State v. Anderson ( 2021 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
John Fitzgerald Anderson, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2018-001596
Appeal From Greenwood County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-340
Heard June 7, 2021 – Filed September 29, 2021
AFFIRMED
Mary Abigail Young Bechtol, of Mount Pleasant, and
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, both for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: John Fitzgerald Anderson appeals his convictions and sentences
for exploitation of a vulnerable adult, unlawful entry on another person's lands, and
receiving stolen goods. On appeal, Anderson argues the trial court (1) erred in
refusing to charge the jury on good character and (2) erred in allowing hearsay
testimony from Deputy Ronnie Powell. We affirm.
In spring of 2017, Dr. Robin Stone diagnosed Bertha Robinson, a childless widow,
with dementia. Following Robinson's diagnosis, her nephew, Anthony Gilmore,
traveled to South Carolina in May 2017 to further evaluate Robinson's condition,
set up power of attorney, and hire caretakers to look after Robinson. Upon arrival,
Gilmore discovered Robinson's bank accounts were inexplicably depleted and
believed a television, jewelry, and a Jaguar key were missing from her home. As a
result, he filed a report with the Greenwood County Sheriff's Office and named
Anderson, Robinson's neighbor, as a potential suspect. The sheriff's office
assigned Deputy Powell to investigate the report.
On June 28, 2017, Gilmore observed Anderson at Robinson's front door through
security cameras installed at Robinson's home; on multiple occasions, Deputy
Powell and Robinson's caretakers had informed Anderson he was not permitted on
Robinson's property or in her residence. When Robinson's caretakers arrived at her
home later that morning, they could not locate her and contacted Deputy Powell,
who initiated a search for Robinson. Shortly thereafter, Gilmore received an alert
that Robinson had withdrawn $300 from her bank account and relayed that
information to Deputy Powell. Eventually, deputies spotted Anderson's Hyundai
leaving a gas station in the vicinity of the bank, and a chase ensued. Anderson
crashed his vehicle, and authorities arrested him. Deputies located Robinson in the
front passenger seat and found a Hyundai first-aid kit in the vehicle. Inside the
first-aid kit, deputies discovered a Jaguar key, another set of keys, and some
jewelry. Deputies also found $249 in Anderson's pocket.
A grand jury indicted Anderson for exploitation of a vulnerable adult, unlawful
entry on another person's lands, and receiving stolen goods. At Anderson's trial,
the State submitted evidence showing (1) Robinson's doctor had diagnosed her
with dementia; (2) Anderson had attempted to enter Robinson's residence, despite
being told he was unwelcome and Gilmore posting no trespassing signs on the
property; and (3) Anderson had attempted to gain information regarding
Robinson's bank account, and his accompanying Robinson to her bank prompted
the bank to contact its financial crimes unit. The State also introduced into
evidence the items discovered in Anderson's vehicle's first-aid kit. The jury found
Anderson guilty on all charges, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years'
imprisonment—thirty days' imprisonment on the charge of unlawful entry on
another's lands after notice, five years' imprisonment on the charge of exploitation
of a vulnerable adult, and ten years' imprisonment on the charge of receiving stolen
goods, all to run concurrently.
1. The trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on good character
because Anderson did not present evidence of his good character during his trial.
At trial, Whitni Jones, Anderson's ex-girlfriend, testified on behalf of the State. At
the outset of questioning, the State asked Jones how she met Anderson. Jones
stated, "I met him a couple years ago at a friend's house and he was just there and I
mean I was talking to him and he seemed like a good person. I mean, and then a
couple of years later we just met back up on Facebook." Jones's testimony during
the State's case-in-chief prompted Anderson to request a jury charge on his good
character. The trial court declined to charge the jury on good character evidence.
The trial court did not err because Jones's testimony was not in the form of
reputation or opinion testimony, as required by Rule 405, SCRE. See State v. Hill,
315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993) ("The law to be charged to the jury
is determined by the evidence presented at trial."); State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604,
632, 545 S.E.2d 805, 819 (2001) ("If there is any evidence to support a charge, the
trial [court] should grant the request."); State v. Brown, 362 S.C. 258, 262, 607
S.E.2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 2004) ("To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give
a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant.");
Rule 404(a)(1), SCRE (allowing "[e]vidence of a pertinent character trait" to be
offered by the defendant); State v. Mizell, 332 S.C. 273, 277, 504 S.E.2d 338, 340
(Ct. App. 1998) ("Rule 404(a)(1) permits such evidence when a defendant
demonstrates he or she possesses a character trait that relates to the alleged
offense—a 'pertinent' trait of his or her character."); Rule 405(a), SCRE ("In all
cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is
admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion.").
2. The trial court did not err in allowing alleged hearsay testimony from Deputy
Powell because the testimony was not hearsay. Deputy Powell testified the origin
of the investigation stemmed from Gilmore's report that Robinson's property had
been stolen. Deputy Powell added that Gilmore's report identified Anderson as a
possible suspect for the missing property. Anderson objected to Deputy Powell's
testimony and asserted both statements were inadmissible hearsay. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in overruling the objections as neither statement was
hearsay because Deputy Powell was explaining his actions in initiating the
investigation and how Anderson came to be a suspect in the investigation. See
State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557, 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002) ("The admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion."); Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528,
539 (2000) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on
an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary
support."); State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1994)
(holding an officer's testimony about "receiving [civilian] complaints" that led to
the surveillance of the defendant's apartment was not hearsay); State v. Kirby, 325
S.C. 390, 396, 481 S.E.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1996) ("We find [the officer's]
testimony concerning the dispatcher's announcement was not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted, but rather, served only to explain the reason for the initiation
of police surveillance of the vehicle in question."); State v. Thompson, 352 S.C.
552, 559, 575 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he officers' testimony regarding
statements made by the bystander were not entered for their truth but rather to
explain and outline the officers' investigation and their reasons for going to the
[defendant's] home.").
AFFIRMED.
KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.