and (3) the Richland County
Sheriff's Department's DNA database was illegal: State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438,
444, 710 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2011) (holding that for an objection to be preserved for
appellate review, the objection must be made "with sufficient specificity to inform
the circuit court judge of the point being urged by the objector" (citing Wilder
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998))); State v. Dunbar,
AFFIRMED.
HUFF, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.
356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (2003) ("Issues not raised and ruled
upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."); id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at
694 ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on
appeal."); State v. Carlson, 363 S.C. 586, 597, 611 S.E.2d 283, 288 (Ct. App.
2005) ("Arguments not raised to or ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved
for appellate review.").