State v. Buck ( 2014 )

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Travis N. Buck, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2011-198189
Appeal From Oconee County
Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-230
Submitted April 1, 2014 – Filed June 18, 2014
AFFIRMED
Travis N. Buck, of Long Creek, pro se.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Christina Theos Adams, of
Anderson, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Travis N. Buck appeals the circuit court's order affirming his
conviction in magistrates court for unlawful use of a telephone. On appeal, he
argues the magistrates court erred in failing to (1) direct a verdict, (2) properly
charge the jury, and (3) recognize and apply pertinent law. We affirm.
1. We find the circuit court did not err in finding Buck was not entitled to a
directed verdict. "On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, an appellate
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State." State v.
Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 44, 626 S.E.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 2006). "If there is any
direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to
prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury." Id. at 45, 626 S.E.2d at 901. We find sufficient evidence
existed for the jury to find Buck's phone call was threatening or harassing. See
S.C. Code Ann § 16-17-430(A)(2), (3) (2003); State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 506, 508,
266 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1980) (construing the language of the unlawful
communications statute "as proscribing only calls initiated by one with the intent
and sole purpose of conveying an unsolicited obscene, imminently threatening
and/or harassing message to an unwilling recipient"). The victim testified Buck
had been harassing and attempting to intimidate him; Buck continued to call the
victim's office and leave messages; Buck had been driving up and down the road
blowing his horn and pointing his middle finger at the victim; and the situation was
escalating. The State played a recording of a message Buck left with the victim,
and Buck admitted to making the call. Additionally, Buck stated the victim
"reignited [his] spark of anger." Buck's assertion that his phone call was not
obscene is inapposite because the unlawful communications statute is not limited
to obscenity. To the extent Buck contends his speech was protected, the circuit
court did not rule on this issue, and it is not preserved. See State v. Dunbar, 356
S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved
for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit
court]."). There is no indication the magistrates court applied the wrong law when
determining whether to grant a directed verdict, and sufficient evidence existed for
the jury to find Buck's phone call was threatening or harassing.
2. We find Buck abandoned the issue of whether the circuit court erred in
finding the magistrates court properly charged the jury. "An issue raised on appeal
but not argued in the brief is deemed abandoned and will not be considered by the
appellate court." Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 20, 640 S.E.2d 486, 497 (Ct. App.
2006). Buck raised the jury charge issue in his statement of issues on appeal, but
the body of his brief does not indicate what the magistrates court charged or why
Buck believed the charge was erroneous. Although Buck cites to Brown and State
v. Buckner, 342 S.C. 241, 534 S.E.2d 15 (Ct. App. 2000), it is unclear from his
brief how they pertain to the magistrates court's charge. See State v. Tyndall, 336
S.C. 8, 16-17, 518 S.E.2d 278, 282-83 (Ct. App. 1999) (determining the appellant
abandoned an issue when he cited to several cases and averred the officers acted
contrary to the cases, but failed to refer to the cases again in his brief and failed to
"include in his argument any discussion of [the] decisions or their applicability to
his situation"). Accordingly, we find this argument is abandoned.
AFFIRMED.1
HUFF, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.