Berry v. BEI Sensors ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Berry, Quackenbush & Stuart, P.A., Appellant,
v.
BEI Sensors & Systems Company, Inc., d/b/a BEI
Duncan Electronics and The Commercial Collection
Corporation of New York, Inc., Defendants,
Of Whom The Commercial Collection Corporation of
New York, Inc. is the Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2013-000770
Appeal From Sumter County
W. Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-247
Heard May 6, 2014 – Filed June 25, 2014
AFFIRMED
Claude E. Hardin, Jr., of Hardin Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, and Leonard R. Jordan, Jr., of Berry
Quackenbush & Stuart, PA, of Columbia, both for
Appellant.
Robert Alan Bernstein, of Bernstein & Bernstein, PA, of
Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this civil appeal involving a debt collection, Berry,
Quackenbush & Stuart, P.A. (Law Firm) contends the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of The Commercial Collection Corporation of New
York, Inc. (Commercial). Specifically, Law Firm maintains that when viewing
evidence in the light most favorable to it, (1) there is evidence Commercial acted
outside the scope of its authority and can be liable for tortious interference with
contractual relations between BEI and Law Firm and (2) there are genuine issues
of material fact regarding whether Commercial engaged in practices constituting a
tortious interference with Law Firm's contract. We affirm.
1. We find the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Commercial because there was no evidence Commercial acted outside the scope of
its authority. Hard Hat Workforce Solutions, LLC v. Mech. HVAC Servs., Inc., 406
S.C. 294, 299-300, 750 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2013) ("In reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court under
Rule 56(c), SCRCP. Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.") (citations
omitted); Ellis v. Davidson, 358 S.C. 509, 518-19, 595 S.E.2d 817, 822 (Ct. App.
2004) ("Under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, the party seeking summary judgment has the
initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Once the party moving for summary judgment meets the initial burden of showing
an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent's case, the opponent cannot
simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings. Rather, the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial.") (citations omitted); Dutch Fork Dev. Grp. II, LLC v. SEL Props.,
LLC, 406 S.C. 596, 604, 753 S.E.2d 840, 844 (2012) ("'The elements of a cause of
action for tortious interference with contract are: (1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) the wrongdoer's knowledge thereof; (3) his intentional procurement of its
breach; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resulting damages.'" (quoting Camp
v. Springs Mortgage Corp., 310 S.C. 514, 517, 426 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1993))); id. at
605, 753 S.E.2d at 844 ("'It is generally recognized that when a contract is
breached by a corporation as the result of the inducement of an officer or agent of
the corporation acting on behalf of the corporation and within the scope of his
employment, the inducement is privileged and is not actionable.'" (quoting
Bradburn v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 273 S.C. 186, 188, 255 S.E.2d 453, 455
(1979))); id. ("Thus, '[t]he actions of a principal's agent are afforded a qualified
privilege from liability for tortious interference with the principal's contract.'"
(alteration by court) (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health
Servs., Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 385 (3d Cir. 2004))).
2. We need not determine Law Firm's remaining issues. Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(noting an appellate court need not address appellant's remaining issues when its
determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.
KONDUROS, LOCKEMY, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.